On p-beauty contest integer games

In this paper we provide a full characterization of the pure-strategyNash Equilibria for the p-Beauty Contest Game when we restrict player schoices to integer numbers. Opposed to the case of real number choices,equilibrium uniqueness may be lost depending on the value of p and thenumber of players: in particular, as p approaches 1 any symmetric profileconstitutes a Nash Equilibrium. We also show that any experimental p-BeautyContest Game can be associated to a game with the integer restriction andthus multiplicity of equilibria becomes an issue. Finally, we show thatin these games the iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies maynot lead to a single outcome while the iterated best-reply process alwaysdoes (though the outcome obtained depends on the initial conditions).

Bundling and competition for slots: On the portfolio effects of bundling

We consider competition among sellers when each of them sells a portfolio ofdistinct products to a buyer having limited slots. We study how bundling affectscompetition for slots. Under independent pricing, equilibrium often does not existand hence the outcome is often inefficient. When bundling is allowed, each sellerhas an incentive to bundle his products and an efficient equilibrium always exists.Furthermore, in the case of digital goods, all equilibria are efficient if slotting contracts are prohibited. We also identify portfolio effects of bundling and analyze theconsequences on horizontal mergers. Finally, we derive clear-cut policy implications.

Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate

This paper examines competition in the standard one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections, but where one candidate (A) enjoys an advantage over the other candidate (D). Voters' preferences are Euclidean, but any voter will vote for candidate A over candidate D unless D is closer to her ideal point by some fixed distance \delta. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, and its distribution is commonly known by both candidates. The candidates simultaneously choose locations to maximize the probability of victory. Pure strategy equilibria often fails to exist in this model, except under special conditions about \delta and the distribution of the median ideal point. We solve for the essentially unique symmetric mixed equilibrium, show that candidate A adopts more moderate policies than candidate D, and obtain some comparative statics results about the probability of victory and the expected distance between the two candidates' policies.

Moral hazard and non-exclusive contracts

This paper studies equilibria for economies characterized by moral hazard(hidden action), in which the set of contracts marketed in equilibrium isdetermined by the interaction of financial intermediaries.The crucial aspect of the environment that we study is thatintermediaries are restricted to trade non-exclusive contracts: theagents' contractual relationships with competing intermediaries cannot bemonitored (or are not contractible upon). We fully characterize equilibrium allocations and contracts. In thisset-up equilibrium allocations are clearly incentive constrainedinefficient. A robust property of equilibria with non-exclusivity isthat the contracts issued in equilibrium do not implement the optimalaction. Moreover we prove that, whenever equilibrium contracts doimplement the optimal action, intermediaries make positive profits andequilibrium allocations are third best inefficient (where the definitionof third best efficiency accounts for constraints which capture thenon-exclusivity of contracts).

Increasing political returns and rural-urban migrations

This paper analyzes the different equilibria in rural-urban migrationsand political redistribution that result from the interaction betweenincreasing political returns, the distribution of land, and creditmarket imperfections. Governments that put a special weight on thewelfare of urban workers when setting agricultural prices generate apolitical externality in the urban sector, giving peasants anincentive to migrate in anticipation of policy determination. Ifcredit markets are imperfect, land ownership confers higherproductivity to peasants, who require large price changes to migrate.In this context, land inequality would lead to large migrations and tolarge policy change, while an egalitarian land distribution would leadto no migration and to a small policy change. This interaction shedslight on the contrasting experience of Latin America and East Asia atthe outset of World War II.

A non-quasi-competitive Cournot oligopoly with stability

This paper presents a classical Cournot oligopoly model with some peculiar features: it is non--quasi--competitive as price under N-poly is greater than monopoly price; Cournot equilibrium exists and is unique with each new entry; the successive equilibria after new entries are stable under the adjustment mechanism that assumes that actual output of each seller is adjusted proportionally to the difference between actual output and profit maximizing output. Moreover, the model tends to perfect competition as N goes to infinity, reaching the monopoly price again.

Risk dominance selects the leader. An experimental analysis

Coordination games arise very often in studies of industrial organization and international trade. This type of games has multiple strict equilibria, and therefore the identification of testable predictions isvery difficult. We study a vertical product differentiation model with two asymmetric players choosing first qualities and then prices. This game has two equilibria for some parameter values. However, we apply the risk dominance criterion suggested by Harsanyi and Selten and show that it always selects the equilibrium where the leader is the firm having some initial advantage. We then perform an experimental analysis totest whether the risk dominance prediction is supported by the behaviour oflaboratory agents. We show that the probability that the risk dominance prediction is right depends crucially on the degree of asymmetry of the game. The stronger the asymmetries the higher the predictive power of the risk dominance criterion.

Endogenous information structures

Many models in the economics literature deal with strategic situations withprivately informed agents. In those models the information structure isassumed to be exogenous and common knowledge. We consider whether suchmodels, and the results they produce, are robust with respect theendogenization of the information structure. The results depend on whetherinformation acquisition is secret or private, and on whether the strategicsituation involves simultaneous or sequential moves. In particular we findthat only when information is secretly acquired and moves are simultaneous,the results are fully robust. When information is acquired secretly butmoves are sequential additional equilibria may appear. Instead, privateinformation acquisition may make the equilibrium set smaller.

A model of collateral, investment and adverse selection

This paper characterizes the relationship between entrepreneurial wealth and aggregate investmentunder adverse selection. Its main finding is that such a relationship need not bemonotonic. In particular, three results emerge from the analysis: (i) pooling equilibria, in whichinvestment is independent of entrepreneurial wealth, are more likely to arise when entrepreneurialwealth is relatively low; (ii) separating equilibria, in which investment is increasing inentrepreneurial wealth, are most likely to arise when entrepreneurial wealth is relatively highand; (iii) for a given interest rate, an increase in entrepreneurial wealth may generate a discontinuousfall in investment.

Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information

This paper studies the equilibrating process of several implementationmechanisms using naive adaptive dynamics. We show that the dynamics convergeand are stable, for the canonical mechanism of implementation in Nash equilibrium.In this way we cast some doubt on the criticism of ``complexity'' commonlyused against this mechanism. For mechanisms that use more refined equilibrium concepts,the dynamics converge but are not stable. Some papers in the literatureon implementation with refined equilibrium concepts have claimed that themechanisms they propose are ``simple'' and implement ``everything'' (incontrast with the canonical mechanism). The fact that some of these ``simple''mechanisms have unstable equilibria suggests that these statements shouldbe interpreted with some caution.

Effects of convection on the removal of the multiplicity of stable states in one-dimensional vertical models

Here I develop a model of a radiative-convective atmosphere with both radiative and convective schemes highly simplified. The atmospheric absorption of radiation at selective wavelengths makes use of constant mass absorption coefficients in finite width spectral bands. The convective regime is introduced by using a prescribed lapse rate in the troposphere. The main novelty of the radiative-convective model developed here is that it is solved without using any angular approximation for the radiation field. The solution obtained in the purely radiation mode (i. e. with convection ignored) leads to multiple equilibria of stable states, being very similar to some results recently found in simple models of planetary atmospheres. However, the introduction of convective processes removes the multiple equilibria of stable states. This shows the importance of taking convective processes into account even for qualitative analyses of planetary atmosphere

Thermoplastic Starch-based Composites Reinforced with Rape Fibers: Water Uptake and Thermomechanical Properties

Fully biodegradable composite materials were obtained through reinforcement of a commercially available thermoplastic starch (TPS) matrix with rapeseed fibers (RSF). The influence of reinforcement content on the water sorption capacity, as well as thermal and thermo-mechanical properties of composites were evaluated. Even though the hydrophilic character of natural fibers tends to favor the absorption of water, results demonstrated that the incorporation of RSF did not have a significant effect on the water uptake of the composites. DSC experiments showed that fibers restricted the mobility of the starch macromolecules from the TPS matrix, hence reducing their capacity to crystallize. The viscoelastic behaviour of TPS was also affected, and reinforced materials presented lower viscous deformation and recovery capacity. In addition, the elasticity of materials was considerably diminished when increasing fiber content, as evidenced in the TMA and DMTA measurements

On the role of non-equilibrium focal points as coordination devices

Considering a pure coordination game with a large number of equivalentequilibria, we argue, first, that a focal point that is itself not a Nash equilibriumand is Pareto dominated by all Nash equilibria, may attract the players'choices. Second, we argue that such a non-equilibrium focal point may act asan equilibrium selection device that the players use to coordinate on a closelyrelated small subset of Nash equilibria. We present theoretical as well asexperimental support for these two new roles of focal points as coordinationdevices.

The stable hydrogen and oxygen isotope variation of water stored in polyethylene terephthalate (PET) bottles

A set of bottled waters from a single natural spring distributed worldwide in polyethylene terephthalate (PET) bottles has been used to examine the effects of storage in plastic polymer material on the isotopic composition (delta(18)O and delta(2)H values) of the water. All samples analyzed were subjected to the same packaging procedure but experienced different conditions of temperature and humidity during storage. Water sorption and the diffusive transfer of water and water vapor through the wall of the PET bottle may cause isotopic exchange between water within the bottle and water vapor in air near the PET-water interface. Changes of about +4 parts per thousand for delta(2)H and +0.7 parts per thousand for delta(18)O have been measured for water after 253 days of storage within the PET bottle. The results of this study clearly indicate the need to use glass bottles for storing water samples for isotopic studies. It is imperative to transfer PET-bottled natural waters to glass bottles for their use as calibration material or potential international working standards. Copyright (C) 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Glyphosate behavior in a Rhodic Oxisol under no-till and conventional agricultural systems

The behavior of glyphosate in a Rhodic Oxisol, collected from fields under no-till and conventional management systems in Ponta Grossa, Parana state (Brazil) was investigated. Both agricultural systems had been in production for 23 years. Glyphosate mineralization, soil-bound forms, sorption and desorption kinetics, sorption/desorption batch experiments, and soil glyphosate phythoavailability (to Panicum maximum) were determined. The mineralization experiment was set up in a completely randomized design with a 2 x 2 factorial scheme (two management systems and two 14C radiolabelled positions in the glyphosate), with five replicates. 14CO2 evolution was measured in 7-day intervals during 63 days. The glyphosate sorption kinetics was investigated in a batch experiment, employing a glyphosate concentration of 0.84 mg L-1. The equilibration solution was 0.01 mol L-1 CaCl2 and the equilibration times were 0, 10, 30, 60, 120, 240, and 360 min. Sorption/desorption of glyphosate was also investigated using equilibrium batch experiments. Five different concentrations of the herbicide were used for sorption (0.42, 0.84, 1.68, 3.36, and 6.72 mg L-1) and one concentration for desorption. Glyphosate phytoavailability was analyzed in a 2 x 5 factorial scheme with two management systems and five glyphosate concentrations added to soil (0, 4.2, 8.4, 42.0, and 210.0 µg g-1) in a completely randomized design. Phytotoxicity symptoms in P. maximum were evaluated for different periods. The soil under both management systems showed high glyphosate sorption, which impeded its desorption and impaired the mineralization in the soil solution. Practically the total amount of the applied glyphosate was quickly sorbed (over 90 % sorbed within 10 min). Glyphosate bound to residues did not have adverse effects on P. maximum growth. The mineralization of glyphosate was faster under no-till and aminomethylphosphonic acid was the main glyphosate metabolite.