825 resultados para public interest law
Resumo:
Judicial duties have for decades extended far beyond the scope of traditional adjudication, judges being progressively called upon to occupy the role of social engineers. Meanwhile, contexts in which judges evolve have transformed: mass damage nowadays tends to multiply and create new challenges not only for legal actors, but also for society at large. In spring 2011, the replies received by the European Commission to its public consultation on collective redress indicated European stakeholders’ strong interest in seeing judiciaries play prominent and leading roles in the supervision and monitoring of procedures which enable groups of claimants to seek together compensation for damage caused by mass events. Judges are thus expected to be neutral and robust agents while assuming heavy responsibilities under a considerable burden. Insights from social sciences however invite us to revisit policymakers expectations and may shed new light on current debates about mass litigation.
Resumo:
The article discusses the problems of applicable law to copyright infringements online. It firstly identifies the main problems related to the well established territoriality principle and the lex loci protectionis rules. Then; the discussion focuses on the "ubiquitous infringement" rule recently proposed by the American Law Institute (ALI) and the European Max Planck Group for Conflicts of Law and Intellectual Propoperty (CLIP). The author strongly welcomes a compromise between the territoriality and universality approaches suggested in respect of ubiquitous infringement cases. At the same time; the paper draws the attention that the interests of "good faith" online service providers (such as legal certainty and foreseeability) have been until now underestimated and invites to take these interests into account when merging the projects into a common international proposal.
Resumo:
Public broadcasting has always been a regulatory field somewhat zealously guarded within the nation states' sphere and kept willingly untouched by regional or international rules. Values inherent to the role of public broadcasting, such as cultural and national identity, social cohesion, pluralism and a sustained public sphere, were thought too critical and too historically connected with the particular society to allow any "outside" influence. Different regulatory models have emerged to reflect these specificities within the national boundaries of European countries. Yet, as media evolved technologically and economically, the constraints of state borders were rendered obsolete and the inner tension between culture and commerce of the television medium became more pronounced. This tension was only intensified with the formulation of a European Community (EC) layer of regulation, which had as its primary objective the creation of a single market for audiovisual services (or as the EC Directive beautifully put it, a "Television without Frontiers"), while also including some provisions catering for cultural concerns, such as the infamous quota system for European and independent productions. Against this backdrop, public broadcasting makes a particularly intriguing subject for a study of regulatory dilemmas of national versus supranational, integration versus intergovernmentalism, culture versus commerce, intervention versus liberalisation, and all this in the dynamic setting of contemporary media. The present paper reviews Irini Katsirea's book PUBLIC BROADCASTING AND EUROPEAN LAW and seeks to identify whether all elements of the complex governance puzzle of European public service broadcasting rules are analytically well fitted together.
Resumo:
In 2008, 132 law enforcement officers were killed in the line of duty in The United States. Additionally, some have explored both the public health implications of interactions with law enforcement as well as the potential benefits of the use of law enforcement officers as public health and emergency healthcare providers. By virtue of these novel analyses and techniques, professional medical direction of the emerging specialty of law enforcement medicine is needed. This paper, an analysis of law enforcement medical direction through a look at the Dallas Police Medical Direction Program, seeks to examine origins of law enforcement medicine through a comprehensive literature review, as well as begin to define to core competencies of law enforcement medical direction. ^ The unique intersection of public health, medicine and law enforcement, and the subsequent specialty that is developing to manage this interface, is in its relative infancy. An analysis of this nature is in order to begin to lay down the foundations necessary for future study and improvements in the field. ^
Resumo:
In December, 1980, following increasing congressional and constituent-interest in problems associated with hazardous waste, the Comprehensive Environmental Recovery, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) was passed. During its development, the legislative initiative was seriously compromised which resulted in a less exhaustive approach than was formerly sought. Still, CERCLA (Superfund) which established, among other things, authority to clean up abandoned waste dumps and to respond to emergencies caused by releases of hazardous substances was welcomed by many as an important initial law critical to the cleanup of the nation's hazardous waste. Expectations raised by passage of this bill were tragically unmet. By the end of four years, only six sites had been declared by the EPA as cleaned. Seemingly, even those determinations were liberal; of the six sites, two were identified subsequently as requiring further cleanup.^ This analysis is focused upon the implementation failure of the Superfund. In light of that focus, discussion encompasses development of linkages between flaws in the legislative language and foreclosure of chances for implementation success. Specification of such linkages is achieved through examination of the legislative initiative, identification of its flaws and characterization of attendant deficits in implementation ability. Subsequent analysis is addressed to how such legislative frailities might have been avoided and to attendant regulatory weaknesses which have contributed to implementation failure. Each of these analyses are accomplished through application of an expanded approach to the backward mapping analytic technique as presented by Elmore. Results and recommendations follow.^ Consideration is devoted to a variety of regulatory issues as well as to those pertinent to legislative and implementation analysis. Problems in assessing legal liability associated with hazardous waste management are presented, as is a detailed review of the legislative development of Superfund, and its initial implementation by Gorsuch's EPA. ^
Resumo:
[From the Introduction]. Information gives knowledge and knowledge gives power. Though in all EC Member States, the task to protect the environment is given to the administration, it is obvious that the administration is not the owner of the environment. The environment is everybody's. It is for this reason that administrative decisions which affect the environment must be transparent, open and must strike a balance between the general interest to preserve, protect and improve the quality of the environment on the one hand, the satisfying of specific private or public interests on the other hand. In order to allow at least a certain control of whether the administration strikes the right balance between the need to protect the environment and other legitimate or less legitimate needs, it appears normal and self-evident that information on the environment which is in the hands of public authorities, be also made available to the public and to citizens.
Resumo:
Article 197 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union stipulates that effective implementation of Union law by the Member States shall be regarded as a matter of common interest. This article considers how Member States may improve their administrative capacity to apply EU law effectively. A law or policy is effectively implemented when it can be confirmed that its objectives, targets or results are actually achieved. It is proposed that effective implementation in the EU is a ‘collaborative project’. This is not only because Member States benefit when others correctly implement common rules, but also because they learn from the experiences of other Member States. It follows that the public authorities responsible for implementation of EU law need to benchmark their performance against that of their peers in other Member States and therefore need to develop the institutional capacity for assessing and adjusting their own performance.
Resumo:
From the Introduction. The present contribution is an attempt to raise awareness between the 'trenches' by juxtaposing the two approaches to subsidiarity. Subsequently, I shall set out why, in economics, subsidiarity is embraced as a key principle in the design and working of the Union and how a functional subsidiarity test can be derived from this thinking. Throughout the paper, a range of illustrations and examples is provided in an attempt to show the practical applicability of a subsidiarity test. This does not mean, of course, that the application of the test can automatically "solve" all debates on whether subsidiarity is (not) violated. What it does mean, however, is that a careful methodology can be a significant help to e.g. national parliaments and the Brussels circuit, in particular, to discourage careless politicisation as much as possible and to render assessments of subsidiarity comparable throughout the Union. The latter virtue should be of interest to national parliaments in cooperating, within just six weeks, about a common stance in the case of a suspected violation of the principle. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a flavour of very different approaches and appreciation of the subsidiarity principle in European law and in the economics of multi-tier government. Section 3 elaborates on the economics of multi-tier government as a special instance of cost / benefit analysis of (de)centralisation in the three public economic functions of any government system. This culminates in a five-steps subsidiarity test and a brief discussion about its proper and improper application. Section 4 applies the test in a non-technical fashion to a range of issues of the "efficiency function" (i.e. allocation and markets) of the EU. After showing that the functional logic of subsidiarity may require liberalisation to be accompanied by various degrees of centralisation, a number of fairly detailed illustrations of how to deal with subsidiarity in the EU is provided. One illustration is about how the subsidiarity logic is misused by protagonists (labour in the internal market). A slightly different but frequently encountered aspect consists in the refusal to recognize that the EU (that is, some form of centralisation) offers a better solution than 25 national ones. A third range of issues, where the functional logic of subsidiarity could be useful, emerges when the boundaries of national competences are shifting due to more intense cross-border flows and developments. Other subsections are devoted to Union public goods and to the question whether the subsidiarity test might trace instances of EU decentralisation: a partial or complete shift of a policy or regulation to Member States. The paper refrains from an analysis of the application of the subsidiarity test to the other two public functions, namely, equity and macro-economic stabilisation.2 Section 5 argues that the use of a well-developed methodology of a functional subsidiarity test would be most useful for the national parliaments and even more so for their cooperation in case of a suspected violation of subsidiarity. Section 6 concludes.
Resumo:
As the final session of the day, my aim in this paper is to briefly outline the nature of exploitative abuses before turning to the question of the relationship between competition law and intellectual property law in the context of what Teubner calls the regulatory trilemma and from that draw a two-fold conclusion. First, the demands on law from the social phenomenon of markets are more acute when those demands raise issues across the different law domains of IP and competition. Second, where IP law and competition meet, the aim should be for both domains to internalise the values of the other. This however can only happen to the extent but only to the extent that there can be what Collins1 calls productive disintegration. Finally, in the specific context of exploitative abuses the overlap between IP law and competition law arises primarily in relation to claims of excessive pricing in licensing arrangements. Such claims could form the basis of a private action2 or can be made in the context of compulsory dealing decisions such as Microsoft.3 The involvement of competition agencies in pricing decisions goes to the heart of concerns about the nature of competition law and the role of competition agencies and highlights the need for the law to indirectly control rather than inappropriately attempt to directly control markets.