992 resultados para small sided-games
Resumo:
Small daily positive energy imbalances of 200 to 800 kJ (about 50 to 200 kcal) due to reduced resting energy expenditure (REE), reduced diet-induced thermogenesis, or physical inactivity are believed to predispose to obesity. However, estimates of the magnitude of the weight gain often fail to account for concurrent changes in body composition and increases in maintenance energy requirements as weight increases and energy equilibrium is re-established. Using previously reported data on body composition and REE in women and the energy cost of tissue deposition, we used mathematical models to predict the theoretical effect of a persistent reduction in energy expenditure on long-term weight gain, assuming no adaptation in energy intake. The analyses indicate the following effects of a reduced level of energy expenditure in lean and obese women: (i) REE rises more slowly with increasing degrees of obesity due to a declining proportion of the more metabolically active fat-free mass; so, for the same positive energy balance, a significantly greater weight gain is expected for obese than for lean women before energy equilibrium is re-established; (ii) due to the greater energy density of adipose tissue, the time course of weight gain to achieve energy balance is longer for obese subjects: in general, this is approximately five years for lean and ten years for obese women; (iii) the magnitude of weight gain of lean women in response to a reduced energy expenditure of 200 to 800 kJ/day is only about 3 to 15 kg, amounts insufficient to explain severe obesity.
Development and validation of an instrument for evaluating the ludicity of games in health education
Resumo:
Abstract OBJECTIVE Developing and validating an instrument to evaluate the playfulness of games in health education contexts. METHODOLOGY A methodological, exploratory and descriptive research, developed in two stages: 1. Application of an open questionnaire to 50 graduate students, with content analysis of the answers and calculation of Kappa coefficient for defining items; 2. Procedures for construction of scales, with content validation by judges and analysis of the consensus estimate byContent Validity Index(CVI). RESULTS 53 items regarding the restless character of the games in the dimensions of playfulness, the formative components of learning and the profiles of the players. CONCLUSION Ludicity can be assessed by validated items related to the degree of involvement, immersion and reinvention of the subjects in the game along with the dynamics and playability of the game.
Resumo:
Starting in February 1994, 20 patients (pt) with a median age of 50 years(range 41-63) from 7 European centers have been included. Completedata were obtained in 16 patients so far. CPC were mobilized with chemo(Epirubicine 75 mg/m2 /d, 01 + 02) followed by G-CSF 5 p.gfkg/d for14 days. HD chemo consisted in 3 sequential courses of ICE regimen(UOs. 10 g/m2 , Carbo. 1200 mg/m2 and Etop. 1200 mg/m2 ) underCPC protection and G-CSF 5 p.g/kg/d. Out of the 16 pt, 12 completedfull program (3 cycles). One pt died of septic shock before receivingany ICE course. One pt died during the first ICE of renal insufficiency.Two pt had only 2 courses because of toxicity. Among the 16 pt, responserate (RR) was: 7 CR, 6 PR, 1 PO; 3 pt are not evaluable dueto early withdrawal (overall RR: 13/16 = 81 %). Thirty-nine cycles ofHD chemo were given with a median hematological recovery of 9 days(range 7-12) until neutro. counts> 1.0 x 109 /1 and 9 days (range 717)until thrombo. > 20 x 109 /1. No cumulative, hematological toxicitywas seen. Accrual of patients is still ongoing and updated results will bepresented.
Resumo:
The title of this thesis is “The importance of using games to teach English in the 3rd Cycle”. I choose this topic because I think that games are important in the process of learning and because in my opinion not only students but people in general are more motivated to learn when they are having fun or when they are doing something that is interesting. Some authors argue that games stimulate learners to practise, to activate and extend their English vocabulary, and that most students feel more motivated to learn and learn more easily when they are having fun. Games make demands on learners’ intelligence and imagination and calls for active participation. That is exactly what 3rd Cycle students and teachers need in order to have success in their studies and work respectively. The 3rd Cycle students have covered the majority of the grammar and functions contents of the English curriculum in the previous Cycles (the 1st and 2nd Cycle) and in the 3rd Cycle the students need most of their time to put into practice what they have learned before. Games are an effective method to put in practice what they have learned before and also through games they have several contexts and different situations to explore in order to show their knowledge or their vocabulary. The 3rd Cycle students need methods that motivate them to learn and to participate in class and since they already study a specific language function. If the teacher uses an enjoyable method like games students will not get bored and they will be more motivate to participate in class.
Resumo:
In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a strategic form game. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the proposer commitment procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash s two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the commitment to threats. We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. However, we show that even in standard pure exchange economies the traditional coalitional function may not be adequate when utilities are not transferable.
Resumo:
In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyzewhether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions dependon the elicitation procedure. In our hot treatment thesecond player responds to the first player s observed actionwhile in our cold treatment we follow the strategy method and have the second player decide on a contingent action foreach and every possible first player move, without firstobserving this move. Our analysis centers on the degree towhich subjects deviate from the maximization of their pecuniaryrewards, as a response to others actions. Our results show nodifference in behavior between the two treatments. We also findevidence of the stability of subjects preferences with respectto their behavior over time and to the consistency of theirchoices as first and second mover.
Resumo:
The Gac/Rsm signal transduction pathway positively regulates secondary metabolism, production of extracellular enzymes, and biocontrol properties of Pseudomonas fluorescens CHA0 via the expression of three noncoding small RNAs, termed RsmX, RsmY, and RsmZ. The architecture and function of the rsmY and rsmZ promoters were studied in vivo. A conserved palindromic upstream activating sequence (UAS) was found to be necessary but not sufficient for rsmY and rsmZ expression and for activation by the response regulator GacA. A poorly conserved linker region located between the UAS and the -10 promoter sequence was also essential for GacA-dependent rsmY and rsmZ expression, suggesting a need for auxiliary transcription factors. One such factor involved in the activation of the rsmZ promoter was identified as the PsrA protein, previously recognized as an activator of the rpoS gene and a repressor of fatty acid degradation. Furthermore, the integration host factor (IHF) protein was found to bind with high affinity to the rsmZ promoter region in vitro, suggesting that DNA bending contributes to the regulated expression of rsmZ. In an rsmXYZ triple mutant, the expression of rsmY and rsmZ was elevated above that found in the wild type. This negative feedback loop appears to involve the translational regulators RsmA and RsmE, whose activity is antagonized by RsmXYZ, and several hypothetical DNA-binding proteins. This highly complex network controls the expression of the three small RNAs in response to cell physiology and cell population densities.
Resumo:
We compare behavior in modified dictator games with and without role uncertainty. Subjectschoose between a selfish action, a costly surplus creating action (altruistic behavior) and acostly surplus destroying action (spiteful behavior). While costly surplus creating actions are themost frequent under role uncertainty (64%), selfish actions become the most frequent withoutrole uncertainty (69%). Also, the frequency of surplus destroying choices is negligible with roleuncertainty (1%) but not so without it (11%). A classification of subjects into four differenttypes of interdependent preferences (Selfish, Social Welfare maximizing, Inequity Averse andCompetitive) shows that the use of role uncertainty overestimates the prevalence of SocialWelfare maximizing preferences in the subject population (from 74% with role uncertainty to21% without it) and underestimates Selfish and Inequity Averse preferences. An additionaltreatment, in which subjects undertake an understanding test before participating in theexperiment with role uncertainty, shows that the vast majority of subjects (93%) correctlyunderstand the payoff mechanism with role uncertainty, but yet surplus creating actions weremost frequent. Our results warn against the use of role uncertainty in experiments that aim tomeasure the prevalence of interdependent preferences.
Resumo:
This paper investigates the role of learning by private agents and the central bank(two-sided learning) in a New Keynesian framework in which both sides of the economyhave asymmetric and imperfect knowledge about the true data generating process. Weassume that all agents employ the data that they observe (which may be distinct fordifferent sets of agents) to form beliefs about unknown aspects of the true model ofthe economy, use their beliefs to decide on actions, and revise these beliefs througha statistical learning algorithm as new information becomes available. We study theshort-run dynamics of our model and derive its policy recommendations, particularlywith respect to central bank communications. We demonstrate that two-sided learningcan generate substantial increases in volatility and persistence, and alter the behaviorof the variables in the model in a significant way. Our simulations do not convergeto a symmetric rational expectations equilibrium and we highlight one source thatinvalidates the convergence results of Marcet and Sargent (1989). Finally, we identifya novel aspect of central bank communication in models of learning: communicationcan be harmful if the central bank's model is substantially mis-specified.