Human TOP1 residues implicated in species specificity of HIV-1 infection are required for interaction with BTBD2, and RNAi of BTBD2 in old world monkey and human cells increases permissiveness to HIV-1 infection

Host determinants of HIV-1 viral tropism include factors from producer cells that affect the efficiency of productive infection and factors in target cells that block infection after viral entry. TRIM5 restricts HIV-1 infection at an early post-entry step through a mechanism associated with rapid disassembly of the retroviral capsid. Topoisomerase I (TOP1) appears to play a role in HIV-1 viral tropism by incorporating into or otherwise modulating virions affecting the efficiency of a post-entry step, as the expression of human TOP1 in African Green Monkey (AGM) virion-producing cells increased the infectivity of progeny virions by five-fold. This infectivity enhancement required human TOP1 residues 236 and 237 as their replacement with the AGM counterpart residues abolished the infectivity enhancement. Our previous studies showed that TOP1 interacts with BTBD1 and BTBD2, two proteins which co-localize with the TRIM5 splice variant TRIM5 in cytoplasmic bodies. Because BTBD1 and BTBD2 interact with one HIV-1 viral tropism factor, TOP1, and co-localize with a splice variant of another, we investigated the potential involvement of BTBD1 and BTBD2 in HIV-1 restriction.

The World Trade Organization at Work: Performance in a Member-Driven Milieu

This article discusses performance in the context of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Applying the framework by Gutner and Thompson and inspired by principal-agent theory, it is argued that existing studies have underspecified the institutional milieu that affects performance. The WTO represents a member-driven organization where Members are part of the international organization (IO) (e.g., through rule-making) and at the same time act outside the IO (e.g., through implementation). Thus, a narrow reading of the IO (focusing on the civil servants and the Director-General and his staff) will not suffice to understand IO performance in the WTO context. Selected evidence is presented to illustrate aspects of the WTO’s inner-working and the institutional milieu of performance. In addition, the article discusses a number of performance parameters, including the relationship between Secretariat autonomy and performance, the role of information, and the mechanisms of performance aggregation. The article ends by cautioning against quick fixes to the system to improve performance.