Tax reforms and inequality: theoretical and empirical implications

In this paper we examine the effect of tax policy on the relationship between inequality and growth in a two-sector non-scale model. With non-scale models, the longrun equilibrium growth rate is determined by technological parameters and it is independent of macroeconomic policy instruments. However, this fact does not imply that fiscal policy is unimportant for long-run economic performance. It indeed has important effects on the different levels of key economic variables such as per capita stock of capital and output. Hence, although the economy grows at the same rate across steady states, the bases for economic growth may be different.The model has three essential features. First, we explicitly model skill accumulation, second, we introduce government finance into the production function, and we introduce an income tax to mirror the fiscal events of the 1980¿s and 1990¿s in the US. The fact that the non-scale model is associated with higher order dynamics enables it to replicate the distinctly non-linear nature of inequality in the US with relative ease. The results derived in this paper attract attention to the fact that the non-scale growth model does not only fit the US data well for the long-run (Jones, 1995b) but also that it possesses unique abilities in explaining short term fluctuations of the economy. It is shown that during transition the response of the relative simulated wage to changes in the tax code is rather non-monotonic, quite in accordance to the US inequality pattern in the 1980¿s and early 1990¿s.More specifically, we have analyzed in detail the dynamics following the simulation of an isolated tax decrease and an isolated tax increase. So, after a tax decrease the skill premium follows a lower trajectory than the one it would follow without a tax decrease. Hence we are able to reduce inequality for several periods after the fiscal shock. On the contrary, following a tax increase, the evolution of the skill premium remains above the trajectory carried on by the skill premium under a situation with no tax increase. Consequently, a tax increase would imply a higher level of inequality in the economy

The effects of tax deductibility on the mix of property taxes and use charges: an empirical analysis of the spanish case

This paper tests some hypothesis about the determinants of the local tax structure. In particular, we focus on the effects that the property tax deductibility in the national income tax has on the relative use of the property tax and user charges. We deal with the incentive effects that local governments face regarding the different sources of revenue by means of a model in which the local tax structure and the level of public expenditure arise as a result of the maximizing behaviour of local politicians subject to the economic effects of the tax system. We attempt to test the hypothesis developed with data corresponding to a set of Spanish municipalities during the period 1987-9l. We find that tax deductibility provides incentives to raise revenues from the property tax but does not introduce a biass against user charges or in favor of overall spending growth

Auction theory, sequential local service privatization, and the effects of geographical scale economies on effective competition

A sequential weakly efficient two-auction game with entry costs, interdependence between objects, two potential bidders and IPV assumption is presented here in order to give some theoretical predictions on the effects of geographical scale economies on local service privatization performance. It is shown that the first object seller takes profit of this interdependence. The interdependence externality rises effective competition for the first object, expressed as the probability of having more than one final bidder. Besides, if there is more than one final bidder in the first auction, seller extracts the entire bidder¿s expected future surplus differential between having won the first auction and having lost. Consequences for second object seller are less clear, reflecting the contradictory nature of the two main effects of object interdependence. On the one hand, first auction winner becomes ¿stronger¿, so that expected payments rise in a competitive environment. On the other hand, first auction loser becomes relatively ¿weaker¿, hence (probably) reducing effective competition for the second object. Additionally, some contributions to static auction theory with entry cost and asymmetric bidders are presented in the appendix

Sibling competition and the risk of falling out of the nest

In birds, sibling competition encompasses several activities, one of which is jostling for position, that is, competing for the location in the nest where parents predictably deliver food items. We hypothesized that nestlings that compete by jostling for position may fall out of the nest either accidentally or because siblings push each other to reduce brood size. This hypothesis predicts that in a competitive environment needy nestlings trade-off the benefit of being fed against the cost of falling out of the nest. As a first attempt to evaluate this hypothesis, we experimentally manipulated the number of young per brood in the colonial Alpine swift, Apus melba. Nestlings fell out of their colony more frequently when reared in enlarged than in reduced broods. Because brood size manipulation affects not only the number of young per nest but also their body condition, we analysed an extended data set to disentangle these two factors. This analysis showed that, independently of brood size, nestlings in poor condition and those reared in broods where sibling differed markedly in weight were more likely to disappear from the colony. Nestling disappearance also occurred predominantly in nests close to the colony entrances. Although nestling swifts can wander in the colony and become adopted in neighbouring nests, we found no evidence that wandering per se increased the risk of falling out of the colony. Our study therefore highlights a novel cost of scramble competition.

Iowa Motor Fuel Tax Monthly Reports, April 2011

The monthly fuel tax report from Iowa Department of Transportation to the Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance.

Iowa Motor Fuel Tax Monthly Reports, June 2011

The monthly fuel tax report from Iowa Department of Transportation to the Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance.

Iowa Motor Fuel Tax Monthly Reports, July 2011

The monthly fuel tax report from Iowa Department of Transportation to the Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance.

Iowa Motor Fuel Tax Monthly Reports, October 2010

The monthly fuel tax report from Iowa Department of Transportation to the Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance.

Iowa Motor Fuel Tax Monthly Reports, November 2010

The monthly fuel tax report from Iowa Department of Transportation to the Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance.

Iowa Motor Fuel Tax Monthly Reports, January 2011

The monthly fuel tax report from Iowa Department of Transportation to the Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance.

Iowa Motor Fuel Tax Monthly Reports, February 2011

The monthly fuel tax report from Iowa Department of Transportation to the Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance.

Iowa Motor Fuel Tax Monthly Reports, May 2011

The monthly fuel tax report from Iowa Department of Transportation to the Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance.

Iowa Motor Fuel Tax Monthly Reports, September 2010

The monthly fuel tax report from Iowa Department of Transportation to the Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance.