Transatlantic Conflict and Cooperation Concerning Trade Issues. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 13, July 2014

From the Introduction. Transatlantic relations have undergone significant changes within the past twenty-five years. During the Cold War era, the United States and Western Europe were bound together by a perceived common threat from the Soviet Union. Consequently, economic issues commanded less attention than security issues. After the Cold War ended, economic issues were thought to be the glue that would hold the transatlantic relationship together. Much attention was given for several years to fostering economic cooperation through the development of intergovernmental initiatives. After the terrorist incidents of September 11, 2001 in the United States, and the subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, security issues again came to the forefront of the relationship. However, in contrast to the earlier era that was mainly characterized by close cooperation, disagreements between the United States and major countries of Western Europe about how to deal with the terrorist threat created severe strains in the relationship. By 2003, the third year of the George W Bush administration, transatlantic political relations had reached perhaps their lowest point since World War II. They have gradually improved since then, but with a significant setback from Wikileaks revelations, and even more serious strains resulting from the revelations by Edward Snowden concerning United States surveillance activities. Security issues have come to the forefront also in connection with regional unrest in the Middle East, EU nations’ dependence on Russian oil and gas, and Russian intrusions into Ukraine.

The War republics in the Donbas one year after the outbreak of the conflict. OSW Commentary Number 174, 17 June 2015

More than one year since the first pro-Russian moves in the Donbas, separatists have taken control of parts of the Donbas and Luhansk oblasts but are still unable to form truly functioning administrative structures. The exercise of power by the central administration of the so-called ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ (DPR) and ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’ (LPR) is restricted to resolving problems as they arise, while administration proper is the prerogative of the local authorities reporting to them which had been performing this function before the conflict broke out. The way the situation is developing and the fact that access to information is restricted make it difficult to determine the structure of the separatist government in more detail, precisely how it is organised, and what the internal hierarchy is like. The overriding goal of the governments of the DPR and the LPR is to maintain and develop their military potential. In effect, the lives of the so-called republics are subordinate to military goals. The Donbas separatism is a conglomerate of different groups of interests, with Russia at the fulcrum. Its representatives set the main tactical and strategic goals and thus have a decisive influence on the development of the situation in the region. Individual separatist groupings come into conflict, and some oligarchs linked to the former Party of Regions circles have also been making attempts to maintain their influence. The struggle between individual groups of interest is intensifying as the situation on the war front becomes calmer. Since the situation has temporarily stabilised after the seizure of Debaltseve, the central governments of the DPR and the LPR have made attempts to expand their influence, combating armed criminals who are outside their control and that of Russia. The civilian population is taking the brunt of the devastation caused by the war and the increasing militarisation of the region. Despite the fact that the intensity of the fighting on the war front is falling, worsening humanitarian problems are causing refugees to continue their flight from the territories controlled by the separatists. 2 million people have fled the conflict zone since the beginning of the war: 1.3 million of them have found shelter in other regions of Ukraine, and more than 700,000 have left for Russia. The region has also sustained great economic losses – most mines have been either destroyed or closed, many industrial plants have restricted or completely discontinued their production, and many firms have been taken over by force. In effect, the region has seen an economic downturn.

Germany’s engagement in the resolution of the Syrian conflict. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 194/25.01.2016

German Tornado Recce aircraft have been engaged in reconnaissance operations over Syria since January 2016. In December 2015 the German government and parliament decided that up to 1,200 Bundeswehr soldiers would take part in the international coalition fighting Islamic State in Syria. This decision marks a new chapter in Germany’s activity in the Middle East. The increasing destabilisation of the southern neighbourhood and the consequences this has for the EU and Germany have forced the German government to increase its level of engagement in the region. Even though Germany is a third-rate player in the Middle Eastern game, it is nonetheless ever more engaged politically and wants to be viewed as a neutral mediator between the competing actors in the region. It has also allocated more funds on regional development co-operation and humanitarian aid. Germany, whose attention has been directed towards Europe’s eastern neighbourhood, is currently turning its attention to the South. The Middle East (and Africa) is taking on increasing significance in German foreign and security policy. This may affect NATO’s eastern flank and the EU’s eastern neighbourhood since part of Germany’s instruments and funds may be redirected to the South.

The EU cannot remain a passive observer of the Karabakh conflict. EPC Commentary, 7 April 2016

When Federica Mogherini visited the South Caucasus in March, she was quoted as saying that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was a top priority for the EU. Facts, however, do not seem to match the words of the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. As violent clashes in the conflict zone unfolded over the past week, the EU was a passive observer, with few visible signs of engagement apart from a cursory phone call urging Armenia and Azerbaijan to show restraint. The escalation has shown how quickly and dangerously the situation can develop, and the unassailable nature of the Line of Contact (LoC). If the diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict show no progress, a repetition is very probable. Furthermore, it is likely the next incident will be more devastating in human and material costs than this recent one, and may not be contained so quickly. The EU needs to be part of the renewed diplomatic effort.

A constitution for Erdoğan. Consequences of the political conflict in Turkey. OSW COMMENTARY No. 213, 2016-06-01

Since mid-2015 Turkey has been affected by a deep internal crisis, caused by rising political polarisation, increased levels of terrorist threat (posed by the Kurds and Islamic radicals) and the revived conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). As a consequence of this crisis, over 350,000 residents of south-eastern Turkey have been forced to leave their homes. At the same time, due to the migration crisis and despite mutual distrust in relations between Turkey and the EU, cooperation between Ankara and Brussels has been intensifying. Turkey’s ongoing destabilisation does not challenge the status of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), which is de facto controlled by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan; paradoxically, it strengthens the party. The internal crisis which the authorities have been deliberately fuelling is an element of a plan to rubber-stamp political change by introducing a presidential system of government. This is happening amid a thorough reconstruction of the socio-political order which has been underway for over a decade. In the upcoming months it is expected to result in the constitution being changed and, as a consequence, the institutionalisation of Erdoğan’s autocratic rule.

Ethnic Politics, Regime Support and Conflict in Central and Eastern Europe

Ethnicity and ethnic parties have often been portrayed as a threat to political stability. There is also no shortage of conflicts with an ethnic flavor. Yet, this book challenges the notion that the organization of politics in heterogeneous societies should necessarily overcome ethnicity. Rather, descriptive representation of ethnic groups arguably has potential to increase regime support and reduce conflict. The book studies partisan-descriptive representation of up to 130 ethnic groups in central and eastern European democracies. Ethnic minority parties are found to only run and succeed if they can expect electoral support sufficient to pass the electoral threshold. Conditional on gender and strategies of representation, ethnic representation increases satisfaction with democracy among the minority population. While protest rises given moderate levels of representation, it is reduced once ethnic groups have access to executives. In conclusion, a proportional vision of power-sharing between ethnic groups receives some qualified empirical support.

Crisis Coming Home? Firm Performance During the Economic Crisis and Managers‘ Work-Family Conflict

The economic crisis over the past years has challenged managers in many ways. In our longitudinal study during the global recession, we examine how perceived firm performance interacts with sources of supervisor support and stress to affect managers’ work-family conflict. First, we draw from Conservation of Resources theory to analyze how sources of supervisor support and stress relate to managers’ work-family conflict. Second, we explore how perceived firm performance modifies the relationships between these factors and work-family conflict. Our surveys of 182 managers before and during the crisis reveal that perceived firm performance significantly alters the effectiveness of sources of supervisor support in relieving work-family conflict. Additionally, perceived poor firm performance was found to intensify the negative effect of stressors on work-family conflict. Our results highlight the need to consider an organization’s perceived health when studying managers’ attitudes and career outcomes.

The Impact of Relationship Conflict on subjective Family Firm Valuation

The present paper empirically investigates the impact of family relationship conflict on subjective firm valuation by family firm owner managers. Drawing on the emerging socioemotional wealth perspective of corporate ownership, we find a U-shaped relationship between relationship conflict inside the family firm and subjective family firm valuation. This finding suggests that negatively valenced emotions induced by the conflict, at low levels of conflict, lead to emotion congruent withdrawal behavior and hence lower valuation. With conflicts gaining in fervor and severity, owner-managers start endowing and pricing sunk costs related to the conflict. This finding suggests that emotions do indeed have spill-over effects on monetary value perceptions and that negatively valenced emotions induced by relationship conflict are not linearly appraised. Rather, to understand the impact of negative emotions on corporate ownership appraisal and attachment it is required to reconcile the emotion congruency with the prospect theory perspective.

El Salvador at war : an oral history of conflict from the 1979 insurrection to the present /

Mode of access: Internet.

Balancing the trinity : the fine art of conflict termination /

"February 1996."

Terrorism, guerrilla warfare/counterinsurgency/low-intensity conflict, and revolutions : 1986-June 1988 /

"June 1988."

Manchuria; cradle of conflict,

Mode of access: Internet.

Manchuria, cradle of conflict,

Mode of access: Internet.

Culture conflict and crime,

Mode of access: Internet.