QCD sum rules study of the meson Z(+)(4430)

We use QCD sum rules to study the recently observed meson Z(+)(4430), considered as a D*D-1 molecule with J(P) = 0(-). We consider the contributions of condensates up to dimension eight and work at leading order in alpha(s). We get m(Z) = (4.40 +/- 0.10) GeV in a very good agreement with the experimental value. We also make predictions for the analogous mesons Z(s) and Z(bb) considered as D-s*D-1 and B*B-1 molecules, respectively. For Z(s) we predict mZ(s) = (4.70 +/- 0.06) GeV, which is above the D-s* D-1 threshold, indicating that it is probably a very broad state and, therefore, difficult to observe experimentally. For Z(bb) we predict m(Zbb) = (10.74 +/- 0.12) GeV, in agreement with quark model predictions. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

rho D*D* vertex from QCD sum rules

We calculate the form factors and the coupling constant in the rho D*D* vertex in the framework of QCD sum rules. We evaluate the three point correlation functions of the vertex considering both rho and D* mesons off-shell. The form factors obtained are very different but give the same coupling constant: g rho D*D* = 6.60 +/- 0.31. This number is 50% larger than what we would expect from SU(4) estimates. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

"I like being under those rules here": Students Using the College Library

This presentation was offered as part of the CUNY Library Assessment Conference, Reinventing Libraries: Reinventing Assessment, held at the City University of New York in June 2014.

Perceptions of Sustainability and Functional Aspects on Liquid Carton Board Packaging Materials versus Competing Materials for Juice Applications in Sweden

This research explores the downstream perceptions of liquid carton board versus competing materials in packaging applications for juice. The methodology used is focus groups. The context is sustainability and functional performance, and related potential implications for the beverage industry value chain. The purpose is to get a deeper insight and understanding of functionality in relation to juice beverage packaging. The results confirm that there is no optimal packaging for every juice product, but a multitude, depending on the distribution channel, retail outlet, customer preferences, and context of consumption. There are some general packaging preferences, but the main deciding criteria for purchase seem to be the product characteristics in terms of quality, taste, brand, price and shelf life. For marketing reasons, packaging has to be adopted to the product and its positioning, liquid carton board packaging seem to have some functional advantages in distribution and is considered as sustainable and functional among many consumers. Major drawbacks seem to be shape limitations, lack of transparency, and lack of a “premium look”. To improve packaging performance and avoid sub-optimization, actors in the beverage industry value chain need to be integrated in development processes.

Endogenous time-dependent rules and inflation inertia: preliminary version

When policy rules are changed, the effect of nominal rigidities should be modelled through endogenous pricing rules. We endogenize Taylor (1979) type pricing rule to examine the output effects of monetary disinflations. We derive optimal fixed-price time-dependent rules in inflationary steady states and during disinflations. We also develop a methodology to aggregate individual pricing rules which vary through disinflation. This allows us to reevaluate the output costs of monetary disinflation, including aspects as the role of the initial leveI of inflation and the importance of the degree of credibility of the policy change.

Endogenous time-dependent rules and the costs of disinflation with imperfect credibility

This paper examines the output effects of monetary disinflation in a model with endogenous time-dependent pricing rules and imperfect credibility of the disinflation policy. We find that these features interact to generate an additional effect on top f the ones obtained with either endogenous time-dependent rules (Bonomo and Carvalho, 2003) or imperfect credibility (Ball, 1995) in isolation. This results in higher output costs of monetary disinflation.

Electoral rules, political competition and fiscal spending: regression discontinuity evidence from brazilian municipalities

We exploit a discontinuity in Brazilian municipal election rules to investigate whether political competition has a causal impact on policy choices. In municipalities with less than 200,000 voters mayors are elected with a plurality of the vote. In municipalities with more than 200,000 voters a run-off election takes place among the top two candidates if neither achieves a majority of the votes. At a first stage, we show that the possibility of runoff increases political competition. At a second stage, we use the discontinuity as a source of exogenous variation to infer causality from political competition to fiscal policy. Our second stage results suggest that political competition induces more investment and less current spending, particularly personnel expenses. Furthermore, the impact of political competition is larger when incumbents can run for reelection, suggesting incentives matter insofar as incumbents can themselves remain in office.

Decision rules and information provision: monitoring versus manipulation

The paper focuses on the organization of institutions designed to resolve disputes between two parties, when some information is not veriable and decision makers may have vested preferences. It shows that the choice of how much discretional power to grant to the decision maker and who provides the information are intrinsically related. Direct involvement of the interested parties in the supply of information enhances monitoring over the decision maker, although at the cost of higher manipulation. Thus, it is desirable when the decision maker is granted high discretion. On the contrary, when the decision maker has limited discretional power, information provision is better assigned to an agent with no direct stake. The analysis helps to rationalize some organizational arrangements that are commonly observed in the context of judicial and antitrust decision-making.

Are one-sided S,s rules useful proxies for optimal pricing rules?

This article is motivated by the prominence of one-sided S,s rules in the literature and by the unrealistic strict conditions necessary for their optimality. It aims to assess whether one-sided pricing rules could be an adequate individual rule for macroeconomic models, despite its suboptimality. It aims to answer two questions. First, since agents are not fully rational, is it plausible that they use such a non-optimal rule? Second, even if the agents adopt optimal rules, is the economist committing a serious mistake by assuming that agents use one-sided Ss rules? Using parameters based on real economy data, we found that since the additional cost involved in adopting the simpler rule is relatively small, it is plausible that one-sided rules are used in practice. We also found that suboptimal one-sided rules and optimal two-sided rules are in practice similar, since one of the bounds is not reached very often. We concluded that the macroeconomic effects when one-sided rules are suboptimal are similar to the results obtained under two-sided optimal rules, when they are close to each other. However, this is true only when one-sided rules are used in the context where they are not optimal.

Sequential cost-reimbursement rules

This paper studies cost-sharing rules under dynamic adverse selection. We present a typical principal-agent model with two periods, set up in Laffont and Tirole's (1986) canonical regulation environment. At first, when the contract is signed, the firm has prior uncertainty about its efficiency parameter. In the second period, the firm learns its efficiency and chooses the level of cost-reducing effort. The optimal mechanism sequentially screens the firm's types and achieves a higher level of welfare than its static counterpart. The contract is indirectly implemented by a sequence of transfers, consisting of a fixed advance payment based on the reported cost estimate, and an ex-post compensation linear in cost performance.

Optimal rules for monetary policy in Brazil

This paper presents optimal rules for monetary policy in Brazil derived from a backward looking expectation model consisting of a Keynesian IS function and an Augmented Phillips Curve (ISAS). The IS function displays'a high sensitivity of aggregate demand to the real interest rate and the Phillips Curve is accelerationist. The optimal monetary rules show low interest rate volatility with reaction coefficients lower than the ones suggested by Taylor (1993a,b). Reaction functions estimated through ADL and SUR models suggest that monetary policy has not been optimal and has aimed to product rather than inflation stabilization.