Individual notions of distributive justice and relative economic status

We present two experiments designed to investigate whether individuals’ notions of distributive justice are associated with their relative (within-society) economic status. Each participant played a specially designed four-person dictator game under one of two treatments, under one initial endowments were earned, under the other they were randomly assigned. The first experiment was conducted in Oxford, United Kingdom, the second in Cape Town, South Africa. In both locations we found that relatively well-off individuals make allocations to others that reflect those others’ initial endowments more when those endowments were earned rather than random; among relatively poor individuals this was not the case.

Lessons from the northern hake long-term management plan: Could the economic assessment have accepted it?

An economic expert working group (STECF/SGBRE-07-05) was convened in 2007 for evaluating the potential economic consequences of a Long-Term Management Plan for the northern hake. Analyzing all the scenarios proposed by biological assessment, they found that keeping the F in the status quo level was the best policy in terms of net present values for both yield and profits. This result is counter intuitive because it may indicate that effort costs do no affect the economic reference points. However, it is well accepted that the inclusion of costs affects negatively the economic reference points. In this paper, applying a dynamic agestructured model to the northern hake, we show that the optimal fishing mortality that maximizes the net present value of profits is lower than Fmax.

Fiscal Policy and Economic Stability: Does PIGS stand for Procyclicality In Government Spending?

The Financial Crisis has hit particularly hard countries like Ireland or Spain. Procyclical fiscal policy has contributed to a boom-bust cycle that undermined fiscal positions and deepened current account deficits during the boom. We set up an RBC model of a small open economy, following Mendoza (1991), and introduce the effect of fiscal policy decisions that change over the cycle. We calibrate the model on data for Ireland, and simulate the effect of different spending policies in response to supply shocks. Procyclical fiscal policy distorts intertemporal allocation decisions. Temporary spending boosts in booms spur investment, and hence the need for external finance, and so generates very volatile cycles in investment and the current account. This economic instability is also harmful for the steady state level of output. Our model is able to replicate the relation between the degree of cyclicality of fiscal policy, and the volatility of consumption, investment and the current account observed in OECD countries.

The Impact of Regulation on Pricing Behavior in the Spanish Electricity Market

In this paper we measure the impact of regulatory measures which affected the Spanish electricity wholesale market in the period 2002-2005. Our approach is based on the fact that regulation changes firms' incentives and therefore their market behavior. In the absence of any regulation firms would choose profit- maximizing prices on their residual demands so that the observed gap between optimal and actual prices provides a measure of the effect of regulation. Our results indicate that regulation has decreased wholesale prices considerably, but became less effective at the end of the sample period which explains the change of regulatory regime introduced in 2006.

Mergers in Durable Goods Industries

Revised 2008-11.-- Published as an article in: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2008, 68, pp. 691-701.

Social Security, Education, Retirement and Growth

In this paper we analyze the effects of social security policies in an unfunded, earnings-related social security system on the incentives to education investment and voluntary retirement, on growth and on income inequality. Growth is endogenously driven by human capital investment, individuals differ in their innate (learning) ability at birth, and the pension scheme includes a minimum pension. More skilled individuals spend more on education, minimum pensions reduce low skill individuals' incentives to invest in human capital, there is no monotonic relationship between per capita growth and income inequality.

Roaming in the Mobile Internet: when coverage sharing agreements call for regulation

Revised: 2006-06

Dependência de trajetória nos incentivos fiscais: fragmentação do empresariado na reforma tributária

Desde a promulgação da Constituição de 1988, todos os governos têm buscado realizar a reforma tributária. Há aparente consenso de que essa reforma precisa ser feita. No entanto, os insucessos nas propostas submetidas ao Congresso Nacional têm sido recorrentes. Essa dissertação busca explicar esse aparente insucesso a partir da análise evolutiva histórica de cinco tipos de incentivo fiscal: 1) regional (Sudam, Sudene e Zona Franca de Manaus); 2) guerra fiscal do ICMS; 3) exportação; 4) tributação simplificada (em especial o Simples); e 5) desenvolvimento econômico. O argumento central da pesquisa é o de que a política tributária desenvolvimentista e extrativa, adotada historicamente pelo Estado brasileiro e pautada pela concessão de incentivos fiscais, envolve interesses difíceis de serem revertidos - com características de dependência de trajetória -, que têm condicionado o comportamento do ator fundamental para o desenlace da reforma tributária - o empresariado -, o qual tem atuado de forma fragmentada e na busca por rendas, em vez de atuar de forma concertada buscando o objetivo coletivo pressuposto em uma reforma tributária. A pesquisa evidenciou ter havido uma dinâmica e relevante evolução do sistema tributário no período recente, vinculada em grande medida ao conjunto de incentivos fiscais que foram objeto de análise, o que afasta a hipótese de eventual paralisia decisória e relativizam as hipóteses de pontos de veto e de impasse entre interesses federativos como variáveis explicativas para o insucesso da reforma tributária.

On the strategic equivalence of multiple-choice test scoring rules

A disadvantage of multiple-choice tests is that students have incentives to guess. To discourage guessing, it is common to use scoring rules that either penalize wrong answers or reward omissions. These scoring rules are considered equivalent in psychometrics, although experimental evidence has not always been consistent with this claim. We model students' decisions and show, first, that equivalence holds only under risk neutrality and, second, that the two rules can be modified so that they become equivalent even under risk aversion. This paper presents the results of a field experiment in which we analyze the decisions of subjects taking multiple-choice exams. The evidence suggests that differences between scoring rules are due to risk aversion as theory predicts. We also find that the number of omitted items depends on the scoring rule, knowledge, gender and other covariates.