Random diffusion and leverage effect in financial markets

We prove that Brownian market models with random diffusion coefficients provide an exact measure of the leverage effect [J-P. Bouchaud et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 87, 228701 (2001)]. This empirical fact asserts that past returns are anticorrelated with future diffusion coefficient. Several models with random diffusion have been suggested but without a quantitative study of the leverage effect. Our analysis lets us to fully estimate all parameters involved and allows a deeper study of correlated random diffusion models that may have practical implications for many aspects of financial markets.

Uniform-price assignment markets

Uniform-price assignment games are introduced as those assignment markets with the core reduced to a segment. In these games, for all active agents, competitive prices are uniform although products may be non-homogeneous. A characterization in terms of the assignment matrix is given. The only assignment markets where all submarkets are uniform are the Bohm-Bawerk horse markets. We prove that for uniform-price assignment games the kernel, or set of symmetrically-pairwise bargained allocations, either coincides with the core or reduces to the nucleolus

Multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets: the nucleolus and the core-center

En aquest treball mostrem que, a diferència del cas bilateral, per als mercats multilaterals d'assignació coneguts amb el nom de Böhm-Bawerk assignment games, el nucleolus i el core-center, i. e. el centre de masses del core, no coincideixen en general. Per demostrar-ho provem que donant un m-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game les dues solucions anteriors poden obtenir-se respectivament del nucleolus i el core-center d'un joc convex definit en el conjunt format pels m sectors. Encara més, provem que per calcular el nucleolus d'aquest últim joc només les coalicions formades per un jugador o m-1 jugadors són importants. Aquests resultats simplifiquen el càlcul del nucleolus d'un multi-sided ¿¿ohm-Bawerk assignment market amb un número molt elevat d'agents.

Vertical Syndication-Proof Competitive Prices in Multilateral Markets

[eng] A multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible commodities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a unique vector of competitive prices for the commodities that is vertical syndication-proof, in the sense that, at those prices, syndication of sellers each owning a different commodity is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the buyers. Since, moreover, the benefits obtained by the agents at those prices correspond to the nucleolus of the market game, we provide a syndication-based foundation for the nucleolus as an appropriate solution concept for market games. For different solution concepts a syndicate can be disadvantageous and there is no escape to Aumman’s paradox (Aumann, 1973). We further show that vertical syndicationproofness and horizontal syndication-proofness – in which sellers of the same commodity collude – are incompatible requirements under some mild assumptions. Our results build on a self-interesting link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982). We identify a particular subset of Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and we show that it is isomorphic to the whole class of bankruptcy games. This isomorphism enables us to show the uniqueness of the vector of vertical syndication-proof prices for the whole class of Böhm-Bawerk assignment market using well-known results of bankruptcy problems.

Monge assignment games

Un juego de asignación se define por una matriz A; donde cada fila representa un comprador y cada columna un vendedor. Si el comprador i se empareja a un vendedor j; el mercado produce aij unidades de utilidad. Estudiamos los juegos de asignación de Monge, es decir, aquellos juegos bilaterales de asignación en los cuales la matriz satisface la propiedad de Monge. Estas matrices pueden caracterizarse por el hecho de que en cualquier submatriz 2x2 un emparejamiento óptimo está situado en la diagonal principal. Para mercados cuadrados, describimos sus núcleos utilizando sólo la parte central tridiagonal de elementos de la matriz. Obtenemos una fórmula cerrada para el reparto óptimo de los compradores dentro del núcleo y para el reparto óptimo de los vendedores dentro del núcleo. Analizamos también los mercados no cuadrados reduciéndolos a matrices cuadradas apropiadas.

An axiomatization of the nucleolus of the assignment game

[cat] En el domini dels jocs bilaterals d’assignació, es presenta una axiomàtica del nucleolus com l´unica solució que compleix les propietats de consistència respecte del joc derivat definit per Owen (1992) i monotonia de les queixes dels sectors respecte de la seva cardinalitat. Com a conseqüència obtenim una caracterització geomètrica del nucleolus mitjançant una propietat de bisecció més forta que la que satisfan els punts del kernel (Maschler et al, 1979).

Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in multi-sided assignment markets

[cat] Aquest treball tracta d’extendre la noció d’equilibri simètric de negociació bilateral introduït per Rochford (1983) a jocs d’assignació multilateral. Un pagament corresponent a un equilibri simètric de negociación multilateral (SMB) és una imputación del core que garanteix que qualsevol agent es troba en equilibri respecte a un procés de negociación entre tots els agents basat en allò que cadascun d’ells podria rebre -i fer servir com a amenaça- en un ’matching’ òptim diferent al que s’ha format. Es prova que, en el cas de jocs d’assignació multilaterals, el conjunt de SMB és sempre no buit i que, a diferència del cas bilateral, no sempre coincideix amb el kernel (Davis and Maschler, 1965). Finalment, responem una pregunta oberta per Rochford (1982) tot introduïnt un conjunt basat en la idea de kernel, que, conjuntament amb el core, ens permet caracteritzar el conjunt de SMB.

Complements and substitutes in multilateral assignment markets

[cat] En aquest treball provo que, en mercats d’assignació amb més de dos costats, agents de diferents sectors poden no ser complementaris mentre que agents del mateix sector poden no ser substituts. Shapley (1962) va provar que això mai pot succeïr quan el mercat d’assignació només té dos costats. No obstant, demostro que existeixen condicions suficients que garanteixen la substitutabilitat i la complementarietat entre agents en aquests tipus de mercats. A més, provo que, quan els béns al mercat son homogenis, el resultat de Shapley (1962) es manté.

Study: Residential Facilities Not for Everyone, September 2012

Evidence-based practices include adhering to what is known as the Risk Principle: An offender's level of supervision and treatment should reflect their risk of recidivism.

Chemodiversity and molecular plasticity: recognition processes as explored by property spaces.

In the last few years, a need to account for molecular flexibility in drug-design methodologies has emerged, even if the dynamic behavior of molecular properties is seldom made explicit. For a flexible molecule, it is indeed possible to compute different values for a given conformation-dependent property and the ensemble of such values defines a property space that can be used to describe its molecular variability; a most representative case is the lipophilicity space. In this review, a number of applications of lipophilicity space and other property spaces are presented, showing that this concept can be fruitfully exploited: to investigate the constraints exerted by media of different levels of structural organization, to examine processes of molecular recognition and binding at an atomic level, to derive informative descriptors to be included in quantitative structure--activity relationships and to analyze protein simulations extracting the relevant information. Much molecular information is neglected in the descriptors used by medicinal chemists, while the concept of property space can fill this gap by accounting for the often-disregarded dynamic behavior of both small ligands and biomacromolecules. Property space also introduces some innovative concepts such as molecular sensitivity and plasticity, which appear best suited to explore the ability of a molecule to adapt itself to the environment variously modulating its property and conformational profiles. Globally, such concepts can enhance our understanding of biological phenomena providing fruitful descriptors in drug-design and pharmaceutical sciences.

Iowa Historic Property Study of the Zeman Barn, 2009

The Zeman Barn (86-00028) is an early twentieth-century example of a gothic roofed barn and is part of the Zeman Farmstead located along U.S. Highway 30 in Otter Creek Township (Township 38N, Range 14W), Tama County, Iowa (Figures 1 and 2). The farmstead was initially evaluated in a reconnaissance architectural survey conducted in 1998 by The Louis Berger Group, Inc (Berger). An intensive architectural survey of the property by Berger’s Principal Architectural Historian, Martha H. Bowers, evaluated the farmstead as not being eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (National Register) but noted that the barn appears to be eligible for listing in the National Register under Criterion C (Bowers 1998). At the request of the Iowa Department of Transportation, Berger completed the recordation project to provide a documentary record of the Zeman Barn in accordance with the guidelines set forth by the Iowa State Historic Preservation Office regarding historic property studies for barns. Background research for this project was conducted in September 2008 and April 2009. The property was inspected and photographed in May 2008. Information on the property was gathered through background research, interviews with Zeman family members, field investigation, and photo documentation. Historical maps of the project area were used to collect data necessary for developing regional and local historic contexts. The research for this report was conducted at the Tama County Courthouse and the Tama County Historical Museum Genealogical Library, both in Toledo. Much of the background research for the project was conducted by Camilla Deiber and Michael Dulle. Ms. Deiber also prepared the photographic documentation, plan drawings, and the graphics used in this report. Mr. Roger L. Ciuffo conducted interviews with Zeman family members and wrote this report.

Testing a large-scale forestry scenario model by means of successive inventories on a forest property

Abstract