Growth, selection and appropriate contracts

We study a dynamic model where growth requires both long-term investmentand the selection of talented managers. When ability is not ex-ante observable and contracts are incomplete, managerial selection imposes a cost, as managers facing the risk ofbeing replaced choose a sub-optimally low level of long-term investment. This generates atrade-off between selection and investment that has implications for the choice of contractualrelationships and institutions. Our analysis shows that rigid long-term contracts sacrificingmanagerial selection may prevail at early stages of economic development and when heterogeneity in ability is low. As the economy grows, however, knowledge accumulation increasesthe return to talent and makes it optimal to adopt flexible contractual relationships, wheremanagerial selection is implemented even at the cost of lower investment. Measures of investor protection aimed at limiting the bargaining power of managers improve selection undershort-term contract. Given that knowledge accumulation raises the value of selection, theoptimal level of investor protection increases with development.

The effects of monetary policy on stock market bubbles: Some evidence

We estimate the response of stock prices to exogenous monetary policy shocks usinga vector-autoregressive model with time-varying parameters. Our evidence points toprotracted episodes in which, after a a short-run decline, stock prices increase persistently in response to an exogenous tightening of monetary policy. That responseis clearly at odds with the "conventional" view on the effects of monetary policy onbubbles, as well as with the predictions of bubbleless models. We also argue that it isunlikely that such evidence be accounted for by an endogenous response of the equitypremium to the monetary policy shocks.

Understanding the gains from wage flexibility: The exchange rate connection

We study the gains from increased wage flexibility and their dependence on exchange rate policy, using a small open economy model with staggered price andwage setting. Two results stand out: (i) the impact of wage adjustments on employment is smaller the more the central bank seeks to stabilize the exchange rate,and (ii) an increase in wage flexibility often reduces welfare, and more likely so ineconomies under an exchange rate peg or an exchange rate-focused monetary policy.Our findings call into question the common view that wage flexibility is particularlydesirable in a currency union.

Standardized enforcement: Access to justice vs. contractual innovation

We model the effect of contract standardization on the development of markets andthe law. In a setting in which biased judges can distort contract enforcement, we findthat the introduction of a standard contract reduces enforcement distortions relative toreliance on precedents, exerting two effects: i) it statically expands the volume of trade,but ii) it crowds out the use of open-ended contracts, hindering legal evolution. We shedlight on the large-scale commercial codification undertaken in the nineteenth centuryin many countries (even common-law ones) during a period of booming commerce andlong-distance trade.

Cities, skills, and regional change

One approach to urban areas emphasizes the existence of certain immutable relationships, such as Zipf's or Gibrat's Law. An alternative view is that urban changereflects individual responses to changing tastes or technologies. This paper examinesalmost 200 years of regional change in the U.S. and finds that few, if any, growth relationships remain constant, including Gibrat's Law. Education does a reasonable jobof explaining urban resilience in recent decades, but does not seem to predict countygrowth a century ago. After reviewing this evidence, we present and estimate a simple model of regional change, where education increases the level of entrepreneurship.Human capital spillovers occur at the city level because skilled workers produce moreproduct varieties and thereby increase labor demand. We find that skills are associatedwith growth in productivity or entrepreneurship, not with growth in quality of life, atleast outside of the West. We also find that skills seem to have depressed housing supplygrowth in the West, but not in other regions, which supports the view that educatedresidents in that region have fought for tougher land-use controls. We also present evidence that skills have had a disproportionately large impact on unemployment duringthe current recession.

Leverage and beliefs: Personal experience and risk taking in margin lending

What determines risk-bearing capacity and the amount of leverage in financial markets? Thispaper uses unique micro-data on collateralized lending contracts during a period of financialdistress to address this question. An investor syndicate speculating in English stocks wentbankrupt in 1772. Using hand-collected information from Dutch notarial archives, we examinechanges in lenders' behavior following exposure to potential (but not actual) losses. Before thedistress episode, financiers that lent to the ill-fated syndicate were indistinguishable from therest. Afterwards, they behaved differently: they lent with much higher haircuts. Only lendersexposed to the failed syndicate altered their behavior. The differential change is remarkable sincethe distress was public knowledge, and because none of the lenders suffered actual losses ? allfinanciers were repaid in full. Interest rates were also unaffected; the market balanced solelythrough changes in collateral requirements. Our findings are consistent with a heterogeneousbeliefs-interpretation of leverage. They also suggest that individual experience can modify thelevel of leverage in a market quickly.

Un regard bayesien sur les modèles dynamiques de la macroéconomie

http://alize.finances.gouv.fr/prevision/revue/resumes/ep183184/pdf/rsf183184a6.pdf

Shrouded costs of government: The political economy of state and local public pensions

Why do public-sector workers receive so much of their compensation in the formof pensions and other benefits? This paper presents a political economy model inwhich politicians compete for taxpayers' and government employees' votes by promising compensation packages, but some voters cannot evaluate every aspect of promisedcompensation. If pension packages are "shrouded", so that public-sector workers better understand their value than ordinary taxpayers, then compensation will be highlyback-loaded. In equilibrium, the welfare of public-sector workers could be improved,holding total public-sector costs constant, if they received higher wages and lowerpensions. Centralizing pension determination has two offsetting effects on generosity:more state-level media attention helps taxpayers better understand pension costs, andthat reduces pension generosity; but a larger share of public-sector workers will votewithin the jurisdiction, which increases pension generosity. A short discussion of pensions in two decentralized states (California and Pennsylvania) and two centralizedstates (Massachusetts and Ohio) suggests that centralization appears to have modestlyreduced pensions, but, as the model suggests, this is unlikely to be universal.

Firms, destinations, and aggregate fluctuations

This paper uses a database covering the universe of French firms for the period 1990-2007 to provide a forensic account of the role of individual firms in generating aggregatefluctuations. We set up a simple multi-sector model of heterogeneous firms selling tomultiple markets to motivate a theoretically-founded decomposition of firms' annualsales growth rate into different components. We find that the firm-specific componentcontributes substantially to aggregate sales volatility, mattering about as much as thecomponents capturing shocks that are common across firms within a sector or country.We then decompose the firm-specific component to provide evidence on two mechanismsthat generate aggregate fluctuations from microeconomic shocks highlighted in the recentliterature: (i) when the firm size distribution is fat-tailed, idiosyncratic shocks tolarge firms directly contribute to aggregate fluctuations; and (ii) aggregate fluctuationscan arise from idiosyncratic shocks due to input-output linkages across the economy.Firm linkages are approximately three times as important as the direct effect of firmshocks in driving aggregate fluctuations.

The global welfare impact of China: Trade integration and technological change

This paper evaluates the global welfare impact of China's trade integration and technological change in a multi-country quantitative Ricardian-Heckscher-Ohlin model.We simulate two alternative growth scenarios: a "balanced" one in which China's productivity grows at the same rate in each sector, and an "unbalanced" one in whichChina's comparative disadvantage sectors catch up disproportionately faster to theworld productivity frontier. Contrary to a well-known conjecture (Samuelson 2004),the large majority of countries experience significantly larger welfare gains whenChina's productivity growth is biased towards its comparative disadvantage sectors.This finding is driven by the inherently multilateral nature of world trade.

A global view of cross-border migration

This paper evaluates the global welfare impact of observed levels of migration using a quantitativemulti-sector model of the world economy calibrated to aggregate and firm-level data.Our framework features cross-country labor productivity differences, international trade, remittances,and a heterogeneous workforce. We compare welfare under the observed levels ofmigration to a no-migration counterfactual. In the long run, natives in countries that receiveda lot of migration -such as Canada or Australia- are better o due to greater product varietyavailable in consumption and as intermediate inputs. In the short run the impact of migrationon average welfare in these countries is close to zero, while the skilled and unskilled nativestend to experience welfare changes of opposite signs. The remaining natives in countries withlarge emigration flows -such as Jamaica or El Salvador- are also better off due to migration,but for a different reason: remittances. The welfare impact of observed levels of migration issubstantial, at about 5 to 10% for the main receiving countries and about 10% in countries withlarge incoming remittances. Our results are robust to accounting for imperfect transferabilityof skills, selection into migration, and imperfect substitution between natives and immigrants.

Alternative tests for correct specification of conditional predictive densities

We propose new methods for evaluating predictive densities that focus on the models' actual predictive ability in finite samples. The tests offer a simple way of evaluatingthe correct specification of predictive densities, either parametric or non-parametric.The results indicate that our tests are well sized and have good power in detecting mis-specification in predictive densities. An empirical application to the Survey ofProfessional Forecasters and a baseline Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium modelshows the usefulness of our methodology.

Input diffusion and the evolution of production networks

What determines which inputs are initially considered and eventually adopted in the productionof new or improved goods? Why are some inputs much more prominent than others? We modelthe evolution of input linkages as a process where new producers first search for potentially usefulinputs and then decide which ones to adopt. A new product initially draws a set of 'essentialsuppliers'. The search stage is then confined to the network neighborhood of the latter, i.e., to theinputs used by the essential suppliers. The adoption decision is driven by a tradeoff between thebenefits accruing from input variety and the costs of input adoption. This has important implicationsfor the number of forward linkages that a product (input variety) develops over time. Inputdiffusion is fostered by network centrality ? an input that is initially represented in many networkneighborhoods is subsequently more likely to be adopted. This mechanism also delivers a powerlaw distribution of forward linkages. Our predictions continue to hold when varieties are aggregatedinto sectors. We can thus test them, using detailed sectoral US input-output tables. We showthat initial network proximity of a sector in 1967 significantly increases the likelihood of adoptionthroughout the subsequent four decades. The same is true for rapid productivity growth in aninput-producing sector. Our empirical results highlight two conditions for new products to becomecentral nodes: initial network proximity to prospective adopters, and technological progress thatreduces their relative price. Semiconductors met both conditions.

Political centralization and government accountability

This paper studies fiscal federalism when regions differ in voters' ability to monitor publicofficials. We develop a model of political agency in which rent-seeking politicians providepublic goods to win support from heterogeneously informed voters. In equilibrium, voterinformation increases government accountability but displays decreasing returns. Therefore,political centralization reduces aggregate rent extraction when voter information varies acrossregions. It increases welfare as long as the central government is required to provide publicgoods uniformly across regions. The need for uniformity implies an endogenous trade off between reducing rents through centralization and matching idiosyncratic preferences throughdecentralization. We find that a federal structure with overlapping levels of government canbe optimal only if regional differences in accountability are sufficiently large. The modelpredicts that less informed regions should reap greater benefits when the central governmentsets a uniform policy. Consistent with our theory, we present empirical evidence that lessinformed states enjoyed faster declines in pollution after the 1970 Clean Air Act centralizedenvironmental policy at the federal level.

Sovereign default, domestic banks and financial institutions

We present a model of sovereign debt in which, contrary to conventional wisdom, government defaultsare costly because they destroy the balance sheets of domestic banks. In our model, better financial institutionsallow banks to be more leveraged, thereby making them more vulnerable to sovereign defaults.Our predictions: government defaults should lead to declines in private credit, and these declines should belarger in countries where financial institutions are more developed and banks hold more government bonds.In these same countries, government defaults should be less likely. Using a large panel of countries, we findevidence consistent with these predictions.