Civil Society and Political Parties in the Period of Transition

The major aim of Mr. Marada's project was to investigate the role of political parties on the one hand, and various institutional forms of civil society on the other, in the process of establishing mechanisms of political decision-making and policy-formation in Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic, after November 1989. Mr. Marada wanted to examine what consequences the interplay and tensions between political parties and institutions of civil society had on the status and practical understanding of citizenship and civil society. At the beginning of his research Mr. Marada found that, while the sphere of the political was relatively clearly defined, the phenomenon of civil society required a conceptual clarification. He devoted a great deal of time to analysing the emergence, development, and disintegration of Civic Forum as the major agent of the regime change and subsequent political reforms. Alongside this analysis is a commentary on Czech society in general, drawing on established research to show how, as yet, a kind of civic incompetence reigns within the country, and how this situation has its roots in the belief, promoted by politicians themselves, that politics is an activity for experts only. The final outcome of his research took the form of a series of articles, in English, totalling 40 pages.

Compensation, Incentives and Risk: Economic Theory and Russian Practise

Mr. Pechersky set out to examine a specific feature of the employer-employee relationship in Russian business organisations. He wanted to study to what extent the so-called "moral hazard" is being solved (if it is being solved at all), whether there is a relationship between pay and performance, and whether there is a correlation between economic theory and Russian reality. Finally, he set out to construct a model of the Russian economy that better reflects the way it actually functions than do certain other well-known models (for example models of incentive compensation, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model etc.). His report was presented to the RSS in the form of a series of manuscripts in English and Russian, and on disc, with many tables and graphs. He begins by pointing out the different examples of randomness that exist in the relationship between employee and employer. Firstly, results are frequently affected by circumstances outside the employee's control that have nothing to do with how intelligently, honestly, and diligently the employee has worked. When rewards are based on results, uncontrollable randomness in the employee's output induces randomness in their incomes. A second source of randomness involves the outside events that are beyond the control of the employee that may affect his or her ability to perform as contracted. A third source of randomness arises when the performance itself (rather than the result) is measured, and the performance evaluation procedures include random or subjective elements. Mr. Pechersky's study shows that in Russia the third source of randomness plays an important role. Moreover, he points out that employer-employee relationships in Russia are sometimes opposite to those in the West. Drawing on game theory, he characterises the Western system as follows. The two players are the principal and the agent, who are usually representative individuals. The principal hires an agent to perform a task, and the agent acquires an information advantage concerning his actions or the outside world at some point in the game, i.e. it is assumed that the employee is better informed. In Russia, on the other hand, incentive contracts are typically negotiated in situations in which the employer has the information advantage concerning outcome. Mr. Pechersky schematises it thus. Compensation (the wage) is W and consists of a base amount, plus a portion that varies with the outcome, x. So W = a + bx, where b is used to measure the intensity of the incentives provided to the employee. This means that one contract will be said to provide stronger incentives than another if it specifies a higher value for b. This is the incentive contract as it operates in the West. The key feature distinguishing the Russian example is that x is observed by the employer but is not observed by the employee. So the employer promises to pay in accordance with an incentive scheme, but since the outcome is not observable by the employee the contract cannot be enforced, and the question arises: is there any incentive for the employer to fulfil his or her promises? Mr. Pechersky considers two simple models of employer-employee relationships displaying the above type of information symmetry. In a static framework the obtained result is somewhat surprising: at the Nash equilibrium the employer pays nothing, even though his objective function contains a quadratic term reflecting negative consequences for the employer if the actual level of compensation deviates from the expectations of the employee. This can lead, for example, to labour turnover, or the expenses resulting from a bad reputation. In a dynamic framework, the conclusion can be formulated as follows: the higher the discount factor, the higher the incentive for the employer to be honest in his/her relationships with the employee. If the discount factor is taken to be a parameter reflecting the degree of (un)certainty (the higher the degree of uncertainty is, the lower is the discount factor), we can conclude that the answer to the formulated question depends on the stability of the political, social and economic situation in a country. Mr. Pechersky believes that the strength of a market system with private property lies not just in its providing the information needed to compute an efficient allocation of resources in an efficient manner. At least equally important is the manner in which it accepts individually self-interested behaviour, but then channels this behaviour in desired directions. People do not have to be cajoled, artificially induced, or forced to do their parts in a well-functioning market system. Instead, they are simply left to pursue their own objectives as they see fit. Under the right circumstances, people are led by Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of impersonal market forces to take the actions needed to achieve an efficient, co-ordinated pattern of choices. The problem is that, as Mr. Pechersky sees it, there is no reason to believe that the circumstances in Russia are right, and the invisible hand is doing its work properly. Political instability, social tension and other circumstances prevent it from doing so. Mr. Pechersky believes that the discount factor plays a crucial role in employer-employee relationships. Such relationships can be considered satisfactory from a normative point of view, only in those cases where the discount factor is sufficiently large. Unfortunately, in modern Russia the evidence points to the typical discount factor being relatively small. This fact can be explained as a manifestation of aversion to risk of economic agents. Mr. Pechersky hopes that when political stabilisation occurs, the discount factors of economic agents will increase, and the agent's behaviour will be explicable in terms of more traditional models.

Age and gender-dependent alternative splicing of P/Q-type calcium channel EF-hand

Ca(v)2.1 Ca(2+) channels (P/Q-type), which participate in various key roles in the CNS by mediating calcium influx, are extensively spliced. One of its alternatively-spliced exons is 37, which forms part of the EF hand. The expression of exon 37a (EFa form), but not exon 37b (EFb form), confers the channel an activity-dependent enhancement of channel opening known as Ca(2+)-dependent facilitation (CDF). In this study, we analyzed the trend of EF hand splice variant distributions in mouse, rat and human brain tissues. We observed a developmental switch in rodents, as well as an age and gender bias in human brain tissues, suggestive of a possible role of these EF hand splice variants in neurophysiological specialization. A parallel study performed on rodent brains showed that the data drawn from human and rodent tissues may not necessarily correlate in the process of aging.

Molecular characterization of HOXA13 polyalanine expansion proteins in hand-foot-genital syndrome

We report on a father and daughter with hand-foot-genital syndrome (HFGS) with typical skeletal and genitourinary anomalies due to a 14-residue polyalanine expansion in HOXA13. This is the largest (32 residues) polyalanine tract so far described for any polyalanine mutant protein. Polyalanine expansion results in protein misfolding, cytoplasmic aggregation and degradation; however, HOXA13 polyalanine expansions appear to act as loss of function mutations in contrast to gain of function for HOXD13 polyalanine expansions. To address this paradox we examined the cellular consequences of polyalanine expansions on HOXA13 protein using COS cell transfection and immunocytochemistry. HOXA13 polyalanine expansion proteins form cytoplasmic aggregates, and distribution between cytoplasmic aggregates or the nucleus is polyalanine tract size-dependent. Geldanamycin, an Hsp90 inhibitor, reduces the steady-state abundance of all polyalanine-expanded proteins in transfected cells. We also found that wild-type HOXA13 or HOXD13 proteins are sequestered in HOXA13 polyalanine expansion cytoplasmic aggregates. Thus, the difference between HOXA13 polyalanine expansion loss-of-function and HOXD13 polyalanine expansion dominant-negative effect is not the ability to aggregate wild-type group 13 paralogs but perhaps to variation in activities associated with refolding, aggregation or degradation of the proteins.

Left parietal activation related to planning, executing and suppressing praxis hand movements

OBJECTIVE: We sought to investigate the activity of bilateral parietal and premotor areas during a Go/No Go paradigm involving praxis movements of the dominant hand. METHODS: A sentence was presented which instructed subjects on what movement to make (S1; for example, "Show me how to use a hammer."). After an 8-s delay, "Go" or "No Go" (S2) was presented. If Go, they were instructed to make the movement described in the S1 instruction sentence as quickly as possible, and continuously until the "Rest" cue was presented 3 s later. If No Go, subjects were to simply relax until the next instruction sentence. Event-related potentials (ERP) and event-related desynchronization (ERD) in the beta band (18-22 Hz) were evaluated for three time bins: after S1, after S2, and from -2.5 to -1.5 s before the S2 period. RESULTS: Bilateral premotor ERP was greater than bilateral parietal ERP after the S2 Go compared with the No Go. Additionally, left premotor ERP was greater than that from the right premotor area. There was predominant left parietal ERD immediately after S1 for both Go and No Go, which was sustained for the duration of the interval between S1 and S2. For both S2 stimuli, predominant left parietal ERD was again seen when compared to that from the left premotor or right parietal area. However, the left parietal ERD was greater for Go than No Go. CONCLUSION: The results suggest a dominant role in the left parietal cortex for planning, executing, and suppressing praxis movements. The ERP and ERD show different patterns of activation and may reflect distinct neural movement-related activities. SIGNIFICANCE: The data can guide further studies to determine the neurophysiological changes occurring in apraxia patients and help explain the unique error profiles seen in patients with left parietal damage.

Risks and Responsibilities? The Individualisation of Youth Transitions and the Ambivalence between Participation and Activation in Europe

This report provides insight on the situation facing young people in contemporary European societies in their transitions to work and citizenship. On the one hand, risks of exclusion have increased, while on the other, responsibilities for coping with such risks have been individualised, a state of affairs reinforced by the trend towards activation labour market policies. Drawing on the findings of a EU-funded study across nine European regions, the report gives evidence of the resulting biographical and policy dilemmas. Furthermore, it explores if and under what conditions the concept of participation may open new ways of reconciling systemic imperatives and individual needs in the social integration of young people.

A practical posture for hand grip dynamometry in the clinical setting

The optimal testing position for hand grip strength, which is a useful functional measure of nutritional status, is open to debate. We therefore examined the systematic difference between different postures in order to establish a methodology that is clinically relevant, easy to perform and reproducible.

Transition from nerve stimulator to sonographically guided axillary brachial plexus anesthesia in hand surgery: block quality and patient satisfaction during the transition period

OBJECTIVES Sonographic guidance for peripheral nerve anesthesia has proven increasingly successful in clinical practice; however, fears that a change to sonographically guided regional anesthesia may impair the block quality and operating room work flow persist in certain units. In this retrospective cohort study, block quality and patient satisfaction during the transition period from nerve stimulator to sonographic guidance for axillary brachial plexus anesthesia in a tertiary referral center were investigated. METHODS Anesthesia records of all patients who had elective surgery of the wrist or hand during the transition time (September 1, 2006-August 25, 2007) were reviewed for block success, placement time, anesthesiologist training level, local anesthetic volume, and requirement of additional analgesics. Postoperative records were reviewed, and patient satisfaction was assessed by telephone interviews in matched subgroups. RESULTS Of 415 blocks, 341 were sonographically guided, and 74 were nerve stimulator guided. Sonographically guided blocks were mostly performed by novices, whereas nerve stimulator-guided blocks were performed by advanced users (72.3% versus 14%; P < .001). Block performance times and success rates were similar in both groups. In sonographically guided blocks, significantly less local anesthetics were applied compared to nerve stimulator-guided blocks (mean ± SD, 36.1 ± 7.1 versus 43.9 ± 6.1 mL; P< .001), and less opioids were required (fentanyl, 66.1 ± 30 versus 90 ± 62 μg; P< .001). Interviewed patients reported significantly less procedure-related discomfort, pain, and prolonged procedure time when block placement was sonographically guided (2% versus 20%; P = .002). CONCLUSIONS Transition from nerve stimulator to sonographic guidance for axillary brachial plexus blocks did not change block performance times or success rates. Patient satisfaction was improved even during the early institutional transition period.