Déjà-vu (again): The Lisbon Treaty Referendum in Ireland. IHS Political Science Series No. 133, February 2013

There has been an increasing use of direct democracy in the form of referendums on aspects of European integration. Two such referendums have been held in Ireland in 2008 and 2009 with the outcome changing from a No to a Yes vote. This paper addresses the question of what explains the change in outcome in two referendums on essentially the same document. It will do so by looking at the role of the campaign in providing information and hence reducing uncertainty, the importance of issue frames and the impact of domestic considerations on vote choice. It is suggested that there has not been a change in underlying attitudes but a change in how the Irish electorate weighed the same factors differently at both referendums. In addition, a change in economic conditions at the time of the second referendum also had an effect on how voters decided the second time around.

EU Trade Actors after Lisbon: Enhanced Negotiations or Business as Usual? Brugges Political Research Paper No. 32, November 2013

As seen by the launching of trade negotiations with Japan and the United States, the European Union has shifted gears in order to achieve amplified benefits in bilateral trade agreements. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty brought the European Parliament and the European External Action Service into the picture as new actors in trade negotiations. The question arises if the new framework of trade negotiations is better off than the pre-Lisbon era. By applying Veto Players theory to the Central American Association Agreement and Principal-Agent theory to the Ukrainian Association Agreement, two results were concluded. First, the participation of the European Parliament as a veto player has decreased the effectiveness of trade negotiation. Second, the participation of the European External Action Service has shown the contrary, namely an increase of effectiveness in trade negotiations.

On Political Union in Europe: The changing landscape of decisionmaking and political accountability. CEPS Essay No. 4, 21 February 2013

This essay discusses how recent developments have modified the existing allocation of tasks between the EU and national levels and the legitimising mechanisms in decision-making by the EU institutions. It examines in turn the increasing differentiation emerging in member states’ participation in EU policies and institutions, the changing configuration of executive powers and its relationship to the community method, the criteria governing the transfer of economic powers from the member states to the Union and the emerging democratic accountability and legitimising mechanisms before both the European and the national parliaments. Some main implications for the future of European institutions are summarised in the conclusions.

Hegemony Without Stability: The fiscal and political vulnerabilities of monetary union. ACES Cases No. 2011.2

The crisis has forced the Euro area to establish an emergency fund that supports member states experiencing a sovereign debt crisis. The difficulties of coming up with such a fund for Greece and other Euro area members stands in marked contrast to the balance of payments support that non-Euro members like Hungary received, swiftly and quietly. In order to solve this puzzle, we first establish the difference between EU interventions and IMF programs and, second, trace the evolution of crisis management with France and Germany in the lead. The lens of hegemonic stability theory suggests that the Franco-German leadership is too weak to provide stability and the extensive use of conditionality is one symptom of this weakness. Providing incentives for cooperation "after hegemony" (Keohane) is the unresolved issues troubling the monetary union. Its dominant powers must acknowledge that markets perceive monetary union to be already politically more integrated than its lack of fiscal integration suggests.

American Attitudes on European Political Integration — The Nixon-Kissinger Legacy. IES WORKING PAPER 2/2007

This paper concentrates on the Nixon-Kissinger view of European political integration. In contrast with the mainstream position of the American Administrations during the 1950s and 1960s, Kissinger was convinced that by encouraging European unity, the United States was in fact creating its own rival. The start of a new system of European foreign policy cooperation in 1970 was seen by Kissinger as a particularly important example of Europe’s attempt to challenge the American hegemony. Kissinger emphasized the need to maintain Western Europe in a subordinate role. Three main lines of action were pursued to keep the development of the European Community under control: maintaining bilateral contacts with key European allies, requesting a seat at the Community's decision-making table, and linking "obedient" European behavior to American military presence in Europe. The legacy of this policy still seems to influence the current American policy on the European Union. The Nixon-Kissinger term was, however, detrimental to rather than conducive of harmonious transatlantic relations. Tendencies to emulate it should therefore be discouraged.

The European Union as a System of Differentiated Integration: Interdependence, Politicization and Differentiation. IHS Political Science Series No. 137, 10 July 2014

This paper conceptualizes the European Union (EU) as a system of differentiated integration characterized by both variation in levels of centralization (vertical differentiation) and variation in territorial extension (horizontal differentiation) across policy areas. Differentiation has been a concomitant of deepening and widening and has increased and consolidated as the EU’s powers, policy scope, and membership have grown. Turning to explanation, the paper attributes the pattern of differentiated integration in the EU to the interaction of interdependence and politicization. Differentiation among the member states (internal differentiation) results from supranational integration under conditions of high interdependence and politicization. By contrast, external differentiation (the selective policy integration of non-member states) occurs in highly interdependent but weakly politicized policy areas. These constellations are illustrated in case studies of differentiation in the internal market, monetary union, and defence.

Eurodéputé: «Seconde chance» ou «Tremplin» – Comparaisons des trajectoires politiques de candidats PSE et PPE aux élections européennes de 2014 en France et en Suède. = MEP: "Second Chance" or "Jump" - comparisons of PSE candidates and political trajectories EPP in European elections 2014 in France and Sweden. Bruges Political Research Paper No. 40, February 2015

Le mandat d’eurodéputé est conçu différemment dans chaque état membre. Cet article teste la validité des cultures politiques inclusive et exclusive, créées pour l’analyse des sélections des candidats français et suédois et leur conception du mandat européen. Leur sélection demeure un monopole partisan national où l’adhésion à un parti et la professionnalisation politique priment. La distinction apparait dans le degré d’ouverture de la sélection et la conception de la fonction d’eurodéputé et du Parlement européen. Les conclusions valident l’approche créée, montrant un déplacement du curseur le long des continuums formés par les cultures inclusive et exclusive. La France, «exclusive», reste centrée sur Paris et des élections ayant des conséquences sur le pouvoir exécutif. La Suède est plus inclusive tant dans les profils des candidats que dans les processus qui les intègrent aux listes et dans la façon de concevoir le rôle des MEP et du Parlement européen. Cet article se fonde sur un mémoire de Master: E. Cazenave, Eurodéputé: «Seconde chance» ou «Tremplin»? Comparaison des trajectoires politiques de candidats PPE et PSE aux élections européennes de 2014 en France et en Suède, Bruges, Collège d’Europe, 2014