950 resultados para nonpoint-source pollution control


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Bibliography : leaf 33.

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Mode of access: Internet.

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"Prepared for the Secretary of Commerce."

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"EPA Report No. 600/9-86-013"--P. ii.

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Includes bibliographies.

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"Presented at the Water quality management training course conducted by the Water Supply and Pollution Control Training Program, Robert A. Taft Sanitary Engineering Center, Cincinnati, Ohio, March 4, 1963."

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Title varies slightly.

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Automotive catalysts are the most effective short-term answer to air pollution from automobiles. Since strict control of exhaust emissions is, or will be,covered by legislation in most developed countries in the world, catalytic devices will be increasingly fitted to cars. There is consequently an urgent need for the development of catalysts that will not compete for scarce precious metal resources. A number of problems have already been identified in connection with base metal catalysts but quantitative investigations are lacking. The base metal reduction catalysts developed by Imperial Chemical Industries Limited, catalysts and Chemical Group, in collaboration with the Air Pollution Control Laboratory, B L Cars Limited for automotive emission control, are susceptible to de-activation by three major mechanisms. These are: physical loss of the wash-coat (a high surface area coating which supports the active species), aggregation of the active species and poisoning by fuel and engine oil additives. This thesis is especially concerned with the first two of these and attempts to indicate the relative magnitude .of their effect on the activity of. the catalysts. Aggregation of the active species or sintering, as it is loosely called, was studied by using impregnated granules to overcome effects due to the loss of the wash-coat. Samples were aged in a synthetic exhaust gas, free from poisons, and metal crystallite sizes were measured by scanning-electron microscopy. The increase in particle size was correlated with the loss in catalytic activity. In order to maintain a link with the real conditions of service a number of monolithic catalysts were tested in an engine-dynamometer and several previously tested endurance catalysts were examined. A mechanism is proposed for the break-up and subsequent 10s.5 of the wash-coat and suggestions for improved resistance to loss of the' coating and active species are proposed.

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Coke oven liquor is a toxic wastewater produced in large quantities by the Iron and Steel, and Coking Industries, and gives rise to major effluent treatment problems in those industries. Conscious of the potentially serious environmental impact of the discharge of such wastes, pollution control agencies in many countries have made progressively more stringent quality requirements for the discharge of the treated waste. The most common means of treating the waste is the activated sludge process. Problems with achieving consistently satisfactory treatment by this process have been experienced in the past. The need to improve the quality of the discharge of the treated waste prompted attempts by TOMLINS to model the process using Adenosine Triphosophnte (ATP) as a measure of biomass, but these were unsuccessful. This thesis describes work that was carried out to determine the significance of ATP in the activated sludge treatment of the waste. The use of ATP measurements in wastewater treatment were reviewed. Investigations were conducted into the ATP behaviour of the batch activated sludge treatment of two major components of the waste, phenol, and thiocyanate, and the continuous activated sludge treatment of the liquor itself, using laboratory scale apparatus. On the basis of these results equations were formulated to describe the significance of ATP as a measured activity and biomass in the treatment system. These were used as the basis for proposals to use ATP as a control parameter in the activated sludge treatment of coke oven liquor, and wastewaters in general. These had relevance both to the treatment of the waste in the reactor and to the settlement of the sludge produced in the secondary settlement stage of the treatment process.

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The development of catalytic materials for the efficient combustion of light alkanes is fundamentally important for both automotive pollution control and the control of emissions produced from bio-fuel combustion. The presence of trace gas-phase SO2 is known to promote low temperature propane combustion over conventional Pt/Al2O3 combustion catalysts, however, there have been no systematic efforts to isolate the respective roles of support and metal, and it remains unclear, which plays the dominant role in this unusual phenomenon. Light alkane combustion over Pt/Al2O3 using pre-sulfated alumina supports to tune the physicochemical catalyst properties was presented. Support sulfation significantly enhanced ethane combustion, and improved methane and propane light-off. Catalyst activity increased with Pt loading, while the magnitude of sulfate promotion scales with alkane chain length. This is an abstract of a paper presented at the 228th ACS National Meeting (Philadelphia, PA 8/22-26/2004).

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Monitoring and enforcement are perhaps the biggest challenges in the design and implementation of environmental policies in developing countries where the actions of many small informal actors cause significant impacts on the ecosystem services and where the transaction costs for the state to regulate them could be enormous. This dissertation studies the potential of innovative institutions based on decentralized coordination and enforcement to induce better environmental outcomes. Such policies have in common that the state plays the role of providing the incentives for organization but the process of compliance happens through decentralized agreements, trust building, signaling and monitoring. I draw from the literatures in collective action, common-pool resources, game-theory and non-point source pollution to develop the instruments proposed here. To test the different conditions in which such policies could be implemented I designed two field-experiments that I conducted with small-scale gold miners in the Colombian Pacific and with users and providers of ecosystem services in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan in Mexico. This dissertation is organized in three essays.

The first essay, “Collective Incentives for Cleaner Small-Scale Gold Mining on the Frontier: Experimental Tests of Compliance with Group Incentives given Limited State Monitoring”, examines whether collective incentives, i.e. incentives provided to a group conditional on collective compliance, could “outsource” the required local monitoring, i.e. induce group interactions that extend the reach of the state that can observe only aggregate consequences in the context of small-scale gold mining. I employed a framed field-lab experiment in which the miners make decisions regarding mining intensity. The state sets a collective target for an environmental outcome, verifies compliance and provides a group reward for compliance which is split equally among members. Since the target set by the state transforms the situation into a coordination game, outcomes depend on expectations of what others will do. I conducted this experiment with 640 participants in a mining region of the Colombian Pacific and I examine different levels of policy severity and their ordering. The findings of the experiment suggest that such instruments can induce compliance but this regulation involves tradeoffs. For most severe targets – with rewards just above costs – raise gains if successful but can collapse rapidly and completely. In terms of group interactions, better outcomes are found when severity initially is lower suggesting learning.

The second essay, “Collective Compliance can be Efficient and Inequitable: Impacts of Leaders among Small-Scale Gold Miners in Colombia”, explores the channels through which communication help groups to coordinate in presence of collective incentives and whether the reached solutions are equitable or not. Also in the context of small-scale gold mining in the Colombian Pacific, I test the effect of communication in compliance with a collective environmental target. The results suggest that communication, as expected, helps to solve coordination challenges but still some groups reach agreements involving unequal outcomes. By examining the agreements that took place in each group, I observe that the main coordination mechanism was the presence of leaders that help other group members to clarify the situation. Interestingly, leaders not only helped groups to reach efficiency but also played a key role in equity by defining how the costs of compliance would be distributed among group members.

The third essay, “Creating Local PES Institutions and Increasing Impacts of PES in Mexico: A real-Time Watershed-Level Framed Field Experiment on Coordination and Conditionality”, considers the creation of a local payments for ecosystem services (PES) mechanism as an assurance game that requires the coordination between two groups of participants: upstream and downstream. Based on this assurance interaction, I explore the effect of allowing peer-sanctions on upstream behavior in the functioning of the mechanism. This field-lab experiment was implemented in three real cases of the Mexican Fondos Concurrentes (matching funds) program in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan, where 240 real users and 240 real providers of hydrological services were recruited and interacted with each other in real time. The experimental results suggest that initial trust-game behaviors align with participants’ perceptions and predicts baseline giving in assurance game. For upstream providers, i.e. those who get sanctioned, the threat and the use of sanctions increase contributions. Downstream users contribute less when offered the option to sanction – as if that option signal an uncooperative upstream – then the contributions rise in line with the complementarity in payments of the assurance game.

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Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)