Siboga expeditie.

Mono.32a (Isopoden: Isopoda Chelifera); Livr.72

Siboga expeditie.

Mono.53b (Lamellibranches: systematique pectinides); Livr.63

Verhandelingen der Natuurkundige Vereeniging in Nederlandsch Indië.

d.7 (1860)

Verhandelingen der Natuurkundige Vereeniging in Nederlandsch Indië.

d.5 (1858-1859)

Verhandelingen der Natuurkundige Vereeniging in Nederlandsch Indië.

d.8 (1860)

Nederlandsch kruidkundig archief.

suppl.

Handbuch der zoologie : Nach der zweiten holländischen ausgabe.

2

Handbuch der zoologie : Nach der zweiten holländischen ausgabe.

1

Contribuição ao conhecimento do gênero Zelurus Hahn (Spiniger auct. ) (Reduviidae, Hemiptera)

In the present paper the authors describe the male and female genitalia of various species of Zelurus (=Spiniger). There were not always obtained reliable specific characters, specially in nearly related species. Futhermore there were studied 59 species and subspecies, from Dutch Guiana, Brazil, Peru, Bolivia and Argentine. New locality records and synonymic notes are given and some allotypes are designated. Eight species and two subspecies, from Brazil and Argentine, proved to new to science.

Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions

This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when each firm sets a price-quantity pair specifying the firm's minimum acceptable price and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell at this price, there exists a range of discount factors for which the monopoly outcome with equal sharing is sustainable in the uniform price auction, but not in the corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this out-come. We extend these results to the case where firms may set bids that are arbitrary step functions of price-quantity pairs with any finite number of price steps. Surprisingly, under the Maximum Accepted Price rule, firms need employ no more than two price steps to minimize the value of the discount factor

Elicited bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions

We report on a series of experiments that examine bidding behavior in first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric and asymmetric bidders. To study the extent of strategic behavior, we use an experimental design that elicits bidders' complete bid functions in each round (auction) of the experiment. In the aggregate, behavior is consistent with the basic equilibrium predictions for risk neutral or homogenous risk averse bidders (extent of bid shading, average seller's revenues and deviations from equilibrium). However, when we look at the extent of best reply behavior and the shape of bid functions, we find that individual behavior is not in line with the received equilibrium models, although it exhibits strategic sophistication.