Iowa Department of Transportation Major Items - Preliminary Quantity Report, December 15, 2015; With Addendums

Weekly letting report

Iowa Department of Transportation Major Items - Preliminary Quantity Report, January 20, 2016; With Addendums

Weekly letting report

Iowa Department of Transportation Major Items - Preliminary Quantity Report, December 15, 2015; With Addendums

Weekly letting report

Iowa Department of Transportation Major Items - Preliminary Quantity Report, February 16, 2016; With Addendums

Weekly letting report

Iowa Department of Transportation Major Items - Preliminary Quantity Report, March 15, 2016; With Addendums

Weekly letting report

Iowa Department of Transportation Major Items - Preliminary Quantity Report, February 16, 2016; With Addendums

Weekly letting report

Iowa Department of Transportation Major Items - Preliminary Quantity Report, February 16, 2016; With Addendums

Weekly letting report

Iowa Department of Transportation Major Items - Preliminary Quantity Report, February 16, 2016; With Addendums

Weekly letting report

Iowa Department of Public Health: SFY 2015 Annual County Service Contract Listing, 2016

Iowa Department of Public Health SFY 2015 Annual County Service Contract Listing. This publication strives to identify all service contracts administered by the Iowa Department of Public Health during the period of July 1, 2014 through June 30, 2015. Contracts may have been increased or decreased, and contract titles changed during the published period. Contracts listed in this summary are shown in alphabetical order by contractor within the county. Interdepartmental Agreements with state government agencies are at the back of the listing. Each page is divided into eight columns which identify the following: column 1: the county of the contractor; column 2: the contractor; column 3: the contract number; column 4: the contract title; column 5: the contract amount; column 6: the funding source; column 7: the start date of the contract and column 8: the end date of the contract.

Iowa Department of Transportation Major Items - Preliminary Quantity Report, April 19, 2016; With Addendums

Weekly letting report

Iowa Department of Transportation Major Items - Preliminary Quantity Report, May 17, 2016; With Addendums

Weekly letting report

Rapid LC-MS/MS quantification of the major benzodiazepines and their metabolites on dried blood spots using a simple and cost-effective sample pretreatment.

BACKGROUND: Dried blood spots (DBS) sampling has gained popularity in the bioanalytical community as an alternative to conventional plasma sampling, as it provides numerous benefits in terms of sample collection and logistics. The aim of this work was to show that these advantages can be coupled with a simple and cost-effective sample pretreatment, with subsequent rapid LC-MS/MS analysis for quantitation of 15 benzodiazepines, six metabolites and three Z-drugs. For this purpose, a simplified offline procedure was developed that consisted of letting a 5-µl DBS infuse directly into 100 µl of MeOH, in a conventional LC vial. RESULTS: The parameters related to the DBS pretreatment, such as extraction time or internal standard addition, were investigated and optimized, demonstrating that passive infusion in a regular LC vial was sufficient to quantitatively extract the analytes of interest. The method was validated according to international criteria in the therapeutic concentration ranges of the selected compounds. CONCLUSION: The presented strategy proved to be efficient for the rapid analysis of the selected drugs. Indeed, the offline sample preparation was reduced to a minimum, using a small amount of organic solvent and consumables, without affecting the accuracy of the method. Thus, this approach enables simple and rapid DBS analysis, even when using a non-DBS-dedicated autosampler, while lowering the costs and environmental impact.

Iowa Department of Transportation Major Items - Preliminary Quantity Report, June 21, 2016; With Addendums

Weekly letting report

Modeling and mitigation of supply-demand mismatches

In this thesis, I develop analytical models to price the value of supply chain investments under demand uncer¬tainty. This thesis includes three self-contained papers. In the first paper, we investigate the value of lead-time reduction under the risk of sudden and abnormal changes in demand forecasts. We first consider the risk of a complete and permanent loss of demand. We then provide a more general jump-diffusion model, where we add a compound Poisson process to a constant-volatility demand process to explore the impact of sudden changes in demand forecasts on the value of lead-time reduction. We use an Edgeworth series expansion to divide the lead-time cost into that arising from constant instantaneous volatility, and that arising from the risk of jumps. We show that the value of lead-time reduction increases substantially in the intensity and/or the magnitude of jumps. In the second paper, we analyze the value of quantity flexibility in the presence of supply-chain dis- intermediation problems. We use the multiplicative martingale model and the "contracts as reference points" theory to capture both positive and negative effects of quantity flexibility for the downstream level in a supply chain. We show that lead-time reduction reduces both supply-chain disintermediation problems and supply- demand mismatches. We furthermore analyze the impact of the supplier's cost structure on the profitability of quantity-flexibility contracts. When the supplier's initial investment cost is relatively low, supply-chain disin¬termediation risk becomes less important, and hence the contract becomes more profitable for the retailer. We also find that the supply-chain efficiency increases substantially with the supplier's ability to disintermediate the chain when the initial investment cost is relatively high. In the third paper, we investigate the value of dual sourcing for the products with heavy-tailed demand distributions. We apply extreme-value theory and analyze the effects of tail heaviness of demand distribution on the optimal dual-sourcing strategy. We find that the effects of tail heaviness depend on the characteristics of demand and profit parameters. When both the profit margin of the product and the cost differential between the suppliers are relatively high, it is optimal to buffer the mismatch risk by increasing both the inventory level and the responsive capacity as demand uncertainty increases. In that case, however, both the optimal inventory level and the optimal responsive capacity decrease as the tail of demand becomes heavier. When the profit margin of the product is relatively high, and the cost differential between the suppliers is relatively low, it is optimal to buffer the mismatch risk by increasing the responsive capacity and reducing the inventory level as the demand uncertainty increases. In that case, how¬ever, it is optimal to buffer with more inventory and less capacity as the tail of demand becomes heavier. We also show that the optimal responsive capacity is higher for the products with heavier tails when the fill rate is extremely high.

Three essays in incomplete contracts

General Introduction These three chapters, while fairly independent from each other, study economic situations in incomplete contract settings. They are the product of both the academic freedom my advisors granted me, and in this sense reflect my personal interests, and of their interested feedback. The content of each chapter can be summarized as follows: Chapter 1: Inefficient durable-goods monopolies In this chapter we study the efficiency of an infinite-horizon durable-goods monopoly model with a fmite number of buyers. We find that, while all pure-strategy Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) are efficient, there also exist previously unstudied inefficient MPE where high valuation buyers randomize their purchase decision while trying to benefit from low prices which are offered once a critical mass has purchased. Real time delay, an unusual monopoly distortion, is the result of this attrition behavior. We conclude that neither technological constraints nor concern for reputation are necessary to explain inefficiency in monopolized durable-goods markets. Chapter 2: Downstream mergers and producer's capacity choice: why bake a larger pie when getting a smaller slice? In this chapter we study the effect of downstream horizontal mergers on the upstream producer's capacity choice. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find anon-monotonic relationship: horizontal mergers induce a higher upstream capacity if the cost of capacity is low, and a lower upstream capacity if this cost is high. We explain this result by decomposing the total effect into two competing effects: a change in hold-up and a change in bargaining erosion. Chapter 3: Contract bargaining with multiple agents In this chapter we study a bargaining game between a principal and N agents when the utility of each agent depends on all agents' trades with the principal. We show, using the Potential, that equilibria payoffs coincide with the Shapley value of the underlying coalitional game with an appropriately defined characteristic function, which under common assumptions coincides with the principal's equilibrium profit in the offer game. Since the problem accounts for differences in information and agents' conjectures, the outcome can be either efficient (e.g. public contracting) or inefficient (e.g. passive beliefs).