Single-valued solutions for the Böhm-Bawerk horse market game

Single-valued solutions for the case of two-sided market games without product differentiation, also known as Böhm-Bawerk horse market games, are analyzed. The nucleolus is proved to coincide with the tau-value, and is thus the midpoint of the core. Moreover a characterization of this setof games in terms of the assignment matrix is provided.

Multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets: the nucleolus and the core-center

En aquest treball mostrem que, a diferència del cas bilateral, per als mercats multilaterals d'assignació coneguts amb el nom de Böhm-Bawerk assignment games, el nucleolus i el core-center, i. e. el centre de masses del core, no coincideixen en general. Per demostrar-ho provem que donant un m-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game les dues solucions anteriors poden obtenir-se respectivament del nucleolus i el core-center d'un joc convex definit en el conjunt format pels m sectors. Encara més, provem que per calcular el nucleolus d'aquest últim joc només les coalicions formades per un jugador o m-1 jugadors són importants. Aquests resultats simplifiquen el càlcul del nucleolus d'un multi-sided ¿¿ohm-Bawerk assignment market amb un número molt elevat d'agents.

Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution and convex descompositions of TU games

We study under which conditions the core of a game involved in a convex decomposition of another game turns out to be a stable set of the decomposed game. Some applications and numerical examples, including the remarkable Lucas¿ five player game with a unique stable set different from the core, are reckoning and analyzed.

The Lorenz-maximal core allocations and the kernel in some classes of assignment games

En aquest treball demostrem que en la classe de jocs d'assignació amb diagonal dominant (Solymosi i Raghavan, 2001), el repartiment de Thompson (que coincideix amb el valor tau) és l'únic punt del core que és maximal respecte de la relació de dominància de Lorenz, i a més coincideix amb la solucié de Dutta i Ray (1989), també coneguda com solució igualitària. En segon lloc, mitjançant una condició més forta que la de diagonal dominant, introduïm una nova classe de jocs d'assignació on cada agent obté amb la seva parella òptima almenys el doble que amb qualsevol altra parella. Per aquests jocs d'assignació amb diagonal 2-dominant, el repartiment de Thompson és l'únic punt del kernel, i per tant el nucleolo.

Coalitionally monotonic set-solutions for cooperative TU games

A static comparative study on set-solutions for cooperative TU games is carried out. The analysis focuses on studying the compatibility between two classical and reasonable properties introduced by Young (1985) in the context of single valued solutions, namely core-selection and coalitional monotonicity. As the main result, it is showed that coalitional monotonicity is not only incompatible with the core-selection property but also with the bargaining-selection property. This new impossibility result reinforces the tradeoff between these kinds of interesting and intuitive economic properties. Positive results about compatibility between desirable economic properties are given replacing the core selection requirement by the core-extension property.

On the nucleolus of 2 x 2 assignment games

[spa] En este artículo hallamos fórmulas para el nucleolo de juegos de asignación arbitrarios con dos compradores y dos vendedores. Se analizan cinco casos distintos, dependiendo de las entradas en la matriz de asignación. Los resultados se extienden a los casos de juegos de asignación de tipo 2 x m o m x 2.

On the coincidence between the Shimomura's bargaining sets and the core

[cat] En l'article es dona una condició necessària per a que els conjunts de negociació definits per Shimomura (1997) i el nucli d'un joc cooperatiu amb utilitat transferible coincideixin. A tal efecte, s'introdueix el concepte de vectors de màxim pagament. La condició necessària consiteix a verificar que aquests vectors pertanyen al nucli del joc.

Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games

[cat] En aquest treball caracteritzem les solucions puntuals de jocs cooperatius d'utilitat transferible que compleixen selecció del core i monotonia agregada. També mostrem que aquestes dues propietats són compatibles amb la individualitat racional, la propietat del jugador fals i la propietat de simetria. Finalment, caracteritzem les solucions puntuals que compleixen les cinc propietats a l'hora.

The assignment game: core bounds for mixed-pair coalitions

In the assignment game framework, we try to identify those assignment matrices in which no entry can be increased without changing the coreof the game. These games will be called buyer¿seller exact games and satisfy the condition that each mixed¿pair coalition attains the corresponding matrix entry in the core of the game. For a given assignment game, a unique buyerseller exact assignment game with the same core is proved to exist. In order to identify this matrix and to provide a characterization of those assignment games which are buyer¿seller exact in terms of the assignment matrix, attainable upper and lower core bounds for the mixed¿pair coalitions are found. As a consequence, an open question posed in Quint (1991) regarding a canonical representation of a ¿45o¿lattice¿ by means of the core of an assignment game can now be answered

Dispersal routes reconstruction and the minimum cost arborescence problem.

We show that the dispersal routes reconstruction problem can be stated as an instance of a graph theoretical problem known as the minimum cost arborescence problem, for which there exist efficient algorithms. Furthermore, we derive some theoretical results, in a simplified setting, on the possible optimal values that can be obtained for this problem. With this, we place the dispersal routes reconstruction problem on solid theoretical grounds, establishing it as a tractable problem that also lends itself to formal mathematical and computational analysis. Finally, we present an insightful example of how this framework can be applied to real data. We propose that our computational method can be used to define the most parsimonious dispersal (or invasion) scenarios, which can then be tested using complementary methods such as genetic analysis.

On the coincidence of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and the core

In this paper we prove that the Mas-Colell bargaining set coincides with the core for three-player balanced and superadditive cooperative games. This is no longer true without the superadditivity condition or for games with more than three-players. Furthermore, under the same assumptions, the coincidence between the Mas-Collel and the individual rational bargaining set (Vohra (1991)) is revealed. Keywords: Cooperative game, Mas-Colell bargaining set, balancedness, individual rational bargaining set. JEL classi fication: C71, D63, D71.

The changing relationship between commodity prices and equity prices in commodity exporting

We explore the linkage between equity and commodity markets, focusing in particular on its evolution over time. We document that a country's equity market valuehas significant out-of-sample predictive ability for the future global commodity priceindex for several primary commodity-exporting countries. The out-of-sample predictive ability of the equity market appears around 2000s. The results are robust to usingseveral control variables as well as firm-level equity data. Finally, our results indicatethat exchange rates are a better predictor of commodity prices than equity markets,especially at very short horizons.

The role of reputation, punishment and their interplay in human cooperation

The problem of how cooperation can evolve between individuals or entities with conflicting interests is central to biology as many of the major evolutionary transitions, from the first replicating molecules to human societies, have required solving this problem. There are many routes to cooperation but humans seem to be distinct from other species as they have more complex and diverse mechanisms, often due to their higher cognitive skills, allowing them to reap the benefits from living in groups. Among those mechanisms, the use of reputation or past experience with others as well as sanctioning mechanisms both seem to be of major importance. They have often been considered separately but the interaction between the two might provide new insights as to how punishment could have appeared as a means to enforce cooperation in early humans. In this thesis, I firstly use theoretical approaches from evolutionary game theory to investigate the evolution of punishment and cooperation through a reputation system based on punitive actions, and compare the efficacy of this system, in terms of cooperation achieved, with one based on cooperative actions. On the other hand, I use empirical approaches from economics to test, in real life, predictions from theoretical models but also to explore further conditions such as environmental variation, constrained memory, or even the scale of competition between individuals. Both approaches have allowed contributing to the understanding of how these factors affect reputation and punishment use, and ultimately how cooperation is achieved.

Modelos dinámicos en finanzas

El problema de la modelización dinámica enfinanzas tiene mucho que ver con el tipo deproblema que se pretende estudiar. Es preciso teneren cuenta el subyacente así como las magnitudesque se pretende estimar para elegir el modeloadecuado.-

Corporate responsibility in the postnational constellation : a multiple-case study

In my thesis I present the findings of a multiple-case study on the CSR approach of three multinational companies, applying Basu and Palazzo's (2008) CSR-character as a process model of sensemaking, Suchman's (1995) framework on legitimation strategies, and Habermas (1996) concept of deliberative democracy. The theoretical framework is based on the assumption of a postnational constellation (Habermas, 2001) which sends multinational companies onto a process of sensemaking (Weick, 1995) with regards to their responsibilities in a globalizing world. The major reason is that mainstream CSR-concepts are based on the assumption of a liberal market economy embedded in a nation state that do not fit the changing conditions for legitimation of corporate behavior in a globalizing world. For the purpose of this study, I primarily looked at two research questions: (i) How can the CSR approach of a multinational corporation be systematized empirically? (ii) What is the impact of the changing conditions in the postnational constellation on the CSR approach of the studied multinational corporations? For the analysis, I adopted a holistic approach (Patton, 1980), combining elements of a deductive and inductive theory building methodology (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Van de Ven, 1992) and rigorous qualitative data analysis. Primary data was collected through 90 semi-structured interviews in two rounds with executives and managers in three multinational companies and their respective stakeholders. Raw data originating from interview tapes, field notes, and contact sheets was processed, stored, and managed using the software program QSR NVIVO 7. In the analysis, I applied qualitative methods to strengthen the interpretative part as well as quantitative methods to identify dominating dimensions and patterns. I found three different coping behaviors that provide insights into the corporate mindset. The results suggest that multinational corporations increasingly turn towards relational approaches of CSR to achieve moral legitimacy in formalized dialogical exchanges with their stakeholders since legitimacy can no longer be derived only from a national framework. I also looked at the degree to which they have reacted to the postnational constellation by the assumption of former state duties and the underlying reasoning. The findings indicate that CSR approaches become increasingly comprehensive through integrating political strategies that reflect the growing (self-) perception of multinational companies as political actors. Based on the results, I developed a model which relates the different dimensions of corporate responsibility to the discussion on deliberative democracy, global governance and social innovation to provide guidance for multinational companies in a postnational world. With my thesis, I contribute to management research by (i) delivering a comprehensive critique of the mainstream CSR-literature and (ii) filling the gap of thorough qualitative research on CSR in a globalizing world using the CSR-character as an empirical device, and (iii) to organizational studies by further advancing a deliberative view of the firm proposed by Scherer and Palazzo (2008).