Who is leading the European Union?. European Policy Briefs No. 33, March 2014

The European Union will only be reconciled with its citizens when they will be able to identify leaders at the level of the institutions.

The Ukraine crisis and the demise of the European Security order. EPC Policy Brief, 1 December 2015

The annexation of Crimea by Russia and the subsequent war in the Donbas have delivered a severe blow to the European security order, and have increased tensions between the West and Russia to a level unprecedented since the end of the Cold War. In this context, it would be difficult to start negotiating a new commitment to the principles of the European security order. In this Policy Brief, Paul Ivan analyses the Ukraine crisis and its effect on European security and calls for the EU and NATO to stand firm on their own principles, but also to engage carefully with Russia to develop mechanisms to contain risks and avoid escalation and military confrontation, whether in Syria, the Baltic, the Mediterranean or the Black seas. The recent shooting down of a Russian jet by Turkish forces makes clear the need to prevent such incidents with potential rapid escalatory dynamics.

The European Union’s Response to Piracy: Are the Lessons Learned in the Horn of Africa a Model for the Gulf of Guinea? EU Diplomacy Paper/2015

The European Union (EU) is seen as the leading actor in successfully fighting piracy around the Horn of Africa. As a global trade power with strong economic interests, the EU is also challenged by similar maritime security threats in the Gulf of Guinea. To date, there has been no comprehensive analysis to assess the potential transfer of successful EU instruments from the Horn of Africa to the piracy situation in West African waters. This paper examines to what extent the EU can draw on its experience made in the Horn of Africa to deter piracy in West African waters. Based on qualitative research interviews, lessons learned from East Africa are identified and subsequently applied to the situation in the Gulf of Guinea. The results show that the EU is only partially drawing on its experience made in the Horn of Africa. One the one hand, it is rather reluctant to use crisis management instruments such as naval operations. On the other hand, the EU is drawing on its successful leadership in international political and military cooperation from around the Horn of Africa in order to make more effective use of available resources in the Gulf of Guinea.

Taiwanese Lobbying in the European Union: ‘Workable Diplomacy’ and its Limitations. EU Diplomacy Paper 8/2015

The policy of the European Union (EU) towards Taiwan has mostly been analysed either as a by-product of EU-China relations or with reference to the general lack of a European geopolitical approach towards East Asia. By adopting a lobbying approach which focusses on Taiwan’s different ‘channels of influence’ within the complex European foreign policy system in Brussels, this study provides new insights into the functioning of EU-Taiwan relations. It also sheds new light on the implications of the radical change in Taiwanese diplomacy after 2008, when Chen Shui-bian’s assertive and identity-based diplomacy was replaced with the Kuomintang’s new dogma of ‘workable diplomacy’. Based on semi-guided interviews with Taiwanese and European actors, this paper examines why Taiwanese lobbying in Brussels, albeit very active and professional, is not salient enough to meet the challenges arising from the overwhelming Chinese competition and from the increasing proliferation of regional trade agreements – with active EU participation – in the Asia-Pacific region. It argues that the pragmatic ‘workable diplomacy’ approach, while smoothing out working-level relations between Taiwan and the EU, fails to attract a sufficient degree of political and public attention in Europe to the Taiwan question and thus fosters the neglect of Taiwan by European foreign policy-makers. The main challenge faced by Taiwanese diplomacy, however, is not simply one of convincing through technical arguments, but one of agenda setting, that is, of redefining European priorities in Taiwan’s favour.

‘The oil friendship’: the state of and prospects for Russian-Chinese energy cooperation. OSW Commentary NUMBER 197|17.02.2016

The oil sector has been the major element of Russian-Chinese energy cooperation. The years 2013–2015 saw a significant increase in the volume of crude oil exported by Russia. In 2015, China became the main importer of Russian oil; Russia became the second largest supplier of oil to the Chinese market, after Saudi Arabia. From Beijing’s perspective, supplies of Russian oil are of strategic importance because the main supply routes are overland routes. Russia, for its part, is interested in boosting its export because of its deteriorating position on the European market, which hitherto has been considered a strategic market.

The European Union as a Mediator in Israel-Palestine: Operations Cast Lead and Protective Edge. EU Diplomacy Paper 01/2016

The European Union (EU) has played an important, yet inconsistent role in the Israel-Palestine conflict since the1980 Venice Declaration. This paper analyses how the EU’s role as a mediator has changed more recently in the Israel-Gaza conflict. Specifically, it examines how the ‘Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities’ adopted in 2009 and the creation of the European External Action Service and the High Representative by the Lisbon Treaty have changed the EU’s resources and strategies as a mediator as well as how these developments improved cooperation and coordination with other mediators. This analysis is done through a comparison of the EU’s role in the Israeli Operation Cast Lead in 2008/2009 and Operation Protective Edge in 2014. It is argued that the aforementioned changes made the EU a more capable mediator and facilitated internal coordination. However, these changes did not create more resources for the EU as a mediator, rather they changed how the EU used its resources.

The Israeli lobby for Research and Innovation in the European Union. An example of efficient cooperation in the European Neighbourhood? Bruges Political Research Papers 49/2015.

Israel figures among the world-leaders in R&D expenditure and has a high-performing scientific community. Since the 1990s it has been associated with the Scientific Policy of the European Union via the European Research Framework Programmes (FP). The cooperation between Israel and the EU in this domain has gradually increased and benefits the scientific communities on both sides. In 2014 the association of Israel to the latest and biggest European FP ever adopted (Horizon 2020) was renewed for the fourth time. Based on all the scientific evidence provided, the elaboration of a European Research Policy can be identified as a highly regulated domain, offering relevant ‘channels of influence’. These channels offer Israel the opportunity to act within the Research Policy system. Being a member of several formal EU bodies in charge of implementing EU Research Policy, Israel is able to introduce its positions effectively. This is accompanied by an outstanding level of activity by Israel in linking concrete EU Research Policy measures to the Israeli Scientific Community at the national level. To carry out this task, Israel relies on an effective organization, which remodels the provided EU structures: European ‘National Contact Points’ (NCPs) are concentrated within the ‘Europe Israel R&D Directorate’ (ISERD). ISERD connects efficiently all the relevant actors, forums and phases of EU-Israeli Research Policy. ISERD can be recognized as being at the heart of Israel's research cooperation with the EU, and its structure may be a source of in

Geopolitics with European characteristics: An essay on pragmatic idealism, equality, and strategy. Egmont Paper 82, March 2016

‘A bizarre phenomenon,’ Der Spiegel concluded, after trying to figure out why young people left Germany to become foreign fighters in Syria. The magazine painted a portrait of two thirty-somethings with similar backgrounds and the same hobby – martial arts. One became director of a martial arts school in Hamburg, the other became a terrorist poster boy in Syria.2

A challenge for liberal democracy: How to understand the Russian intervention in Ukraine. Bertelsmann Policy Brief, 16.10.2014

The Russian intervention in Ukraine has provoked a deep crisis which will likely last for years, with profound consequences not only for Ukraine, Russia and Eastern Europe, but also for the internal situation in the European Union. The current Russian aggression is frequently seen as a profound violation of international law, breaking the rules that are fundamental for relations in Europe. It is perceived as perhaps a step towards rebuilding imperial Russia or, at the very least, an attempt to keep Ukraine within Russia’s sphere of influence. However, one very important aspect is virtually neglected, namely, that Russia’s Ukraine venture may have a significant impact on the future of liberal democracy in Europe and beyond.

A Roadmap to Enhanced Regional Energy Policy: Cooperation in South East Europe. CEPS Special Report, No. 134/April 2016

Regional Energy Policy Cooperation has now gained political traction in the EU as a tool to advance the EU’s energy objectives. Cooperation and coordination is meant to facilitate the convergence of markets and policies, so while the creation of one EU Internal Energy Market remains the goal, regional cooperation is the tool with which to achieve that goal. Cooperation could become the stepping-stone towards the completion of the Internal Energy Market within the European 2030 climate and energy framework and beyond.

The twilight of the oil Eldorado. How the activity of Russian oil companies on the EU market has evolved. OSW Studies 55, April 2016

The European Union has traditionally been the most important outlet for Russian oil exports. At the same time, during the period 2011-2014 a systematic decline was observed in crude oil supplies to the EU, while at the same time the export of petroleum products increased. It is now difficult to say that Russia is following a coherent oil strategy vis-a-vis the EU. The current shape of Russian activity is more the result of the business interests of individual companies, rather than the result of activities coordinated by the state. Although in the short term (up to 2020), the negative trend in crude oil exports to the EU could be halted (as confirmed by the figures for 2015), the long-term prospects for Russia's position on the EU market are pessimistic. This is because the importance of factors unfavourable to Russia is rising, such as the decrease in consumption of oil in the EU, the increased competition among exporters to the EU market, and the deterioration of the climate of Russian/EU cooperation in the context of the anti-Russian sanctions, as well as unclear prospects for the development of the upstream sector in Russia.

Russia’s ‘Middle East’: the escalation of religious conflicts in the Northern Caucasus. OSW Commentary Number 207/04.04.2016

The eastern part of the Northern Caucasus (Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia) is becoming an increasingly distinct region in cultural, civilisational and social terms when compared to the rest of the Russian Federation. The situation on the ground there bears greater resemblance to the Middle East than to Russia: Islam is the key factor organising socio-political life, and conflicts inside the Muslim community, often involving bloodshed, are the driving power of developments in the region. The conflict is between the two main branches of Islam in the Northern Caucasus: Sufism linked to the official clergy and government, and Salafism which is gaining more and more supporters among young people in the Caucasus. Tension, including clashes over mosques, attacks, mass detentions, etc. has been observed mainly in Dagestan and Ingushetia.

Information Guide: European Union information from South Korean sources

No abstract.

The Effects of Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions on EU-Russian Trade Flows. CEPS Commentary, 5 July 2016

After Russia annexed Crimea in early 2014 and then intervened, manu militari, in the Eastern part of Ukraine, the European Union wanted to show its disapproval and put pressure on Russia to change its behaviour. A wide variety of measures were taken, including the imposition of individual restrictions, such as asset freezes and travel bans, but also the suspension of development loans from the EBRD. But the EU (together with the United States) also took, in July and September 2014, a set of broader measures: limited access to EU primary and secondary capital markets for targeted Russian financial institutions and energy and defence companies; export and import bans on trade in arms; an export ban for dual-use goods and reduction of Russia’s access to sensitive technologies and services linked to oil production.

Cautious and rotational – US military engagement on NATO’s eastern flank. OSW Commentary NUMBER 216 | 05.07.2016

The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 put a stop to the gradual scaling down of US military engagement in Europe, a policy that the United States had pursued since the end of the Cold War. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict became a watershed for the US perceptions of European security as Washington started to see the threat of a conflict between Russia and a NATO member as more probable. The United States decided that – despite the mounting challenges in the Pacific region and its involvement in conflicts in the Middle East – it had to invest more in European security. The US has stepped up the intensity of joint drills with the allies and the activities of its forces in Europe. However, its support for the allies has been subject to various limitations and should be treated as a political signal to Moscow, rather than an element in a broader strategy. The future of the policy of strengthening the eastern flank will depend on the outcome of the US presidential elections in November and on developments in the bilateral relations between Washington and Moscow.