Infrastructure development and economic growth in China

China is the fastest growing country in the world for last few decades and one of the defining features of China's growth has been investment-led growth. China's sustained high economic growth and increased competitiveness in manufacturing has been underpinned by a massive development of physical infrastructure. In this context, we investigate the role of infrastructure in promoting economic growth in China for the period 1975 to 2007. Overall, the results reveal that infrastructure stock, labour force, public and private investments have played an important role in economic growth in China. More importantly, we find that Infrastructure development in China has significant positive contribution to growth than both private and public investment. Further, there is unidirectional causality from infrastructure development to output growth justifying China's high spending on infrastructure development since the early nineties. The experience from China suggests that it is necessary to design an economic policy that improves the physical infrastructure as well as human capital formation for sustainable economic growth in developing countries.

A model of economic growth with saturating demand

This study presents a model of economic growth based on saturating demand, where the demand for a good has a certain maximum amount. In this model, the economy grows not only by the improvement in production efficiency in each sector, but also by the migration of production factors (labor in this model) from demand-saturated sectors to the non-saturated sector. It is assumed that the production of a brand-new good will begin after all the existing goods are demand-saturated. Hence, there are cycles where the production of a new good emerges followed by the demand saturation of that good. The model then predicts that should the growth rate be stable and positive in the long run, the above-mentioned cycle must become shorter over time. If the length of cycles is constant over time, the growth rate eventually approaches zero because the number of goods produced grows.

Poder da marca: interações entre direito antitruste e direito industrial

O presente trabalho busca analisar os diferentes tratamentos dispensados à marca no âmbito do controle preventivo e no controle repressivo de condutas. A análise da função social das marcas demonstrou que esta é uma propriedade que se realiza na concorrência e pela concorrência. Nesse sentido, não há dúvidas de que está sujeita aos princípios do Direito Concorrencial. Todavia, a maneira como esses princípios balizam a marca no controle de atos de concentração, de um lado, e no controle repressivo de condutas, de outro, difere. No âmbito do controle de atos de concentração, a atuação da autoridade concorrencial é orientada por uma variante do princípio da precaução, o que a autoriza a tomar decisões e impor restrições aos direitos marcários mesmo em um contexto de incerteza. No âmbito do controle repressivo de condutas, todavia, a intervenção do CADE está sujeita aos princípios do Processo Administrativo Sancionador. Neste contexto, as condutas que envolvem o uso de direitos de propriedade intelectual, incluindo as marcas, devem ser analisadas à luz do princípio da estrita legalidade. Um critério jurídico objetivo é necessário para distinguir o lícito do ilícito, sobretudo em um cenário no qual estão em jogo duas políticas públicas distintas: a de proteção à concorrência e a de proteção à direitos de propriedade industrial. Sendo essas duas políticas instrumentais e parciais, voltadas a um fim maior de política econômica, devem harmonizar-se, e não sobrepor-se uma a outra. Ademais, o escopo de atuação da autoridade concorrencial em processos que investiguem o uso abusivo de direitos marcários e atos de concorrência desleal deve ser esclarecido. O direito concorrencial, enquanto ramo autônomo do direito, com princípios e métodos interpretativos próprios, pode analisar institutos e figuras de outros ramos que com ele guardem relação sem ter de ficar adstrito ao posicionamento de outras instâncias.

Patenting Strategies of the EU Pharmaceutical Industry -Crossroad between Patent Law and Competition Policy. Research Papers in Law, 1/2011

From the Introduction. The pharmaceutical sector inquiry carried out by the European Commission in 2008 provides a useful framework for assessing the relationship between the patent system on the one hand and competition policy and law on the other hand. The pharmaceutical market is not only specifically regulated. It is also influenced by the special characteristics of the patent system which enables pharmaceutical companies engaged in research activities to enter into additional arrangements to cope with the competitive pressures of early patent application and the delays in drug approval. Patents appear difficult to reconcile with the need for sufficient and adequate access to medicines, which is why competition expectations imposed on the pharmaceutical sector are very high. The patent system and competition law are interacting components of the market, into which they must both be integrated. This can result in competition law taking a very strict view on the pharmaceutical industry by establishing strict functional performance standards for the reliance on intellectual property rights protection granted by patent law. This is in particular because in this sector the potential welfare losses are not likely to be of only monetary nature. In brief, the more inefficiencies the patent system produces, the greater the risk of an expansive application of competition law in this field. The aim of the present study is to offer a critical and objective view on the use or abuse of patents and defensive strategies in the pharmaceutical industry. It shall also seek to establish whether patents as presently regulated offer an appropriate degree of protection of intellectual property held by the economic operators in the pharmaceutical sector and whether there is a need or, for that matter, scope for improvement. A useful starting point for the present study is provided by the pharmaceutical sector competition inquiry (hereafter “the sector inquiry”) carried out by the European Commission during the first half of 2008. On 8 July 2008, the Commission adopted its Final Report pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation 1/2003 EC, revealing a series of “antitrust shortcomings” that would require further investigation1.