Altruism, equity and reciprocity in a gift-exchange experiment: An encompassing approach

Considerable experimental evidence suggests that non-pecuniary motivesmust be addressed when modeling behavior in economic contexts. Recentmodels of non-pecuniary motives can be classified as either altruism-based, equity-based, or reciprocity-based. We estimate and compareleading approaches in these categories, using experimental data. Wethen offer a flexible approach that nests the above three approaches,thereby allowing for nested hypothesis testing and for determiningthe relative strength of each of the competing theories. In addition,the encompassing approach provides a functional form for utility in different settings without the restrictive nature of the approaches nested within it. Using this flexible form for nested tests, we findthat intentional reciprocity, distributive concerns, and altruisticconsiderations all play a significant role in players' decisions.

Responsibility-allevation and effort provision in a gift-exchange experiment

Previous indirect evidence suggests that impulses towards pro-socialbehavior are diminished when an external authority is responsiblefor an outcome. The responsibility-alleviation effect states that ashift of responsibility to an external authority dampens internalimpulses toward honesty, loyalty, or generosity. In a gift-exchangeexperiment, we find that subjects respond with more generosity(higher effort) when a wage is determined by a random process thanwhen it is assigned by a third party, indicating that even a slightshift in perceived responsibility for the final payoffs can changebehavior. Responsibility-alleviation is a factor in economicenvironments featuring substantial personal interaction.

Bargaining on networks: An experiment

While markets are often decentralized, in many other cases agents in one role can only negotiate with a proper subset of the agents in the complementary role. There may be proximity issues or restricted communication flows. For example, information may be transmitted only through word-of-mouth, as is often the case for job openings, business opportunities, and confidential transactions. Bargaining can be considered to occur over a network that summarizes the structure of linkages among people. We conduct an alternating-offer bargaining experiment using separate simple networks, which are then joined during the session by an additional link. The results diverge sharply depending on how this connection is made. Payoffs can be systematically affected even for agents who are not connected by the new link. We use a graph-theoretic analysis to show that any two-sided network can be decomposed into simple networks of three types, so that our result can be generalized to more complex bargaining environments. Participants appear to grasp the essential characteristics of the networks and we observe a rather consistently high level of bargaining efficiency.

Does risk aversion or attraction depend on income? An experiment

Does risk attitude (aversion or attraction) vary with the level of the income at risk? About half of our subjects chose to insure all levels, whereas another half chose instead not to insure low levels, but to insure high levels.

Reflections on gains and losses: A 2x2x7 experiment

We test whether risk attitudes change when losses instead of gains areinvolved. The study of gain-loss asymmetries has been largely confinedto reflected choices, where all the money amounts of a positiveprospect are multiplied by minus one. We define the decomposition reflection = translation + probability switch, and experimentally findboth a translation effect (risk attraction becomes more frequent whengains are translated into losses) and a probability switch effect (riskattraction becomes more frequent when the probability of the best outcomedecreases). Surprisingly, the switch effect is somewhat stronger than thetranslation effect, negating a conventional reflection effect when onestarts with choices between gains with a low probability of the bestoutcome. We conclude by arguing that, while both the translation effectand the switch effect contradict the expected utility hypothesis, thetranslation effect implies a deeper violation of standard preference theory.

Eliciting consumers preferences using stated preference discrete choice models: Contingent ranking versus choice experiment

The aim of this paper is twofold: firstly, to carry out a theoreticalreview of the most recent stated preference techniques used foreliciting consumers preferences and, secondly, to compare the empiricalresults of two dierent stated preference discrete choice approaches.They dier in the measurement scale for the dependent variable and,therefore, in the estimation method, despite both using a multinomiallogit. One of the approaches uses a complete ranking of full-profiles(contingent ranking), that is, individuals must rank a set ofalternatives from the most to the least preferred, and the other usesa first-choice rule in which individuals must select the most preferredoption from a choice set (choice experiment). From the results werealize how important the measurement scale for the dependent variablebecomes and, to what extent, procedure invariance is satisfied.

When are layoffs acceptable? Evidence from a quasi-experiment

Many authors have discussed a decline in internal labor markets and an apparent shift to a new employment contract, characterized by less commitment between employer and employee and more portable skills. These discussions occur without much evidence on what employment contract employees currently feel is fair. We perfomed quasi-experimental surveys to study when employees in the U.S. andCanada feel that layoffs are fair.Layoffs were perceived as more fair if they were due to lower product demand than if the result of employee suggestions. This result appears to be solely due to norms of reciprocity (companiesshould not punish employees for their efforts), rather than norms of sharing rents, as new technology was also considered a justification for layoffs.Consistent with theories of distributive and procedural equity, layoffs were perceived as more fair if the CEO voluntarily shared the pain. CEO bonuses due to layoffs lowered their reported fairness only slightly.Respondents in Silicon Valley were not more accepting of layoffsthan were those in Canada on average, although the justificationsconsidered valid differed slightly.

Can sanctions induce pessimism? An experiment

We run an experiment in which two subjects play a two-round minimum effort game inthe presence of a third player (principal) who is the only one informed about past effortchoices and benefits from a higher minimum effort of the others. Sanctions introduced in thesecond round by the experimenter lead to more optimistic beliefs and higher efforts. This isnot true when sanctions have been imposed by the principal. The possibility that the choiceof a sanction is a signal of low effort levels causes players who chose high effort in the firstround to be less optimistic.

Retribution in a cheap-talk experiment

We use a two-person 3-stage game to investigate whether people chooseto punish or reward another player by sacrificing money to increase or decrease the other person's payoff. One player sends a message indicating an intended play, which is either favorable or unfavorable to the other player in the game. After the message, the sender and the receiver play a simultaneous 2x2 game. A deceptive message may be made, in an effort to induce the receiver to make a play favorable to the sender. Our focus is on whether receivers' rates of monetary sacrifice depend on the process and the perceived sender's intention,as is suggested by the literature on deception and proceduralsatisfaction. Models such as Rabin (1993), Sen (1997), and Charnessand Rabin (1999) also permit rates of sacrifice to be sensitive to the sender's perceived intention, while outcome-based models such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (1997) predict otherwise. We find that deception substantially increases the punishment rate as a response to an action that is unfavorable to the receiver. We also find that a small but significant percentage of subjects choose to reward a favorable action choice made by the sender.

Recreating the South Sea bubble: Lessons from an experiment in financial history

Major bubble episodes are rare events. In this paper, we examine what factors might cause some asset price bubbles to become very large. We recreate, in a laboratory setting, some of the specific institutional features investors in the South Sea Company faced in 1720. Several factors have been proposed as potentially contributing to one of the greatest periods of asset overvaluation in history: an intricate debt-for-equity swap, deferred payment for these shares, and the possibility of default on the deferred payments. We consider which aspect might have had the most impact in creating the South Sea bubble. The results of the experiment suggest that the company?s attempt to exchange its shares for government debt was the single biggest contributor to the stock price explosion, because of the manner in which the swap affected fundamental value. Issuing new shares with only partial payments required, in conjunction with the debt-equity swap, also had a significant effect on the size of the bubble. Limited contract enforcement, on the other hand, does not appear to have contributed significantly.

Constitutively active G protein-coupled receptors: potential mechanisms of receptor activation.

Mutations of G protein-coupled receptors can increase their constitutive (agonist-independent) activity. Some of these mutations have been artificially introduced by site-directed mutagenesis, others occur spontaneously in human diseases. The analysis of the constitutively active G protein-coupled receptors has provided important informations about the molecular mechanisms underlying receptor activation and drug action.

High frequency of functionally active Melan-a-specific T cells in a patient with progressive immunoproteasome-deficient melanoma.

Tumor-reactive T cells play an important role in cancer immunosurveillance. Applying the multimer technology, we report here an unexpected high frequency of Melan-A-specific CTLs in a melanoma patient with progressive lymph node metastases, consisting of 18 and 12.8% of total peripheral blood and tumor-infiltrating CD8+ T cells, respectively. Melan-A-specific CTLs revealed a high cytolytic activity against allogeneic Melan-A-expressing target cells but failed to kill the autologous tumor cells. Loading of the tumor cells with Melan-A peptide reversed the resistance to killing, suggesting impaired function of the MHC class I antigen processing and presentation pathway. Mutations of the coding region of the HLA-A2 binding Melan-A26-35 peptide or down-regulation of the MHC class I heavy chain, the antigenic peptide TAP, and tapasin could be excluded. However, PCR and immunohistochemical analysis revealed a deficiency of the immunoproteasomes low molecular weight protein 2 and low molecular weight protein 7 in the primary tumor cells, which affects the quantity and quality of generated T-cell epitopes and might explain the resistance to killing. This is supported by our data, demonstrating that the resistance to killing can be partially reversed by pre-exposure of the tumor cells to IFN-gamma, which is known to induce the immunoproteasomes. Overall, this is the first report of an extremely high frequency of tumor-specific CTLs that exhibit competent T-cell-effector functions but fail to lyse the autologous tumor cells. Immunotherapeutic approaches should not only focus on the induction of a robust antitumor immune response, but should also have to target tumor immune escape mechanisms.