The Informational Value of Corporate Credit Ratings

This thesis examines the quality of credit ratings issued by the three major credit rating agencies - Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch. If credit ratings are informative, then prices of underlying credit instruments such as fixed-income securities and credit default insurance should change to reflect the new credit risk information. Using data on 246 different major fixed income securities issuers and spanning January 2000 to December 2011, we find that credit default swaps (CDS) spreads do not react to changes in credit ratings. Hence credit ratings for all three agencies are not price informative. CDS prices are mostly determined by historical CDS prices while ratings are mostly determined by historical ratings. We find that credit ratings are marginally more sensitive to CDS than CDS are sensitive to ratings.

The Impact of a Corporate Name Change on Stock Price and Trading Volume of Canadian Companies

This thesis examines the impact of a corporate name change on stock price and trading volume of Canadian companies around the announcement date, the approval date, and the adoption date over the time period from 1997 to 2011. Name changes are classified into six categories: major and minor, structural and pure, diversified and focused, accompanied with a change in ticker symbol and without a change in ticker symbol, “Gold” name addition and deletion, and different reasons for name changes (e.g., merger and acquisition, change of structure, change of strategy, and better image). The thesis uses the standard event study methodology to perform abnormal return and trading volume analyses. In addition, regression analysis is employed to examine which type of a name change has the largest impact on cumulative abnormal returns. Sample stocks exhibit a significant positive abnormal return one-day prior to the approval day and one day after the adoption date. Around the approval date we observe significant abnormal returns for stocks with a structural name change. On the day after the adoption date we document abnormal returns for stocks with major, minor, structural, pure, focused, and ticker symbol name changes. If a merger or acquisition is the reason for a name change, companies tend to experience a significant positive abnormal return one-day before the approval date and on the adoption date. If a change of structure is the reason for a name change, companies exhibit a significant positive abnormal return on the approval date and a significant negative abnormal return on the adoption date. In case of a change of strategy as the reason for a name change, companies show a significant negative abnormal return around the approval date and a significant positive abnormal return around the adoption date.

Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Governance, And Managerial Risk-Taking

This dissertation investigates the association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and managerial risk-taking, as well as the differences in governance structure that affect this association. Using a sample of US public firms from 1995 to 2009, we find that firms with strong CSR records engage in higher risk-taking. Furthermore, we find that this relationship is robust when accounting for differences in governance structure and correcting for endogeneity via simultaneous equations modeling. Additional testing indicates that performance in the employee relations dimension of CSR in particular increases with risk-taking, while high firm visibility dampens the association between CSR and the accounting-based measures of risk-taking. Prior literature establishes that high managerial risk-tolerance is necessary for the undertaking of risky yet value-enhancing investment decisions. Thus, the main findings suggest that CSR, rather than being a waste of scarce corporate resources, is instead an important aspect of shareholder value creation. They contribute to the debate on CSR by documenting that corporate risk-taking is one mechanism among others through which CSR maps into higher firm value.

"Everyone Loves Marineland!" (?): Entertainment Animal Advocacy, Praxis, and Resisting Corporate Repression

Following allegations and graphic evidence of animal cruelty and neglect documented by ex-employee whistleblowers of Marineland Canada to the Toronto Star newspaper in late 2012, the ethics surrounding animal captivity have been increasingly contested in regional public discourse. Animal advocates in the Niagara region and beyond have been compelled to demand change at the infamous local captive animal park— whether it be welfare-oriented reform, or radical animal liberation. With this as a backdrop, this research explores the ideologies, experiences, and strategic tactics of anti-Marineland animal advocates; the sociopolitical issues surrounding the largely unexamined but serious issue of imprisoned animals as entertainers; and the ensuing governmental and corporatist attempts to squash dissent of anti-Marineland critics. Situated within a Critical Animal Studies theoretical paradigm as well as a flourishing global anti-captivity critique inspired by the film Blackfish, this project employs semi-structured interviews and participant observation methodologies to analyze advocates' views on captivity under capitalism and the effectiveness of their praxes. Finally, this research illuminates the nuances of the conventionally-upheld dualistic theoretical debate of animal welfare versus animal rights within zoo and aquaria entertainment contexts through an exploratory examination of advocates' complex ideological views.

Convergence of corporate governance : comparative study in Canada and in China

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures En vue de l'obtention du grade de Maître en droit (LL.M.)"

Management renewal? Consequences of the new conception of the “best interests of the corporation” in North American and French Corporate Law

Corporate law integrates a stakeholder conception through the comprehensive meaning of the best interests of the corporation. In this paper, I address criticisms about classical definition of the firm’s purpose. Even if American law is more discreet and uncertain, it is possible to defend a broad conception of the best interests of the corporation. The interests of Canadian and French firms include their partners. While the notion of intérêt social is debatable in France, Canada has recently modified its point of view regarding the purpose of the firm. Indeed, the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada Magasins à rayons Peoples Inc. (Syndic de) v. Wise in 2004 changed the concept of corporate law. With respect to fiduciary duties, the Supreme Court set aside the traditional interpretation of the “best interests of the corporation” which gave primacy to shareholders’ interests. The Court held that the expression “best interests of the corporation” refers to the maximization of the corporation’s value. This innovative vision of the best interest of the corporation introduces stakeholder theory and corporate social responsibility (CSR) into corporate law and provides a new field for the firm’s management to frame their responsibilities. This paper concludes with an extended discussion of the implications of stakeholder and CSR influence for the future of corporate law, economy and financial researches.

L’appel conjoint de la FEE et d’Eurosif pour une amélioration de la divulgation de l’information extra-financière : « drive change in corporate behaviour »

Suite à la table ronde qui s’est tenue le 29 avril 2009 au Parlement européen consacrée au thème de la « Sustainability Disclosure », la Fédération des Experts comptables Européens (FEE) et l’European Sustainable Investment Forum (Eurosif) viennent de diffuser un plan d’actions destiné à améliorer la divulgation des informations extra-financières des sociétés cotées et non cotées contenues dans leurs documents financiers.

Promoting while checking self-interest : a conflict-based governance approach to rebalance corporate power disequilibria in Canada and the United States

La délégation du pouvoir de gestion aux administrateurs et aux gestionnaires, une caractéristique intrinsèque à la gestion efficace de grandes entreprises dans un contexte de capitalisme, confère une grande discrétion à l’équipe de direction. Cette discrétion, si elle n’est pas surveillée, peut mener à des comportements opportunistes envers la corporation, les actionnaires et les autres fournisseurs de capital qui n’ont pas de pouvoir de gestion. Les conflits entre ces deux classes d’agents peuvent émerger à la fois de décisions de gouvernance générale ou de transactions particulières (ie. offre publique d’achat). Dans les cas extrêmes, ces conflits peuvent mener à la faillite de la firme. Dans les cas plus typiques, ils mènent l’extraction de bénéfices privés pour les administrateurs et gestionnaires, l’expropriation des actionnaires, et des réductions de valeur pour la firme. Nous prenons le point de vue d’un petit actionnaire minoritaire pour explorer les méchanismes de gouvernance disponibles au Canada et aux États‐Unis. Après une synthèse dans la Partie 1 des théories sous‐jacentes à l’étude du pouvoir dans la corporation (séparation de la propriété et du contrôle et les conflits d’agence), nous concentrons notre analyse dans la Partie 2 sur les différents types de méchanismes (1) de gouvernance interne, (2) juridiques et (3) marchands, qui confèrent du pouvoir aux deux classes d’agents. Nous examinons comment les intérêts de ces deux classes peuvent être réalignés afin de prévenir et résoudre les conflits au sein de la firme. La Partie 3 explore un équilibre dynamique de pouvoir corporatif qui cherche à minimiser le potentiel d’opportunisme toute en préservant une quantité de discrétion suffisante pour la gestion efficace de la firme. Nous analysons des moyens pour renforcer les protections des actionnaires minoritaires et proposons un survol des pistes de réforme possibles.

La Belgique renforce ses règles en matière de corporate governance : Regard d'un juriste français sur la réforme récente du Code des sociétés.

Alors que l’Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Economique appelle de tous ses voeux à développer les initiatives en matière de corporate governance pour faire face aux échecs dont la crise financière a été le témoin, la loi belge du 6 avril 2010 témoigne d’une position proactive et met en oeuvre les propositions faites au niveau européen. D’un côté, certaines modifications législatives introduites au premier trimestre 2010 sont connues du juriste français et soulèvent des interrogations similaires à celles existantes en France. D’un autre côté, un certain nombre d’options choisies par le gouvernement belge (notamment celles concernant la rémunération) présente un caractère original, la France n’en étant à l’heure actuelle qu’au stade des débats. Au-delà de détailler la loi d’avril 2010 dans son aspect gouvernance d’entreprise avec un regard comparatiste, le présent article s’interroge sur l’efficacité future du dispositif mis en place.

Comparative Lessons on Corporate law and CSR: Hard Law as Solution? Do the French offer the way ahead?

This paper provides a comparative analysis of corporate law and CSR and asks whether there are lessons for Australia from corporate law and CSR developments in France. This presentation presents a summary of the provisions of the new French Act Number 2010-788 passed on 12 July 2010 – called “Grenelle 2” –. Firstly, article 225 of Law’s Grenelle 2 changes the Commercial Code to extend the reach of non-financial reporting and to ensure its pertinence. Secondly, article 227 Law’s Grenelle 2 amends certain provisions of the Commercial and Environmental Codes and incorporates into substantive law the liability of parent companies for their subsidiaries. In fine, article 224 of Law’s Grenelle 2 reinforces the pressure on the market to act in a responsible manner. It modifies article 214-12 of the Monetary and Financial Code in order to compel institutional investors (mutual funds and fund management companies) to take social, environmental and governance criteria into account in their investment policy.