663 resultados para Burra charter
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One folio-sized leaf containing a handwritten copy of a transcribed extract from the Charter of 1650 regarding property tax exemption, and followed with accounting figures related to rents and valuations of College properties. The verso has a handwritten paragraph on the unconstitutionality of the taxation practices towards the College.
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One folio-sized leaf containing a one-and-a-half-page handwritten draft of a memorial to the Overseers in Nicholas Sever's hand requesting the resident Fellows receive membership in the Corporation. The text of the memorial begins, "Shewith That by ye Charter of 1650, whc: ye College is now upon ye Next & Immediate Governm't : of ye Society is limited to ye Corporation."
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This volume was begun by Thomas Danforth, most likely around 1687, and contains transcriptions of donation records, property inventories, College laws, Overseers and Corporation minutes, and other official documents dating from 1636 onwards. By copying these documents into one volume, Danforth brought together a chronicle of Harvard's early history. Some of its content duplicates that of College Book 1, and other entries were copied from sources which no longer exist, including College Book 2, which was destroyed by fire in 1764. Danforth, who served as College Treasurer from 1650 to 1668, as Steward from 1668 to 1682, and again as Treasurer from 1682 to 1683, is believed to have created this volume as a precautionary measure during the great upheaval surrounding the 1684 annulment of the Royal Charter of the Massachusetts Colony and consequent dissolution of the Harvard Corporation. Some scholars believe he created College Book 3 in fear that the College's original records, from which it was largely derived and copied, might be destroyed.
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Regular recording of Corporation meetings began in College Book 4, which includes minutes from July 23, 1686 through September 5, 1750. Its spine title reads "College Book 4 & 5" due to a nineteenth century labeling error. The creation of College Book 4 was precipitated by the English Court of Chancery's October 1684 judgment, which annulled the Royal Charter of the Massachusetts Colony and seemed to render the College Charter of 1650 – and with it the Corporation and Board of Overseers – defunct. In May 1686, Joseph Dudley (Harvard AB 1665) received a commission as the President of the Council of New England, and on July 23, 1686, Dudley and the Council met in Boston to create a provisional College governing board led by Increase Mather as Rector of the College and John Leverett and William Brattle as Tutors. The "Rector and Tutors" mirrored in purpose if not in name the Corporation's "President and Fellows," and the agreements of President Dudley and the Council creating the new governing board comprise the first entry in College Book 4. In June 1692, a new act of incorporation for Harvard College was passed in the Massachusetts Legislature and signed by the Governor. The Charter of 1692 merged the functions of the Board of Overseers and the Corporation into one Corporation consisting of the President, Treasurer, and eight Fellows. As the Corporation created by this 1692 act (and modified in later versions of the Charter) grew unwieldy, its members met less frequently. As a result, the Faculty (known until 1825 as the "Immediate Government") assumed more responsibility in managing the College's daily operations and addressing student discipline. On December 6, 1707 the Massachusetts General Court restored the Charter of 1650, thus reestablishing the Board of Overseers and the Corporation as the governing bodies of Harvard College. The changes in name and composition of the Harvard Corporation between 1686 and 1707 are documented in the proceedings recorded in College Book 4.
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The first volume of the College Papers contains original documents dating from 1651 to 1763. It also contains documents dating from 1787, 1817, and 1889, a 1886 photograph of the Charter of 1650, 19th century manscript and 20th century photostat copies of original documents. The documents span the tenures of presidents Increase Mather, John Leverett, Benjamin Wadsworth, and Edward Holyoke.
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The first volume of the College Papers contains original documents dating from 1651 to 1763. It also contains documents dating from 1787, 1817, and 1889, a 1886 photograph of the Charter of 1650, 19th century manscript and 20th century photostat copies of original documents. The documents span the tenures of presidents Increase Mather, John Leverett, Benjamin Wadsworth, and Edward Holyoke.
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The diary and commonplace book of Perez Fobes is written on unlined pages in a notebook with a sewn binding at the top of the pages; only the edge of the original leather softcover remain. The volume holds handwritten entries added irregularly from August 23, 1759 until December 1760 while Fobes was a student at Harvard College. The topics range from the irreverent, to the mundane, to the theological and scientific. The notebook serves to chronicle both his daily activities, such as books he read, lectures he attended, and travel, as well as a place to note humorous sayings, transcribe book passages, or ponder religious ideas such as original sin. In the volume, Fobes devotes considerable space to the subject of astronomy, and drew a picture of the "The Solar System Serundum Coper[nici] with the Or[bit] of 5 Remarkable Comets." At the back of the book, on unattached pages is a short personal dictionary for the letters A-K kept by Fobes.
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Draft of Tudor's manuscript, interfiled with loose notes and copies of various documents regarding the Boston Tea Party and the Charter Oak tree.
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Large rubbing of the gravestone of Nathaniel Ward, librarian of Harvard college for one week in 1768. The rubbing was made by David S. Ferriero, and is signed and dated October 15, 1972 in the lower right corner.
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This single page handwritten letter was sent from Lemuel Shaw to his mother, Susanna, during his freshman year at Harvard. In the letter, he requested that his mother wash and return his dirty laundry and send him clothes, including a pair of overalls, some neck-handkerchiefs, and a new hat. Shaw also asked for money to be sent to pay off his debt of $21.25 to Mr. Richard Hunnewell for board and rent, $18.93 for the previous quarter’s bill, and $1.15 for Mr. Timothy Alden, the College Butler.
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Introduction. “Convention” is an ambiguous term, not only for lawyers, containing a wide variety of different meanings. Even when restricted to denote an assembly it may be used for all sorts of gatherings. In the context of constitutional law a convention is a very specific instrument, and the question is to what extent it is actually known in European constitutional law and whether the “Convention on the Future of Europe” as called forth by the Declaration of Laeken conforms to what is understood in constitutional law by “convention”.1 Or did the Laeken Council pick up a term without any foundation in European constitutional law, rarely practiced and even less understood, the only precedents of which are supposed to be the American Federal Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 and the convention that drafted the European Charter on Fundamental Rights, as can be read time and again? 2 As it is the privilege of the constitutional historian to make aware the evolution of legal institutions and to analyze their conferred meaning so that they will be available in political discourse, I shall examine the meaning of “convention” in constitutional history and comparative constitutional law in a first part, while a second part will place the Convention on the Future of the European Union according to its composition and commission into the context of constitutional conventions as understood in law.
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From the Introduction. This article seeks to examine the relationship between European Union law, international law, and the protection of fundamental rights in the light of recent case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Court of First Instance (CFI) relating to economic sanctions against individuals. On 3 September 2008, the ECJ delivered its long-awaited judgment in Kadi and Al Barakaat on appeal from the CFI.3 In its judgment under appeal,4 the CFI had held that the European Community (EC) is competent to adopt regulations imposing economic sanctions against private organisations in pursuance of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions seeking to combat terrorism; that although the EC is not bound directly by the UN Charter, it is bound pursuant to the EC Treaty to respect international law and give effect to UNSC; and that the CFI has jurisdiction to examine the compatibility of EC regulations implementing UNSC resolutions with fundamental rights not as protected by the EC but as protected by jus cogens. On appeal, following the Opinion of Maduro AG, the ECJ rejected the CFI’s approach. It held that UNSC resolutions are binding only in international law. It subjected the contested regulations to full review under EC human rights standards and found them in breach of the right to a hearing, the right to judicial protection and the right to property. Kadi and Al Barakaat is the most important judgment ever delivered by the ECJ on the relationship between EC and international law and one of its most important judgments on fundamental rights. It is imbued by constitutional confidence, commitment to the rule of law but also some scepticism towards international law. In the meantime, the CFI has delivered a number of other judgments on anti-terrorist sanctions assessing the limits of the “emergency constitution” at European level. The purpose of this paper is to examine the above case law and explore the dilemmas and tensions facing the EU judiciary in seeking to define and protect the EU’s distinct constitutional space. It is divided as follows. It first looks at the judgment in Kadi. After a short presentation of the factual and legal background, it explores the question whether the EU has competence to adopt smart sanctions. It then examines whether the EU is bound by resolutions of the Security Council, whether the ECJ has jurisdiction to review Community measures implementing such resolutions and the applicable standard of judicial scrutiny. It analyses the contrasting views of the CFI, the Advocate General, and the ECJ taking account also of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Further, it explores the consequences of annulling the contested regulation. It then turns to discussing CFI case law in relation to sanctions lists drawn up not by the UN Security Council but by the EC. The paper concludes by welcoming the judgment of the ECJ. Whilst its reasoning on the issue of Community competence is questionable, once such competence is established, it is difficult to support the abrogation of Community standards for the protection of fundamental rights. Such standards should ensure procedural due process whilst recognising the importance of public security.
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The 1992 Maastricht Treaty introduced the concept of European Union citizenship. All citizens of the 28 EU member states are also EU citizens through the very fact that their countries are members of the EU. Acquired EU citizenship gives them the right to free movement, settlement and employment across the EU, the right to vote in European elections, and also on paper the right to consular protection from other EU states' embassies when abroad. The concept of citizenship in Europe – and indeed anywhere in the world – has been evolving over the years, and continues to evolve. Against this time scale, the concept of modern citizenship as attached to the nation-state would seem ephemeral. The idea of EU citizenship therefore does not need to be regarded as a revolutionary phenomenon that is bound to mitigate against the natural inclination of European citizens towards national identities, especially in times of economic and financial crises. In fact, the idea of EU citizenship has even been criticised by some scholars as being of little substantive value in addition to whatever rights and freedoms European citizens already have. Nonetheless the ‘constitutional moment’ that the Maastricht Treaty achieved for the idea of EU citizenship has served more than just symbolic value – the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights is now legally binding, for instance. The idea of EU citizenship also put pressure on the Union and its leaders to address the perceived democratic deficit that the EU is often accused of. In attempts to cement the political rights of EU citizens, the citizens’ initiative was included in Lisbon Treaty allowing citizens to directly lobby the European Commission for new policy initiatives or changes.
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This paper examines the challenges facing the EU regarding data retention, particularly in the aftermath of the judgment Digital Rights Ireland by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) of April 2014, which found the Data Retention Directive 2002/58 to be invalid. It first offers a brief historical account of the Data Retention Directive and then moves to a detailed assessment of what the judgment means for determining the lawfulness of data retention from the perspective of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: what is wrong with the Data Retention Directive and how would it need to be changed to comply with the right to respect for privacy? The paper also looks at the responses to the judgment from the European institutions and elsewhere, and presents a set of policy suggestions to the European institutions on the way forward. It is argued here that one of the main issues underlying the Digital Rights Ireland judgment has been the role of fundamental rights in the EU legal order, and in particular the extent to which the retention of metadata for law enforcement purposes is consistent with EU citizens’ right to respect for privacy and to data protection. The paper offers three main recommendations to EU policy-makers: first, to give priority to a full and independent evaluation of the value of the data retention directive; second, to assess the judgment’s implications for other large EU information systems and proposals that provide for the mass collection of metadata from innocent persons, in the EU; and third, to adopt without delay the proposal for Directive COM(2012)10 dealing with data protection in the fields of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.
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The nomination of a First Vice-President (Frans Timmermans) in charge of rule of law and the EU Charter of Fundamental is one of the more far-reaching innovations contained in the new institutional shape of the Juncker Commission. This CEPS Commentary by Sergio Carrera and Elspeth Guild welcomes the fact that a new fundamental rights and rule of law First Vice-President will exercise a coordination and advisory role over the other two JHA Commissioners – Věra Jourová, responsible for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality (DG Justice); and Dimitris Avramopoulos, responsible for Migration and Home Affairs (DG Home Affairs), but expresses a note caution whether this new role and triangular relationship can be made to work effectively in practice.