893 resultados para Clear Question
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This study examined the challenges associated with the explicit delivery of questiongeneration strategy with 8 Arab Canadian students from the perspective of a bilingual beginning teacher. This study took place in a private school and involved 2 stages consisting of 9 instructional sessions, and individual interviews with the students. Data gathered from these interviews and the researcher's field notes from the sessions were used to gain insights about the participants' understanding and use of explicit instruction. The themes that emerged from the data included "teacher attitude," "students' enhanced metacognitive awareness and strategy use," "listening skills," and "instructional challenges." Briefly, teacher's attitude demonstrated how teacher's beliefs and knowledge influenced her willingness and perseverance to teach explicitly. Students' enhanced metacognitive awareness and strategy use included students' understanding and use of the question-generation strategy. The students' listening skills suggested that culture may influence their response to the delivery of explicit instruction. Here, the cultural expectations associated with being a good listener reinforced students' willingness to engage in this strategy. Students' prior knowledge also influenced their interaction with the question-generation strategy. Time for process versus covering content was a dominant instructional challenge. This study provides first hand information for teachers when considering how students' cultural backgrounds may affect their reactions to explicit strategy instruction.
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Although much research has been conducted on blood-meal acquisition in adult female black flies (Diptera: Simuliidae), the same cannot be said for sugarmeals. Both sexes feed on sugar which provides energy for flight and it has been commonly held that nectar is the major carbohydrate source. This thesis addresses the question of whether a non-floral carbohydrate source, specifically homopteran honeydew, is ingested by male and female black flies. Black flies reared in the laboratory have been observed to readily ingest freshly excreted and older (dry) honeydew when presented with honeydew coated tamarack branches. Field work was conducted in Algonquin Park, Ontario in the spring and summer of 1993. Three separate studies were designed to test whether homopteran honeydew is an important carbohydrate source for black flies and whether flies from different habitats utilize different sugar sources. The sugars melezitose and / or stachyose are known to occur in a variety of homopteran honeydews and therefore were used as indicators of honeydew feeding by black flies. In the first study, black flies were collected with insect nets from a stand of Larix larcina heavily infested with honeydew - producing homopterans (Adelges lariciatus). Six black fly species were captured: Simulium venustum, S. rostra tum, S. vittatum, Stegopterna mutata, S. aureum and S. quebecense. Samples of honeydew and individual black flies were tested using thin layer chromatography (T. L. C.) with fructose, glucose, sucrose, turanose, melezitose, raffinose and stachyose as standards. All sugars except turanose and melezitose were found in the adelgid honeydew samples. Since the sugar melezitose was absent from ~ honeydew samples, stachyose was used to indicate that black flies were feeding from this particular honeydew source. Of the 201 black flies tested, 194 contained sugars which occurred in 16 combinations. Stachyose combinations excluding melezitose, present in 45.9 % of flies, were used to indicate that black flies had been feeding on the adelgid honeydew. In the second study, black flies were collected in the morning and evening on 8 collection dates, using a vehicle mounted insect net. The crops and midguts of 10 male and 10 female Simulium venustum were dissected on each sample date. In total the gut contents of 320 individual flies were analysed by T. L. C. The sugars identified from these flies were present in the following proportions: fructose (100.0%), glucose (100.0%), sucrose/turanose (50.4%), melezitose (30.3%), raffinose (18.8%) and stachyose (8.7%). These sugars occurred in fourteen different combinations. It is argued that the presence of melezitose and / or stachyose indicates that black flies had fed on homopteran honeydew. Significantly more female flies (40.0%) than male flies (27.5%) had fed on honeydew. In the third study, adult black flies were sampled by sweep netting vegetation in four habitats in the morning and evening on 8 collection dates. The habitats are as follows: (1) Davies Bog, (2) Abandoned Air Field (dominated by blueberries, Vaccinium spp.), (3) Deciduous Habitat and (4) Coniferous Habitat. Sugars in the crops and midguts of female flies were tested by T. L. C. and, for S. venustum, it was found that significantly fewer flies (18.8%) from the Air Field contained honeydew than from the other three sites (Davies Bog, 34.4%; Deciduous Habitat, 36.2%; Coniferous Habitat, 25.0%). Of the 1287 black flies tested individually by T. L. C. 441 (34.3%) contained melezitose and / or stachyose sugars indicating that this proportion of the population were feeding from Homopteran honeydew. It is therefore clear that floral (nectar) sugars are not the only source of carbohydrates available to black flies.
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It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.
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Joseph Dana was also considered as the supposed author.
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In the Pamphleteer, vol. 4, p. 551-576. London, 1814.
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Despite having been published over three hundred years ago, Spinoza's Ethics is a text that is still, even today, widely misunderstood. Two of the more common and persistent misunderstandings revolve around the accusations of some who have labeled his philosophy both atheistic and materialistic. These two misunderstandings date back to the first time the Ethics was published, immediately following Spinoza's death. In an attempt to not only address these accusations, but as well to clear up any misunderstandings surrounding them, this thesis will be split into four chapters that are divided into two main parts. The first half will deal with the question of whether or not Spinoza is an atheist. The second half will deal with the question of whether or not Spinoza is a materialist. In so doing this thesis will establish and defend the position that it is a misreading to characterize Spinoza's philosophy as atheistic and materialistic.
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This qualitative study investigated senior level staff (Senior Therapists), front-line staff (Instructor Therapists), and parent perspectives on parent-therapist collaboration within Intensive Behavioural Intervention settings. Two senior staff interviews, two parent interviews, and a focus group with therapists were conducted to examine how parents and therapists currently interact within IBI settings, parent and therapist expectations of each other, factors that promote and barriers that impede parent-therapist collaboration, and how parent-therapist collaboration might be improved. A constant comparative analysis by question within and across cases revealed five prominent themes of 'Role Definition', 'Perspective-taking/Empathy', 'Trust', 'Open Communication', and 'Consistency'. Additional similarities and differences were discovered between parent and therapist perspectives such as the need for clear parentprofessional boundaries, the importance of maintaining client privacy, and respect. Implications of the findings and suggestions for future research are discussed.
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Joseph Dana was also considered as the supposed author. Bibliogr. Printed by Snelling and Simons
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In the Pamphleteer, vol. 4, p. 551-576. London, 1814
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Susan Kneebone, Université Monash, Melbourne, Australie