Initial inventory levels for a book publishing firm = Kezdőkészletek egy könyvkiadó vállalatnál

Egy könyvkiadó vállalatot vizsgálunk. A kiadó kiadványait a szokásos értékesítési láncon (kis- és nagykereskedelem) keresztül értékesíti. A kérdés az, hogy egy új könyv példányait hogyan allokálja az értékesítési láncban. Feltételezzük, hogy a kereslet ismert, Poisson-eloszlású. A készletezés költségeit szintén ismertnek tételezzük fel. Cél a költségek minimalizálása. = The aim of the paper is to analyze a practical real world problem. A publishing house is given. The publishing firm has contacts to a number of wholesaler / retailer enterprises and direct contact to customers to satisfy the market demand. The book publishers work in a project industry. The publisher faces with the problem to allocate the stocks of a given, newly published book to the wholesaler and retailer, and to hold some copies to satisfy the customers direct from the publisher. The distribution of the demand is unknown, but it can be estimated. The costs consist of inventory holding and shortage, backorder costs. The decision maker wants to minimize these relevant costs. The problem can be modeled as a one-warehouse and N-retailer supply chain with not identical demand distribution. The problem structure is similar that of a newsvendor model. It is assumed that the demand distribution follows a Poisson distribution.

Ellátási lánc kapcsolatok modellezése = Modeling of supply chain relationships

A dolgozatban az ellátási láncokban meglévő diadikus kapcsolatok minőségét állítjuk a vizsgálatok középpontjába. Az irodalomban számtalan megközelítés ismert az ellátási lánc kapcsolatok fejlődésének leírására. Ezen fejlődési elméletek inkább elméleti szinten írják le a diadikus kapcsolatok változását, annak empirikus tesztelhetőségét nem vizsgálják. Dolgozatunkban kísérletet teszünk az ellátási lánc kapcsolatok fejlődésének empirikus vizsgálatára. Arra próbálunk választ találni, hogy az életciklus hipotézis az üzleti kapcsolatok időbeli fejlődésére alkalmazható-e. = Our paper combines two approaches using data of an internet based questionnaire and applying quantitative analysis it tests the hypothesis business relationship development in time can be described with the concept of life cycle. The concept of life cycle is widely used in business research. Among others the diffusion of innovation is described using this concept, or the concept of product life cycle just to name a few. All of these researches analyze the life cycle along a specific variable (for example the volume of sales or revenue in case of the product life cycle) which (except the last stage of the cycle, the decline) has a cumulative character resulting in the widely known specific shape of a life cycle. Consequently testing a life cycle hypothesis inevitably means the acceptance of some type cumulativity in the development.

Cooperation in an HMMS-type supply chain: A management application of cooperative game theory = Kooperáció egy HMMS-típusú ellátási láncban: A kooperatív játékelmélet egy menedzsment alkalmazása

We apply cooperative game theory concepts to analyze a Holt-Modigliani-Muth-Simon (HMMS) supply chain. The bullwhip effect in a two-stage supply chain (supplier-manufacturer) in the framework of the HMMS-model with quadratic cost functions is considered. It is assumed that both firms minimize their relevant costs, and two cases are examined: the supplier and the manufacturer minimize their relevant costs in a decentralized and in a centralized (cooperative) way. The question of how to share the savings of the decreased bullwhip effect in the centralized (cooperative) model is answered by the weighted Shapley value, by a transferable utility cooperative game theory tool, where the weights are for the exogenously given “bargaining powers” of the participants of the supply chain. = A cikkben a kooperatív játékelmélet fogalmait alkalmazzuk egy Holt-Mogigliani-Muth-Simon-típusú ellátási lánc esetében. Az ostorcsapás-hatás elemeit egy beszállító-termelő ellátási láncban ragadjuk meg egy kvadratikus készletezési és termelési költség mellett. Feltételezzük, hogy mindkét vállalat minimalizálja a releváns költségeit. Két működési rendszert hasonlítunk össze: egy hierarchikus döntéshozatali rendszert, amikor először a termelő, majd a beszállító optimalizálja helyzetét, majd egy centralizált (kooperatív) modellt, amikor a vállalatok az együttes költségüket minimalizálják. A kérdés úgy merül fel, hogy a csökkentett ostorcsapás-hatás esetén hogyan osszák meg a részvevők ebben a transzferálható hasznosságú kooperatív játékban a költség megtakarítást, exogén módon adott tárgyalási pozíció mellett.

A magyarországi vállalatok K+F és innovációs teljesítménye = Innovation performance of the Hungarian firms

A tanulmány ökonometriai módszerekkel vizsgálja a magyarországi közép- és nagyvállalatok innovációs tevékenységét az EU-csatlakozást közvetlenül megelőző években. Fő megállapításai közé tartozik, hogy a vállalatmérettel nő az innovációs aktivitás valószínűsége; a külföldi tulajdonú cégek meghatározó szerepet töltenek be a termék- és technológiamegújításban; exportunkban csekély az aránya a magas újdonságtartalmú, K+F igényes termékeknek. Az állami támogatás segítette a termék- és technológiai megújulást. A tanulmány a IX. Ipar és Vállalatgazdasági konferencián elhangzott előadás átdolgozott változata (Kiss, 2008). = Based on logit econometrics we explore the innovation activities of the Hungarian manufacturing firms between 2001-2003. Our results suggest that the large and the foreign owned firms are the most innovative, while the export-oriented firms are less innovative. Government subsidies of innovation help the introduction of new products and processes.

A Countable Economy: An Example

Weiss (1981) established core equivalence and the existence of competitive equilibria in finitely additive exchange economies. To underline the relevance of finitely additive economies we present in this note an example with a close connection to finite exchange economies.

A Theory of Natural Addiction

Economic theories of rational addiction aim to describe consumer behavior in the presence of habit-forming goods. We provide a biological foundation for this body of work by formally specifying conditions under which it is optimal to form a habit. We demonstrate the empirical validity of our thesis with an in-depth review and synthesis of the biomedical literature concerning the action of opiates in the mammalian brain and their eects on behavior. Our results lend credence to many of the unconventional behavioral assumptions employed by theories of rational addiction, including adjacent complementarity and the importance of cues, attention, and self-control in determining the behavior of addicts. We oer evidence for the special case of the opiates that "harmful" addiction is the manifestation of a mismatch between behavioral algorithms encoded in the human genome and the expanded menu of choices faced by consumers in the modern world.

Production in advance versus production to order

We use a theoretical framework to compare production-in-advance type and production-to-order type environments. Carrying out our analysis in the framework of a symmetric capacity-constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly game, we prove that the equilibrium prots are the same in case of production in advance and production to order. In addition, advance production results in higher prices than production to order if both games have an equilibrium in nondegenerated mixed strategies.

A way of explaining unemployment through a wage-setting game

We investigate a duopsonistic wage-setting game in which the rms have a limited number of workplaces. We assume that the rms have heterogeneous productivity, that there are two types of workers with dierent reservation wages and that a worker's productivity is independent of his type. We show that equilibrium unem- ployment arises in the wage-setting game under certain conditions, although the efficient allocation of workers would result in full employment.

Non-manipulable domains for the Borda count

We characterize the preference domains on which the Borda count satises Arrow's "independence of irrelevant alternatives" condition. Under a weak richness condition, these domains are obtained by xing one preference ordering and including all its cyclic permutations ("Condorcet cycles"). We then ask on which domains the Borda count is non-manipulable. It turns out that it is non-manipulable on a broader class of domains when combined with appropriately chosen tie-breaking rules. On the other hand, we also prove that the rich domains on which the Borda count is non-manipulable for all possible tie-breaking rules are again the cyclic permutation domains.

Price vs. quantity in oligopoly games

Price-setting and quantity-setting oligopoly games lead to extremely dierent outcomes in the market. One natural way to address this problem is to formulate a model in which some rms use price while the remaining rms use quantity as their decision variable. We introduce a mixed oligopoly game of this type and determine its equilibria. In addition, we consider an extension of this mixed oligopoly game through which the choice of the decision variables can be endogenized. We prove the emergence of the Cournot game.

Weighted Sum of Correlated Lognormals: Convolution Integral Solution

Probability density function (pdf) for sum of n correlated lognormal variables is deducted as a special convolution integral. Pdf for weighted sums (where weights can be any real numbers) is also presented. The result for four dimensions was checked by Monte Carlo simulation.

The extent of the population paradox in the Hungarian electoral system

The Hungarian mixed-member electoral system, adopted in 1989, is one of the world’s most complicated electoral systems, and, as this paper demonstrates, it suffers from the "population paradox". In particular, the governing coalition may lose as many as 8 seats either by getting more votes or by the opposition obtaining fewer votes on each territorial list.

Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm

We consider a possible game-theoretic foundation of Forchheimer's model of dominant-firm price leadership based on quantity-setting games with one large firm and many small firms. If the large firm is the exogenously given first mover, we obtain Forchheimer's model. We also investigate whether the large firm can emerge as a first mover of a timing game.

Axiomatic Districting

In a framework with two parties, deterministic voter preferences and a type of geographical constraints, we propose a set of simple axioms and show that they jointly characterize the districting rule that maximizes the number of districts one party can win, given the distribution of individual votes (the \optimal gerrymandering rule"). As a corollary, we obtain that no districting rule can satisfy our axioms and treat parties symmetrically.