Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London.

Mode of access: Internet.

The Edinburgh philosophical journal

Contains the proceedings of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, the Wernerian Natural History Society, etc

Edinburgh new philosophical journal

Mode of access: Internet.

Religion & science; a philosophical essay,

Mode of access: Internet.

Annals of archaeology and anthropology.

At head of title: University of Liverpool.

Annals of archaeology and anthropology

Issued by the Institute of Archaeology

Comparative vocabulary of Algonquin dialects. From Heckewelder's manuscripts in the collections of the American philosophical society, Philadelphia.

"The manuscript of this work is in the library of the American philosophical society. It is a copy made by Mr. Duponceau, and forms no. xxvii of a collection made by him and recorded in a folio account book, of which it occupies pp. 114-119."--Pilling, Bibl. of the Algonquin languages, p. 227.

The philosophical dictionary. With an original life of the author and the quotations

Translation of Dictionnaire philosophique.

An oration, delivered before the American Philosophical Society, held in Philadelphia on the 27th of February, 1786; containing an enquiry into the influence of physical causes upon the moral faculty ...

Microfilmed for preservation

A voyage to Senegal ; or, historical, philosophical, and political memoirs, relative to the discoveries ... of Europeans in the Atlantic Ocean ... to which is added an account of a journey from Isle St. Louis to Galam

by J. P. L. Durand

The philosophical significance of Cox's theorem

Cox's theorem states that, under certain assumptions, any measure of belief is isomorphic to a probability measure. This theorem, although intended as a justification of the subjectivist interpretation of probability theory, is sometimes presented as an argument for more controversial theses. Of particular interest is the thesis that the only coherent means of representing uncertainty is via the probability calculus. In this paper I examine the logical assumptions of Cox's theorem and I show how these impinge on the philosophical conclusions thought to be supported by the theorem. I show that the more controversial thesis is not supported by Cox's theorem. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.