Construction contracts: law and management. 5th edition

The fifth edition of this best-selling textbook has been thoroughly revised to provide the most up-to-date and comprehensive coverage of the legislation, administration and management of construction contracts. It now includes comparison of working with JCT, NEC3 and FIDIC contracts, throughout. In line with new thinking in construction management research, this authoritative guide is essential reading for every construction undergraduate and is an extremely useful source of reference for practitioners.

Can the Deforestation Breeze Change the Rainfall in Amazonia? A Case Study for the BR-163 Highway Region

The authors simulated the effects of Amazonian mesoscale deforestation in the boundary layer and in rainfall with the Brazilian Regional Atmospheric Modeling System (BRAMS) model. They found that both the area and shape (with respect to wind incidence) of deforestation and the soil moisture status contributed to the state of the atmosphere during the time scale of several weeks, with distinguishable patterns of temperature, humidity, and rainfall. Deforestation resulted in the development of a three-dimensional thermal cell, the so-called deforestation breeze, slightly shifted downwind to large-scale circulation. The boundary layer was warmer and drier above 1000-m height and was slightly wetter up to 2000-m height. Soil wetness affected the circulation energetics proportionally to the soil dryness (for soil wetness below similar to 0.6). The shape of the deforestation controlled the impact on rainfall. The horizontal strips lined up with the prevailing wind showed a dominant increase in rainfall, significant up to about 60 000 km(2). On the other hand, in the patches aligned in the opposite direction (north-south), there was both increase and decrease in precipitation in two distinct regions, as a result of clearly separated upward and downward branches, which caused the precipitation to increase for patches up to 15 000 km(2). The authors` estimates for the size of deforestation impacting the rainfall contributed to fill up the low spatial resolution in other previous studies.

Modeling worldwide highway networks

This Letter addresses the problem of modeling the highway systems of different countries by using complex networks formalism. More specifically, we compare two traditional geographical models with a modified geometrical network model where paths, rather than edges, are incorporated at each step between the origin and the destination vertices. Optimal configurations of parameters are obtained for each model and used for the comparison. The highway networks of Australia, Brazil, India, and Romania are considered and shown to be properly modeled by the modified geographical model. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Swedish translation and psychometric testing of the safety attitudes questionnaire (operating room version)

Background: Tens of millions of patients worldwide suffer from avoidable disabling injuries and death every year. Measuring the safety climate in health care is an important step in improving patient safety. The most commonly used instrument to measure safety climate is the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ). The aim of the present study was to establish the validity and reliability of the translated version of the SAQ. Methods: The SAQ was translated and adapted to the Swedish context. The survey was then carried out with 374 respondents in the operating room (OR) setting. Data was received from three hospitals, a total of 237 responses. Cronbach's alpha and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to evaluate the reliability and validity of the instrument. Results: The Cronbach's alpha values for each of the factors of the SAQ ranged between 0.59 and 0.83. The CFA and its goodness-of-fit indices (SRMR 0.055, RMSEA 0.043, CFI 0.98) showed good model fit. Intercorrelations between the factors safety climate, teamwork climate, job satisfaction, perceptions of management, and working conditions showed moderate to high correlation with each other. The factor stress recognition had no significant correlation with teamwork climate, perception of management, or job satisfaction. Conclusions: Therefore, the Swedish translation and psychometric testing of the SAQ (OR version) has good construct validity. However, the reliability analysis suggested that some of the items need further refinement to establish sound internal consistency. As suggested by previous research, the SAQ is potentially a useful tool for evaluating safety climate. However, further psychometric testing is required with larger samples to establish the psychometric properties of the instrument for use in Sweden.

Handling Mitigating Circumstances for Electronic Contracts

Electronic contracts are a means of representing agreed responsibilities and expected behaviour of autonomous agents acting on behalf of businesses. They can be used to regulate behaviour by providing negative consequences, penalties, where the responsibilities and expectations are not met, i.e. the contract is violated. However, long-term business relationships require some flexibility in the face of circumstances that do not conform to the assumptions of the contract, that is, mitigating circumstances. In this paper, we describe how contract parties can represent and enact policies on mitigating circumstances. As part of this, we require records of what has occurred within the system leading up to a violation: the provenance of the violation. We therefore bring together contract-based and provenance systems to solve the issue of mitigating circumstances.

Determining the Trustworthiness of New Electronic Contracts

Expressing contractual agreements electronically potentially allows agents to automatically perform functions surrounding contract use: establishment, fulfilment, renegotiation etc. For such automation to be used for real business concerns, there needs to be a high level of trust in the agent-based system. While there has been much research on simulating trust between agents, there are areas where such trust is harder to establish. In particular, contract proposals may come from parties that an agent has had no prior interaction with and, in competitive business-to-business environments, little reputation information may be available. In human practice, trust in a proposed contract is determined in part from the content of the proposal itself, and the similarity of the content to that of prior contracts, executed to varying degrees of success. In this paper, we argue that such analysis is also appropriate in automated systems, and to provide it we need systems to record salient details of prior contract use and algorithms for assessing proposals on their content. We use provenance technology to provide the former and detail algorithms for measuring contract success and similarity for the latter, applying them to an aerospace case study.

Electronic Business Contracts between Services

Electronic contracts mirror the paper versions exchanged between businesses today, and offer the possibility of dynamic, automatic creation and enforcement of restrictions and compulsions on service behaviour that are designed to ensure business objectives are met. Where there are many contracts within a particular application, it can be difficult to determine whether the system can reliably fulfil them all, yet computer-parsable electronic contracts may allow such verification to be automated. In this chapter, we describe a conceptual framework and architecture specification in which normative business contracts can be electronically represented, verified, established, renewed, and so on. In particular, we aim to allow systems containing multiple contracts to be checked for conflicts and violations of business objectives. We illustrate the framework and architecture with an aerospace aftermarket example.

Using Normative Markov Decision Processes for Evaluating Electronic Contracts: A Case Study in a Simulated Aerospace Aftermarket

Before signing electronic contracts, a rational agent should estimate the expected utilities of these contracts and calculate the violation risks related to them. In order to perform such pre-signing procedures, this agent has to be capable of computing a policy taking into account the norms and sanctions in the contracts. In relation to this, the contribution of this work is threefold. First, we present the Normative Markov Decision Process, an extension of the Markov Decision Process for explicitly representing norms. In order to illustrate the usage of our framework, we model an example in a simulated aerospace aftermarket. Second, we specify an algorithm for identifying the states of the process which characterize the violation of norms. Finally, we show how to compute policies with our framework and how to calculate the risk of violating the norms in the contracts by adopting a particular policy.

Optimal performance fee and flow of funds in asset management contracts

This paper investigates the importance of ow of funds as an implicit incentive in the asset management industry. We build a two-period bi- nomial moral hazard model to explain the trade-o¤s between ow, per- formance and fees where e¤ort depends on the combination of implicit ( ow of funds) and explicit (performance fee) incentives. Two cases are considered. With full commitment, the investor s relevant trade-o¤ is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce e¤ort in the rst period. The more concerned the investor is with today s pay- o¤, the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the second period by penalizing negative excess return in the rst period. Without full commitment, the investor learns some symmetric and imperfect infor- mation about the ability of the manager to obtain positive excess return. In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as e¤ort choices. We show that powerful implicit incentives may explain the ow-performance relationship with a numerical solution. Besides, risk aversion explains the complementarity between performance fee and ow of funds.

Non-monotone insurance contracts and their empirical consequences

The goal of this paper is to show the possibility of a non-monotone relation between coverage ans risk which has been considered in the literature of insurance models since the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We present an insurance model where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter). Risk aversion is described by a continuous parameter which is correlated with lenience and for the sake of simplicity, we assume perfect correlation. In the case of positive correlation, the more risk averse agent has higher cosr of prevention leading to a higher demand for coverage. Equivalently, the single crossing property (SCP) is valid and iplies a positive correlation between overage and risk in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the correlation between risk aversion and lenience is negative, not only may the SCP be broken, but also the monotonocity of contracts, i.e., the prediction that high (low) risk averse types choose full (partial) insurance. In both cases riskiness is monotonic in risk aversion, but in the last case there are some coverage levels associated with two different risks (low and high), which implies that the ex-ante (with respect to the risk aversion distribution) correlation between coverage and riskiness may have every sign (even though the ex-post correlation is always positive). Moreover, using another instrument (a proxy for riskiness), we give a testable implication to desentangle single crossing ans non single croosing under an ex-post zero correlation result: the monotonicity of coverage as a function os riskiness. Since by controlling for risk aversion (no asymmetric information), coverage is monotone function of riskiness, this also fives a test for asymmetric information. Finally, we relate this theoretical results to empirical tests in the recent literature, specially the Dionne, Gouruéroux and Vanasse (2001) work. In particular, they found an empirical evidence that seems to be compatible with asymmetric information and non single crossing in our framework. More generally, we build a hidden information model showing how omitted variables (asymmetric information) can bias the sign of the correlation of equilibrium variables conditioning on all observable variables. We show that this may be the case when the omitted variables have a non-monotonic relation with the observable ones. Moreover, because this non-dimensional does not capture this deature. Hence, our main results is to point out the importance of the SPC in testing predictions of the hidden information models.

The insurance function of contracts

One of the central problems in contract law is to define the frontier between legal and illegal breaches of promises. The distinction between good and bad faith is perhaps the conceptual tool most commonly used to tell one from the other. Lawyers spend a lot of energy trying to frame better definitions of the concepts of good and bad faith based on principles of ethics or justice, but often pay much less attention to theories dealing with the incentives that can engender good faith behavior in contractual relationships. By describing the economics of what Stiglitz defined as “explicit” and “implicit” insurance, I highlight the “insurance function” hidden in any promise with basically no mathematical notation. My aim is to render the subject intelligible and useful to lawyers with little familiarity with economics.