Russia goes on the offensive ahead of the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius. OSW Commentary No. 115, 30.09.2013

In recent weeks, Russia has stepped up its efforts to prevent a group of former Soviet republics from tightening their relations with the European Union. The intensification of these efforts comes ahead of the upcoming Eastern Partnership summit, scheduled to take place in Vilnius on 28-29 November. It is expected that during the summit Kiev will sign the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (AA) initialled in March 2012, including an agreement for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). Meanwhile, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia are expected to initial similar documents, effectively accepting their terms and conditions, and paving the way for their official signing in the near future. Moscow has always viewed the relations between the EU and the post-Soviet states as a threat to its own influence in the region. Consequently, any attempts to tighten these relations have been actively opposed by Russia. The EU’s Eastern Partnership programme, launched in 2009, has posed a particular challenge to Moscow’s policies in the region.. Russia responded by rolling out a Eurasian integration project, which began in 2010 with the establishment of the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, and is expected to culminate in the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union by 2015. Moscow’s overarching objective has been to persuade the countries in the region, especially Ukraine, to adopt an unambiguously pro-Russian geopolitical stance and to join the integration project proposed by the Kremlin. The Russian government hopes that this would permanently place these states in Moscow’s sphere of influence and at the same time prevent them from developing closer relations with Brussels. Russia has regularly taken actions aimed at showcasing the benefits of integration with the Customs Union (particularly, by promising preferential pricing of Russian energy resources) and at the same time it has adopted measures highlighting the pitfalls of retaining a pro-European orientation (mainly by imposing occasional trade sanctions). The upcoming summit in Vilnius, during which Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia could lock themselves on to a pro-European course, has spurred Moscow to intensify its efforts to torpedo a successful outcome of the Vilnius meeting, with a view to slowing down or even blocking the possibility of closer cooperation between the EU and the former Soviet republics.

Crimean Tatars after Russia's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. OSW Commentary No. 141, 30.06.2014

After Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Crimean Tatars face the necessity of working out a modus vivendi to cope with the difficult situation which now confronts them. On the one hand, the desire to remain in their homeland, which they regained after exile in Soviet times, is an imperative encouraging them to accept the status quo, while on the other, the fear of Russia and the strong relations of Crimean Tatar elites with Kyiv would favour opposing the present state of affairs. Another fact pointing in favour of an agreement with Moscow is that Kyiv has not attempted to defend Crimea and has not been active in demanding its return to Ukraine, which has undermined Kyiv’s authority in the eyes of the Tatars. Therefore, the leaders of the Mejlis of Crimean Tatars (the national self-government) act carefully, trying to avoid actions which could be seen as provocative and thus liable to incite retribution. It could be expected that this course of action will continue, although it faces ever greater difficulties in the context of the Russian authorities’ adoption of a strongly anti-Tatar policy, which is likely to evoke more radical attitudes among the Crimean Tatars.

The Pro-Western Turn in Russia's Foreign Policy: Causes, Consequences and Prospects. OSW Point of View, September 2002

From Europe and Poland's point of view, one of the most important recent developments in international politics was the re-orientation of Russia's foreign policy. This paper aims to answer three important questions relating to this issue: 4. When and why did the "pro-Western turn" in the Russian Federation's policy take place? 5. Has it been profitable for Russia? 6. What goals will the Russian policy pursue in the future? An analysis of the last two years in Russia's foreign policy leads to the several conclusions, including those: 5. Clearly, the Russian leaders realise that in the longer term, Russia - in its desire for more influence in the world - will not be able to survive as an independent pole of power in international politics and it will have to join forces with the West (most likely, the European Union). 6. September 11 was not the cause of Russia's pro-Western turn, but rather a catalyst that put the process which started when Vladimir Putin took his office in sharp focus. 7. In the nearest future, this new direction of Russia's foreign policy seems not be challenged by internal opposition in Russia. 8. The "pro-Western turn" proved to be beneficial for Russia, although: d. Russia has not become a strategic ally of the US e. There has been no breakthrough in the relations between Russia and the European Union, and Moscow has not gained any real influence on NATO's important decisions. f. Russia has not become a major decision-maker of international politics. 5. Russia's closing to the West is in Poland's and Europe's interest.

The "Pro-Western Turn" in Russia's Foreign Policy: Causes, Consequences and Prospects. OSW Point of View (unspecified), September 2002

From Europe and Poland's point of view, one of the most important recent developments in international politics was the re-orientation of Russia's foreign policy. This paper aims to answer three important questions relating to this issue: 1. When and why did the "pro-Western turn" in the Russian Federation's policy take place? 2. Has it been profitable for Russia? 3. What goals will the Russian policy pursue in the future? An analysis of the last two years in Russia's foreign policy leads to the several conclusions, including those: a. Clearly, the Russian leaders realise that in the longer term, Russia - in its desire for more influence in the world - will not be able to survive as an independent pole of power in international politics and it will have to join forces with the West (most likely, the European Union). b. September 11 was not the cause of Russia's pro-Western turn, but rather a catalyst that put the process which started when Vladimir Putin took his office in sharp focus. 7. In the nearest future, this new direction of Russia's foreign policy seems not be challenged by internal opposition in Russia. c. The "pro-Western turn" proved to be beneficial for Russia, although: d. Russia has not become a strategic ally of the US e. There has been no breakthrough in the relations between Russia and the European Union, and Moscow has not gained any real influence on NATO's important decisions. f. Russia has not become a major decision-maker of international politics. g. Russia's closing to the West is in Poland's and Europe's interest.

Russian gas industry - current condition and prospects; New regional 'in-security' system in Central Asia; Caspian oil and gas: the facts at the end of the year 2000. OSW Study 1/2001

Russian gas industry: The current condition of the gas industry is one of the most crucial factors influencing the Russian state·s functioning, internal situation and international position. Not only is gas the principal energy resource in Russia, it also subsidises other sectors of the economy. Status of the main European gas exporter strengthens also Russia's importance in the international arena. New regional in-security: Ten years have passed since the Central Asian states declared their independence, but their relationship with Russia still remains close, and the latter treats them as its exclusive zone of influence. A crucial reason for keeping Central Asia within the orbit of Moscow·s influence is the fact that Russia exercises control over the most important transport routes out of the region of raw materials for the power industry, on which the economic development of Asia depends on. But this is the only manifestation of Central Asia·s economic dependence on Russia. Moscow lacks solid economic instruments (i.e. investment input or power industry dependence) to shape the situation in the region. Caspian oil and gas: Caspian stocks of energy resources are not, and most probably will not be, of any great significance on the world scale. Nevertheless it is the Caspian region which will have the opportunity to become an oil exporter which will reduce the dependence of the European countries on Arabian oil, and which will guarantee Russia the quantities of gas which are indispensable both for meeting its internal demands and for maintaining its current level of export. For Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, the confirmation of the existence of successive oil strata is not only an opportunity to increase income, but also an additional bargaining chip in the game for the future of the whole region. The stake in this game is the opportunity to limit the economic, and by extension the political influences of Russia in the region.

Russia's best ally: The situation of the Russian oil sector and forecast for its future. OSW Study 39/2012

Oil is a strategic raw material for Russia and one of fundamental significance for the functioning of the state and its future. Taxes on oil production and exports are the most important source of state budget revenues which guarantee Russia maintains its political and economic stability. Russia is building its international position on the basis of its vast raw material and energy potential. While a great number of various publications have been devoted to Russian gas and Gazprom, surprisingly little research has been done into the present condition and possible future developments of the Russian oil sector, despite the fact that oil has and will have a much greater impact than gas on the functioning and the future of Russia. The main objective of this text is to describe the present situation of the Russian oil sector, its problems and the challenges it is posing, as well as the government’s policy towards this key branch of the Russian economy. This will be an introduction to an attempt to answer to the questions about the possible future production and the export levels of Russian oil, also broken down into the European and Asian directions.

NATO’s presence in the Baltic states – reassurance of allies or deterrence for Russia? OSW COMMENTARY Number 169, 29.04.2015 2015-04-29

In late March and early April, the US Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) held an exercise in Estonia, during which US F-16s destroyed ground targets in an Estonian firing range. Around the same time the Americans held a drill with the Swedish and Finnish Air Forces over the Baltic Sea. The United States has been playing a leading role in the process of strengthening NATO’s presence in the Baltic states. As far as the Western European allies are concerned, Germany will follow in the footsteps of Denmark and the United Kingdom, both of which made significant military contributions to the strengthening of the allied presence in 2014, and will deploy the largest number of troops in 2015. Non-aligned Sweden and Finland, key for the performance of NATO operations in the Baltic states, have been emphasising their military and political readiness to co-operate with NATO in the event of potential crises or conflicts. Comparing NATO ‘s military presence in the Baltic states before and after the outbreak of the Russian intervention in Ukraine, it is clear that NATO has stepped up its engagement considerably. However, its scope is still relatively small, given the much larger military potential and mobilisation capacity of Russia. Moreover, the message sent by NATO’s actions may be diminished by the political, military and financial constraints faced by the allies and Sweden and Finland. It seems that the greatest risk to the military security of the Baltic states currently appears to be the possibility that Russia could wrongly assess the reliability of NATO’s security guarantees.

The consequences for Russia of the nuclear deal with Iran. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 177/03.08.2015

The five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the USA, the United Kingdom, China, France and Russia) plus Germany and the European Union signed a deal with Iran on 14 July in Vienna (a Plan of Action with five appendices, henceforth referred to as the Vienna Agreement). Under this agreement, Iran undertook to restrict its nuclear programme and to bring it under international scrutiny for 15 years in exchange for a gradual lifting of international sanctions (both those imposed between 2006 and 2010 by the UN Security Council and the unilateral US and EU sanctions). Even though Russia has officially reacted positively to this deal, the consequences it will have are rather ambiguous from Moscow’s point of view. Iran looks set to become stronger and will possibly normalise its relations with the West, and especially the United States. This, in political terms, is a disadvantage for Russia. The Kremlin’s ability to use its policy towards Iran as a bargaining chip in contacts with Washington will be reduced significantly. In turn, the benefits will include improving the perception of Russia in the West and the opening up of new opportunities for the geopolitical game in the region, both with Iran and its opponents in the Arab world. Similarly, in economic terms, the possible lifting of sanctions will offer Russia new opportunities to achieve immediate benefits owing to co-operation in the nuclear and military-technical areas. In the short term, the lifting of sanctions will not pose any threat to Russia’s position on the global energy markets. However, in the long term, the end of Iran’s international isolation may bring negative consequences for Russia, such as the dominant position of Western and/or Chinese companies in the Iranian upstream sector, rising exports of Iranian oil and gas to EU and Asian markets (which are essential for Russia) and the downward pressure on oil and gas prices.

Geographic distribution of dinoflagellate cysts in surface sediments

Dinoflagellate cysts are useful for reconstructing upper water conditions. For adequate reconstructions detailed information is required about the relationship between modern day environmental conditions and the geographic distribution of cysts in sediments. This Atlas summarises the modern global distribution of 71 organicwalled dinoflagellate cyst species. The synthesis is based on the integration of literature sources together with data of 2405 globally distributed surface sediment samples that have been preparedwith a comparable methodology and taxonomy. The distribution patterns of individual cyst species are being comparedwith environmental factors that are knownto influence dinoflagellate growth, gamete production, encystment, excystment and preservation of their organic-walled cysts: surface water temperature, salinity, nitrate, phosphate, chlorophyll-a concentrations and bottom water oxygen concentrations. Graphs are provided for every species depicting the relationship between seasonal and annual variations of these parameters and the relative abundance of the species. Results have been compared with previously published records; an overview of the ecological significance as well as information about the seasonal production of each individual species is presented. The relationship between the cyst distribution and variation in the aforementioned environmental parameters was analysed by performing a canonical correspondence analysis. All tested variables showed a positive relationship on the 99% confidence level. Sea-surface temperature represents the parameter corresponding to the largest amount of variance within the dataset (40%) followed by nitrate, salinity, phosphate and bottom-water oxygen concentration, which correspond to 34%, 33%, 25% and 24% of the variance, respectively. Characterisations of selected environments as well as a discussion about how these factors could have influenced the final cyst yield in sediments are included.

Skazani i a kni a zi a Kurbskago.

ch. 1. Istori i a Ioanna Groznago.--ch. 2. Perepiska s Ioannom i drugimi lit s ami.

Spisok chlenov Imperatorskoĭ akademīi nauk, 1725-1907 /

Mode of access: Internet.

The picture gallery of Charles I.

Mode of access: Internet.

Slavi︠a︡nskīĭ i vostochnyĭ ornament po rukopisi︠a︡m drevni︠a︡go i novago vremeni /

Added t.p. illustrated in color.

Poslanīe Rossīi : istinnoe znachenīe russkoĭ revoli͡ut͡sīi /

Translation of: Russia's message.

Commentaries on the war in Russia and Germnay in 1812 and 1813.

Mode of access: Internet.