929 resultados para Religion, General|History, Black|History, Church|Sociology, Social Structure and Development
Resumo:
Evidence suggests that the social cognition deficits prevalent in autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) are widely distributed in first degree and extended relatives. This ¿broader autism phenotype¿ (BAP) can be extended into non-clinical populations and show wide distributions of social behaviors such as empathy and social responsiveness ¿ with ASDs exhibiting these behaviors on the lower ends of the distributions. Little evidence has previously shown relationships between self-report measures of social cognition and more objective tasks such as face perception in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and event-related potentials (ERPs). In this study, three specific hypotheses were addressed: a) increased social ability, as measured by an increased Empathy Quotient, decreased Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS-A) score, and increased Social Attribution Task score, will predict increased activation of the fusiform gyrus in response to faces as compared to houses; b) these same measures will predict N170 amplitude and latency showing decreased latency and increased amplitude for faces as compared to houses with increased social ability; c) increased amygdala volume will predict increased fusiform gyrus activation when viewing faces as compared to houses. Findings supported all of the hypotheses. Empathy scores significantly predicted both right FFG activation [F(1,20) = 4.811, p = .041, ß = .450, R2 = 0.20] and left FFG activation [F(1,20) = 7.70, p = .012, ß = .537, R2 = 0.29]. Based on ERP results increased right lateralization face-related N170 was significantly predicted by the EQ [F(1,54) = 6.94, p = .011, ß = .338, R2 = 0.11]. Finally, total amygdala volume significantly predicted right [F(1,20) = 7.217, p = .014, ß = .515, R2 = 0.27] and left [F(1,20) = 36.77, p < .001, ß = .805, R2 = 0.65] FFG activation. Consistent with the a priori hypotheses, traits attributed to the BAP can significantly predict neural responses to faces in a non-clinical population. This is consistent with the face processing deficits seen in ASDs. The findings presented here contribute to the extension of the BAP from unaffected relatives of individuals with ASDs to the general population. These findings also give continued evidence in support of a continuous distribution of traits found in psychiatric illnesses in place of a traditional, dichotomous ¿all-or-nothing¿ diagnostic framework of neurodevelopmental and neuropsychiatric disorders.
Resumo:
BACKGROUND: Social cognition is an important aspect of social behavior in humans. Social cognitive deficits are associated with neurodevelopmental and neuropsychiatric disorders. In this study we examine the neural substrates of social cognition and face processing in a group of healthy young adults to examine the neural substrates of social cognition. METHODS: Fifty-seven undergraduates completed a battery of social cognition tasks and were assessed with electroencephalography (EEG) during a face-perception task. A subset (N=22) were administered a face-perception task during functional magnetic resonance imaging. RESULTS: Variance in the N170 EEG was predicted by social attribution performance and by a quantitative measure of empathy. Neurally, face processing was more bilateral in females than in males. Variance in fMRI voxel count in the face-sensitive fusiform gyrus was predicted by quantitative measures of social behavior, including the Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS) and the Empathizing Quotient. CONCLUSIONS: When measured as a quantitative trait, social behaviors in typical and pathological populations share common neural pathways. The results highlight the importance of viewing neurodevelopmental and neuropsychiatric disorders as spectrum phenomena that may be informed by studies of the normal distribution of relevant traits in the general population. Copyright 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Resumo:
This article explores the role of political context in shaping economic biases in representation-the degree to which wealthy citizens' views are more strongly represented than poorer citizens' views in the choices of policymakers. I develop a general model that explains why poorer citizens will be better represented relative to the rich in certain political contexts than others, arguing that the relative representation of the poor will be stronger in contexts that make the views of the poor relevant and accessible to policymakers. I then derive several specific hypotheses that flow from this model and test these hypotheses through a study of the dyadic relationships between citizens and their representatives in the U.S. Congress. The results show that poorer citizens are better represented relative to the rich in Congressional districts that are electorally competitive, have low median incomes, have relatively equal distributions of incomes, have a significant organized labor presence, and are represented by Democrats.
Resumo:
In this critical analysis of sociological studies of the political subsystem in Yugoslavia since the fall of communism Mr. Ilic examined the work of the majority of leading researchers of politics in the country between 1990 and 1996. Where the question of continuity was important, he also looked at previous research by the writers in question. His aim was to demonstrate the overall extent of existing research and at the same time to identify its limits and the social conditions which defined it. Particular areas examined included the problems of defining basic concepts and selecting the theoretically most relevant indicators; the sources of data including the types of authentic materials exploited; problems of research work (contacts, field control, etc.); problems of analysisl and finally the problems arising from different relations with the people who commission the research. In the first stage of the research, looking at methods of defining key terms, special attention was paid to the analysis of the most frequently used terms such as democracy, totalitarianism, the political left and right, and populism. Numerous weaknesses were noted in the analytic application of these terms. In studies of the possibilities of creating a democratic political system in Serbia and its possible forms (democracy of the majority or consensual democracy), the profound social division of Serbian society was neglected. The left-right distinction tends to be identified with the government-opposition relation, in the way of practical politics. The idea of populism was used to pass responsibility for the policy of war from the manipulator to the manipulated, while the concept of totalitarianism is used in a rather old-fashioned way, with echoes of the cold war. In general, the terminology used in the majority of recent research on the political subsystem in Yugoslavia is characterised by a special ideological style and by practical political material, rather than by developed theoretical effort. The second section of analysis considered the wider theoretical background of the research and focused on studies of the processes of transformation and transition in Yugoslav society, particularly the work of Mladen Lazic and Silvano Bolcic, who he sees as representing the most important and influential contemporary Yugoslav sociologists. Here Mr. Ilic showed that the meaning of empirical data is closely connected with the stratification schemes towards which they are oriented, so that the same data can have different meanings in shown through different schemes. He went on to show the observed theoretical frames in the context of wider ideological understanding of the authors' ideas and research. Here the emphasis was on the formalistic character of such notions as command economy and command work which were used in analysing the functioning and the collapse of communist society, although Mr. Ilic passed favourable judgement on the Lazic's critique of political over-determination in its various attempts to explain the disintegration of the communist political (sub)system. The next stage of the analysis was devoted to the problem of empirical identification of the observed phenomena. Here again the notions of the political left and right were of key importance. He sees two specific problems in using these notion in talking about Yugoslavia, the first being that the process of transition in the FR Yugoslavia has hardly begun. The communist government has in effect remained in power continuously since 1945, despite the introduction of a multi-party system in 1990. The process of privatisation of public property was interrupted at a very early stage and the results of this are evident on the structural level in the continuous weakening of the social status of the middle class and on the political level because the social structure and dominant form of property direct the majority of votes towards to communists in power. This has been combined with strong chauvinist confusion associated with the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, and these ideas were incorporated by all the relevant Yugoslav political parties, making it more difficult to differentiate between them empirically. In this context he quotes the situation of the stream of political scientists who emerged in the Faculty of Political Science in Belgrade. During the time of the one-party regime, this faculty functioned as ideological support for official communist policy and its teachers were unable to develop views which differed from the official line, but rather treated all contrasting ideas in the same way, neglecting their differences. Following the introduction of a multi-party system, these authors changed their idea of a public enemy, but still retained an undifferentiated and theoretically undeveloped approach to the issue of the identification of political ideas. The fourth section of the work looked at problems of explanation in studying the political subsystem and the attempts at an adequate causal explanation of the triumph of Slobodan Milosevic's communists at four subsequent elections was identified as the key methodological problem. The main problem Mr. Ilic isolated here was the neglect of structural factors in explaining the voters' choice. He then went on to look at the way empirical evidence is collected and studied, pointing out many mistakes in planning and determining the samples used in surveys as well as in the scientifically incorrect use of results. He found these weaknesses particularly noticeable in the works of representatives of the so-called nationalistic orientation in Yugoslav sociology of politics, and he pointed out the practical political abuses which these methodological weaknesses made possible. He also identified similar types of mistakes in research by Serbian political parties made on the basis of party documentation and using methods of content analysis. He found various none-sided applications of survey data and looked at attempts to apply other sources of data (statistics, official party documents, various research results). Mr. Ilic concluded that there are two main sets of characteristics in modern Yugoslav sociological studies of political subsystems. There are a considerable number of surveys with ambitious aspirations to explain political phenomena, but at the same time there is a clear lack of a developed sociological theory of political (sub)systems. He feels that, in the absence of such theory, most researcher are over-ready to accept the theoretical solutions found for interpretation of political phenomena in other countries. He sees a need for a stronger methodological bases for future research, either 1) in complementary usage of different sources and ways of collecting data, or 2) in including more of a historical dimension in different attempts to explain the political subsystem in Yugoslavia.
Resumo:
Since the turbulence of 1989, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have striven to "return to Europe". Agreements have been signed with ten post-communist countries, beginning in 1991 with Czechoslovakia (before its division), Hungary and Poland. Since that time several countries have expressed a desire to become members of the EU. In 1997 the European Commission announced its opinion on the applications for EU membership of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and seven other applicant countries. The Commission recommended the commencement of negotiations on accession with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. Mr. Kucia's report, presented in the form of a series of manuscripts totalling 91 pages, written in English and Polish and including many pages of tables and graphs, presents the results of a study of public opinion on European integration in four countries of Central Europe (CE): the Czech Republic (CZ), Hungary (H), Poland (PL), and Slovakia (SK). The research results are primarily based on a public-opinion survey known as the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer (CEEB). CEEB has been conducted on behalf of the European Commission in the Central and Eastern European countries each year in autumn since 1990. Below is a very small selection of Mr. Kucia's research findings. Throughout the 90s people in the four countries increasingly saw their countries' future tied up with the EU, since economic and political connections to the EU were growing and prospects for EU membership were increasing. Regional co-operation within CE did not gain much popular recognition. However, initially high levels of enthusiasm for the EU were gradually superseded by a more realistic approach or even scepticism. Poland was the exception in this respect; its population was more positive about the EU in 1996 than ever before. Mr. Kucia concludes that, since the political "elites" in CE are more positive about the EU than the people they serve, they should do their best to bring people round to their beliefs, lest the project of European integration become purely the business of the elites, as Mr. Kucia claims it has been in the EU up till now. He accuses the governments of the region, the EU authorities and the media of failing to provide appropriate information, especially about the two subjects which most affect them, association with the EU and the PHARE assistance programme. Respondents were asked to rank in order the countries or regions they saw their country's future most closely tied up with. In the period 92-96 the EU received the highest ratings in all of CE. The ratings were highest in CZ in 92 and 93 (46%) and in Poland in 96 (46%). They were the lowest in Hungary (22% in 94). After the EU came "Other Western European countries (non EU)", that is Austria, Sweden and Finland (before they joined the EU in 1995), Switzerland and Norway. Mr. Kucia puts the high ratings of these countries down to historical connections and geographical proximity, particularly in the case of Austria. The USA always came second in Poland, and in Hungary too its standing has always been higher than in CZ or SK. Indeed Mr. Kucia suggests that the USA's standing is disproportionately low in especially the CZ. Germany was nominated frequently by Hungarians, though in the CZ and SK, figures have been consistently low (1-2%). "Other CE/EE countries" increased their ratings in all of CE except Poland between 92 and 96. With regard to these last figures, Mr. Kucia makes an interesting note. Assuming that for the respondents in the four countries this category covered the Visegrad 4, least support was found in Poland, whose government was the most in favour of close political co-operation within the V4, while most support was in evidence in CZ and SK, for whose governments V4 was simply not a priority. Again, there is evidence of a divide between the political elites and the people. Russia has occupied a consistently modest rank. It was the highest in PL, fairly low in H and SK and the lowest in CZ. The Slovak government's policy of closer ties with Russia is reflected in a growth in the figures from 2% in 93 to 6% in 95. Every year the spontaneous answer "we should depend on ourselves" appeared, which Mr. Kucia interprets as either a sign of isolationism and disillusionment or as a call for self-reliance. Unfortunately he regards both these tendencies as unfeasible in the uniting Europe. Moving to more general conclusions, Mr. Kucia finds that the concept "Central Europe" does not have much meaning for Central Europeans. He believes that this is probably due to the failure to establish a viable regional co-operation network. Group discussions also revealed that people thought themselves European as a consequence of being Czech or Polish etc. Thus European identity is based on national identities. Generally within the surveyed period, the numbers of those who said they often think themselves European decreased, while the numbers of those who said they never think themselves European increased from 41% in PL, 36% in CZ, and 30% in H in 1990, to 67% in CZ, 58% in PL, and 51% in H in 1995.
Resumo:
OBJECTIVES: To investigate epidemiological, social, diagnostic and economic aspects of chlamydia screening in non-genitourinary medicine settings. METHODS: Linked studies around a cross-sectional population-based survey of adult men and women invited to collect urine and (for women) vulvovaginal swab specimens at home and mail these to a laboratory for testing for Chlamydia trachomatis. Specimens were used in laboratory evaluations of an amplified enzyme immunoassay (PCE EIA) and two nucleic acid amplification tests [Cobas polymerase chain reaction (PCR), Becton Dickinson strand displacement amplification (SDA)]. Chlamydia-positive cases and two negative controls completed a risk factor questionnaire. Chlamydia-positive cases were invited into a randomised controlled trial of partner notification strategies. Samples of individuals testing negative completed psychological questionnaires before and after screening. In-depth interviews were conducted at all stages of screening. Chlamydia transmission and cost-effectiveness of screening were investigated in a transmission dynamic model. SETTING AND PARTICIPANTS: General population in the Bristol and Birmingham areas of England. In total, 19,773 women and men aged 16-39 years were randomly selected from 27 general practice lists. RESULTS: Screening invitations reached 73% (14,382/19,773). Uptake (4731 participants), weighted for sampling, was 39.5% (95% CI 37.7, 40.8%) in women and 29.5% (95% CI 28.0, 31.0%) in men aged 16-39 years. Chlamydia prevalence (219 positive results) in 16-24 year olds was 6.2% (95% CI 4.9, 7.8%) in women and 5.3% (95% CI 4.4, 6.3%) in men. The case-control study did not identify any additional factors that would help target screening. Screening did not adversely affect anxiety, depression or self-esteem. Participants welcomed the convenience and privacy of home-sampling. The relative sensitivity of PCR on male urine specimens was 100% (95% CI 89.1, 100%). The combined relative sensitivities of PCR and SDA using female urine and vulvovaginal swabs were 91.8% (86.1, 95.7, 134/146) and 97.3% (93.1, 99.2%, 142/146). A total of 140 people (74% of eligible) participated in the randomised trial. Compared with referral to a genitourinary medicine clinic, partner notification by practice nurses resulted in 12.4% (95% CI -3.7, 28.6%) more patients with at least one partner treated and 22.0% (95% CI 6.1, 37.8%) more patients with all partners treated. The health service and patients costs (2005 prices) of home-based postal chlamydia screening were 21.47 pounds (95% CI 19.91 pounds, 25.99) per screening invitation and 28.56 pounds (95% CI 22.10 pounds, 30.43) per accepted offer. Preliminary modelling found an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (2003 prices) comparing screening men and women annually to no screening in the base case of 27,000 pounds/major outcome averted at 8 years. If estimated screening uptake and pelvic inflammatory disease incidence were increased, the cost-effectiveness ratio fell to 3700 pounds/major outcome averted. CONCLUSIONS: Proactive screening for chlamydia in women and men using home-collected specimens was feasible and acceptable. Chlamydia prevalence rates in men and women in the general population are similar. Nucleic acid amplification tests can be used on first-catch urine specimens and vulvovaginal swabs. The administrative costs of proactive screening were similar to those for opportunistic screening. Using empirical estimates of screening uptake and incidence of complications, screening was not cost-effective.
Resumo:
Background Recent work on the complexity of life highlights the roles played by evolutionary forces at different levels of individuality. One of the central puzzles in explaining transitions in individuality for entities ranging from complex cells, to multicellular organisms and societies, is how different autonomous units relinquish control over their functions to others in the group. In addition to the necessity of reducing conflict over effecting specialized tasks, differentiating groups must control the exploitation of the commons, or else be out-competed by more fit groups. Results We propose that two forms of conflict – access to resources within groups and representation in germ line – may be resolved in tandem through individual and group-level selective effects. Specifically, we employ an optimization model to show the conditions under which different within-group social behaviors (cooperators producing a public good or cheaters exploiting the public good) may be selected to disperse, thereby not affecting the commons and functioning as germ line. We find that partial or complete dispersal specialization of cheaters is a general outcome. The propensity for cheaters to disperse is highest with intermediate benefit:cost ratios of cooperative acts and with high relatedness. An examination of a range of real biological systems tends to support our theory, although additional study is required to provide robust tests. Conclusion We suggest that trait linkage between dispersal and cheating should be operative regardless of whether groups ever achieve higher levels of individuality, because individual selection will always tend to increase exploitation, and stronger group structure will tend to increase overall cooperation through kin selected benefits. Cheater specialization as dispersers offers simultaneous solutions to the evolution of cooperation in social groups and the origin of specialization of germ and soma in multicellular organisms.
Resumo:
OBJECTIVE: To investigate the relationship between social support and coagulation parameter reactivity to mental stress in men and to determine if norepinephrine is involved. Lower social support is associated with higher basal coagulation activity and greater norepinephrine stress reactivity, which in turn, is linked with hypercoagulability. However, it is not known if low social support interacts with stress to further increase coagulation reactivity or if norepinephrine affects this association. These findings may be important for determining if low social support influences thrombosis and possible acute coronary events in response to acute stress. We investigated the relationship between social support and coagulation parameter reactivity to mental stress in men and determined if norepinephrine is involved. METHODS: We measured perceived social support in 63 medication-free nonsmoking men (age (mean +/- standard error of the mean) = 36.7 +/- 1.7 years) who underwent an acute standardized psychosocial stress task combining public speaking and mental arithmetic in front of an audience. We measured plasma D-dimer, fibrinogen, clotting Factor VII activity (FVII:C), and plasma norepinephrine at rest as well as immediately after stress and 20 minutes after stress. RESULTS: Independent of body mass index, mean arterial pressure, and age, lower social support was associated with higher D-dimer and fibrinogen levels at baseline (p < .012) and with greater increases in fibrinogen (beta = -0.36, p = .001; DeltaR(2) = .12), and D-dimer (beta = -0.21, p = .017; DeltaR(2) = .04), but not in FVII:C (p = .83) from baseline to 20 minutes after stress. General linear models revealed significant main effects of social support and stress on fibrinogen, D-dimer, and norepinephrine (p < .035). Controlling for norepinephrine did not change the significance of the reported associations between social support and the coagulation measures D-dimer and fibrinogen. CONCLUSIONS: Our results suggest that lower social support is associated with greater coagulation activity before and after acute stress, which was unrelated to norepinephrine reactivity.
Resumo:
Ethnic violence appears to be the major source of violence in the world. Ethnic hostilities are potentially all-pervasive because most countries in the world are multi-ethnic. Public health's focus on violence documents its increasing role in this issue.^ The present study is based on a secondary analysis of a dataset of responses by 272 individuals from four ethnic groups (Anglo, African, Mexican, and Vietnamese Americans) who answered questions regarding variables related to ethnic violence from a general questionnaire which was distributed to ethnically diverse purposive, nonprobability, self-selected groups of individuals in Houston, Texas, in 1993.^ One goal was psychometric: learning about issues in analysis of datasets with modest numbers, comparison of two approaches to dealing with missing observations not missing at random (conducting analysis on two datasets), transformation analysis of continuous variables for logistic regression, and logistic regression diagnostics.^ Regarding the psychometric goal, it was concluded that measurement model analysis was not possible with a relatively small dataset with nonnormal variables, such as Likert-scaled variables; therefore, exploratory factor analysis was used. The two approaches to dealing with missing values resulted in comparable findings. Transformation analysis suggested that the continuous variables were in the correct scale, and diagnostics that the model fit was adequate.^ The substantive portion of the analysis included the testing of four hypotheses. Hypothesis One proposed that attitudes/efficacy regarding alternative approaches to resolving grievances from the general questionnaire represented underlying factors: nonpunitive social norms and strategies for addressing grievances--using the political system, organizing protests, using the system to punish offenders, and personal mediation. Evidence was found to support all but one factor, nonpunitive social norms.^ Hypothesis Two proposed that the factor variables and the other independent variables--jail, grievance, male, young, and membership in a particular ethnic group--were associated with (non)violence. Jail, grievance, and not using the political system to address grievances were associated with a greater likelihood of intergroup violence.^ No evidence was found to support Hypotheses Three and Four, which proposed that grievance and ethnic group membership would interact with other variables (i.e., age, gender, etc.) to produce variant levels of subgroup (non)violence.^ The generalizability of the results of this study are constrained by the purposive self-selected nature of the sample and small sample size (n = 272).^ Suggestions for future research include incorporating other possible variables or factors predictive of intergroup violence in models of the kind tested here, and the development and evaluation of interventions that promote electoral and nonelectoral political participation as means of reducing interethnic conflict. ^
Resumo:
Recent research on the transformation of West European party systems emphasises that cultural issues such as immigration have gained in importance besides the traditional socio-economic cleavage. While this literature shows that parties address not only cultural but also economic is-sues, it has paid less attention on whether parties combine cultural and economic issues. In this paper we focus on immigrants’ social rights by analysing if and how mainstream parties combine immigration and redistributive issues. Drawing on Faist (1995), we distinguish three different perspectives how political actors, here mainstream parties, might react to the welfare chauvinist claims that aim to restrict immigrants’ social rights. Our analysis relies on party manifestos in Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom between 1999 and 2011. The results of the anal-ysis indicate that variation is found among party families, in particular among the left. Even though the purpose of the paper is not to ‘prove’ that the populist challenge explains how the mainstream left-wing parties behave, the results allow nonetheless for interpreting mainstream parties’ strategic combination of welfare and immigration issues as a response to anti-immigration and anti-integration issues raised by populist challengers.
Resumo:
Weight bias often results in the social exclusion of individuals with obesity. The direct, short-term psychological effects of social exclusion in obesity have not been investigated yet. This study experimentally tests whether social exclusion elicits stronger negative emotions in individuals with obesity compared to normal-weight controls. Specifically, we test whether social exclusion has a specific impact on shame. In total, N = 299 individuals (n = 130 with body mass index [BMI] ≤ 30 and n = 169 with BMI N 30) were randomly assigned to a social exclusion condition or a control condition that was implemented with an online Cyberball paradigm. Before and after, they filled out questionnaires assessing state emotionality. Social exclusion increased negative emotionality in both groups compared to the control condition (p b 0.001) according to a multivariate ANOVA. However, the interaction of group and social exclusion was also significant (p = 0.035) and arose from a significant, specific increase of shame in the group with obesity during social exclusion (p b 0.001, Cohen's d = 0.7). When faced with social exclusion, individuals with obesity do not respond with more intensive negative emotions in general compared to controls, but with a specific increase in shame. As social exclusion is frequent in individuals with obesity, psychological interventions focussing shame-related emotional distress could be crucial.