Detecting Deception in Movement: The Case of the Side-Step in Rugby

Although coordinated patterns of body movement can be used to communicate action intention, they can also be used to deceive. Often known as deceptive movements, these unpredictable patterns of body movement can give a competitive advantage to an attacker when trying to outwit a defender. In this particular study, we immersed novice and expert rugby players in an interactive virtual rugby environment to understand how the dynamics of deceptive body movement influence a defending player’s decisions about how and when to act. When asked to judge final running direction, expert players who were found to tune into prospective tau-based information specified in the dynamics of ‘honest’ movement signals (Centre of Mass), performed significantly better than novices who tuned into the dynamics of ‘deceptive’ movement signals (upper trunk yaw and out-foot placement) (p<.001). These findings were further corroborated in a second experiment where players were able to move as if to intercept or ‘tackle’ the virtual attacker. An analysis of action responses showed that experts waited significantly longer before initiating movement (p<.001). By waiting longer and picking up more information that would inform about future running direction these experts made significantly fewer errors (p<.05). In this paper we not only present a mathematical model that describes how deception in body-based movement is detected, but we also show how perceptual expertise is manifested in action expertise. We conclude that being able to tune into the ‘honest’ information specifying true running action intention gives a strong competitive advantage.

Vision Modulates Corticospinal Suppression in a Functionally Specific Manner during Movement of the Opposite Limb

The effect of vision on the excitability of corticospinal projections to the flexor carpi radialis (FCR) and extensor carpi radialis (ECR) muscles of right human forearm was investigated before and during discrete movement of the opposite limb. An external force opposed the initial phase of the movement (wrist flexion) and assisted the reverse phase, so that recruitment of the wrist extensors was minimized. Three conditions were used as follows: viewing the inactive right limb (Vision), viewing the mirror image of the moving left limb (Mirror), and with vision of the right limb occluded (No Vision). Transcranial magnetic stimulation was delivered to the left motor cortex: before, at the onset of, or during the left limb movement to obtain motor evoked potentials (MEPs) in the muscles of the right forearm. At and following movement onset, MEPs obtained in the right FCR were smaller in the Vision condition than in the Mirror and No Vision conditions. A distinct pattern of variation was obtained for the ECR. In all conditions, MEPs in this muscle were elevated upon or following movement of the opposite limb. An additional analysis of ipsilateral silent periods indicated that interhemispheric inhibition plays a role in mediating these effects. Activity-dependent changes in corticospinal output to a resting limb during discrete actions of the opposite limb are thus directly contingent upon where one looks. Furthermore, the extent to which vision exerts an influence upon projections to specific muscles varies in accordance with the functional contribution of their homologs to the intended action.

The Importance of Religious Displays for Belief Acquisition and Secularization

Both the sociology and the cognitive science of religion seek to explain the acquisition of religious beliefs. In this article, I offer an account of the acquisition and distribution of religious beliefs using the findings of both fields. In the process, I seek to illustrate the potential of interdisciplinary dialogue for improving our understanding of religion and its absence. More specifically, I present a prima facie case—based on existing work in the social and cognitive sciences, exploratory online surveys, and participant observation—that witnessing actions attesting to religious claims is one of the most crucial variables determining whether or not an individual will explicitly believe such claims. Further, I argue that the connection between action and belief can help produce an improved account of secularization and non-theism, defined here as the lack of explicit belief in the existence of non-physical agents.

The Science of Religious Beliefs

Why have humans, throughout history and across cultures, shown a strong tendency to believe in the existence of superhuman intentional agents and attached this belief to notions of morality, misfortune, and the creation of the world? The answer emerging from the cognitive science of religion appears to be that explicit beliefs are informed and constrained by the natural and cross-culturally recurrent operation of implicit cognitive systems. Successful god concepts resonate with the expectations of these implicit systems but also have attention-demanding and inferentially-rich properties that allow their integration into various areas of human concern. Theological concepts may deviate from these natural cognitive moorings but require special cultural scaffolding, such as Whitehouse's two Modes of Religiosity, to do so and constitute additions to, rather than replacements of the religious beliefs supported by implicit cognitive systems.