Product market deregulation and the U.S. employment miracle

We consider the dynamic relationship between product market entry regulation and equilibrium unemployment. The main theoretical contribution is combining a job matchingmodel with monopolistic competition in the goods market and individual wage bargaining.Product market competition affects unemployment by two channels: the output expansion effect and a countervailing effect due to a hiring externality. Competition is then linked to barriers to entry. We calibrate the model to US data and perform a policy experiment to assess whether the decrease in trend unemployment during the 1980 s and 1990 s could be attributed to product market deregulation. Our quantitative analysis suggests that under individual bargaining, a decrease of less than two tenths of a percentage point of unemployment rates can be attributed to product market deregulation, a surprisingly small amount.

Multimarket contact in pharmaceutical markets

We analyze the effect of multimarket contact on the pricing behavior of pharmaceutical firms controlling for different levels of regulatory constraints using the IMS MIDAS database for the industry. Theoretically, under product differentiation, firms may find it profitable to allocate their market power among markets where they are operating, specifically from more collusive to more competitive ones. We present evidence for nine OECD countries suggesting the existence of a multimarket effect for more market friendly countries (U.S. and Canada) and less regulated ones (U.K., Germany, Netherlands), while the results are more unstable for highly regulated countries with some countries being consistent with the theory (France) while others contradicting it (Japan, Italy and Spain). A key result indicates thatin the latter countries, price constraints are so intense, that there is little room for allocating market power. Thus equilibrium prices are expected in general to be lower in regulated countries.

Catalogue des dessins anciens du Moyen-Age et de la Renaissance (XVe et XVIe siècles), Oeuvres de J. Amman, B. Beham, P. Brueghel, H. Burgkmair, L. Cambiaso, J. Cousin, A. Durer, H. Goltzius, U. Graf, Lagneau, E. de Laune, F. Mazzuola, M. Ostendrofer, J. Palma, Le Primatice, B. Ramenghi, D. Robusti, J. Romain, T. Stimmer, P. Vénronèse, L. de Vinci, etc., etc. ; Dessins, pastels, aquarelles des XVIIe et XVIIIe siècle par N. Berchem, Brauwer, A. Guyp, Dumonstier, C. Dusart, A. Van Dyck, J.-H. Fragonard, Cl. Gellée, Van Goyen, J. Jordaens, J. Lievens, G. Metzu, I. Moucheron, R. Nanteuil, A. Van Ostade, A. Pajou, J.-B. Perronneau, P. Potter, N. Poussin, Rembrandt, P.-P. Rubens, J. Ruysdael, G.-B. Tiepolo, A. et W. Van de Velde, C. Visscher, A. Watteau, etc., etc., composant la collection de M. A. Beurdeley et dont la vente [6e vente] aux enchères publiques, après décès, aura lieu Galerie Georges Petit, 8, rue de Sèze, les mardi 8, mercredi 9 et jeudi 10 juin 1920 / Commissaires-priseurs, Me F. Lair-Dubreuil, Me Henri Baudoin ; experts M. Jules Féral, M. Marius Paulme ; [préface de Marcel Nicolle]

[Vente (Art). 1920-06-08 - 1920-06-10. Paris]

Investigación cooperativa de la anchoveta y su ecosistema (ICANE) entre Perú y Canada

Introducción a los resultados de las investigaciones realizadas para este volumen por la comunidad científica con el apoyo de los dos gobiernos

Cross-border banking in Europe: An empirical investigation

This paper investigates bilateral trade in banking services within the European Union. The attention has been addressed to two main issues. First, to test the bank's motivations for setting up the different forms of overseas offices, and secondly, to assess the importance of barriers to entry across national European banking systems. Empirical results confirm the existence of different motivations for establishing representative offices, branches and subsidiaries in foreign locations. In addition, evidence has been achieved about the importance of non-regulatory barriers that could make difficult the existence of a single European market for banking services.