971 resultados para game technology
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Audit of the Telecommunications Facilities Revenue Bond Funds of Iowa State University of Science and Technology (Iowa State University) as of and for the year ended June 30, 2007
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Audit of the Parking System Revenue Bond Funds of Iowa State University of Science and Technology (Iowa State University) as of and for the year ended June 30, 2007
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Audit of the Ice Arena Facility Revenue Note Funds of Iowa State University of Science and Technology (Iowa State University) as of and for the year ended June 30, 2007
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Audit of the Indoor Multipurpose Use and Training Facility Revenue Bond Funds of Iowa State University of Science and Technology (Iowa State University) as of and for the year ended June 30, 2007
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Audit of the Regulated Materials Facility Revenue Bond Funds of Iowa State University of Science and Technology (Iowa State University) as of and for the year ended June 30, 2007
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Audit of the Memorial Union Revenue Bond Funds of Iowa State University of Science and Technology (Iowa State University) as of and for the year ended June 30, 2007
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This Technology Governance Board Annual Report provides information on the FY05 – FY09 Information Technology Personnel Spending; FY05 – FY09 Technology Equipment and Services Spending; and FY05 – FY09 Internal IT Expenditures with the Iowa Communications Network and Department of Administrative Services - Information Technology Enterprise. The report also contains a projection of technology cost savings. This report was produced in compliance with Iowa Code §8A.204(3a) and was submitted to the Governor, the Department of Management, and the General Assembly on January 2, 2008.
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Small sample properties are of fundamental interest when only limited data is avail-able. Exact inference is limited by constraints imposed by speci.c nonrandomizedtests and of course also by lack of more data. These e¤ects can be separated as we propose to evaluate a test by comparing its type II error to the minimal type II error among all tests for the given sample. Game theory is used to establish this minimal type II error, the associated randomized test is characterized as part of a Nash equilibrium of a .ctitious game against nature.We use this method to investigate sequential tests for the di¤erence between twomeans when outcomes are constrained to belong to a given bounded set. Tests ofinequality and of noninferiority are included. We .nd that inference in terms oftype II error based on a balanced sample cannot be improved by sequential sampling or even by observing counter factual evidence providing there is a reasonable gap between the hypotheses.
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We consider an oligopolistic market game, in which the players are competing firm in the same market of a homogeneous consumption good. The consumer side is represented by a fixed demand function. The firms decide how much to produce of a perishable consumption good, and they decide upon a number of information signals to be sent into the population in order to attract customers. Due to the minimal information provided, the players do not have a well--specified model of their environment. Our main objective is to characterize the adaptive behavior of the players in such a situation.
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We analyze how unemployment, job finding and job separation rates reactto neutral and investment-specific technology shocks. Neutral shocks increaseunemployment and explain a substantial portion of it volatility; investment-specificshocks expand employment and hours worked and contribute to hoursworked volatility. Movements in the job separation rates are responsible for theimpact response of unemployment while job finding rates for movements alongits adjustment path. The evidence warns against using models with exogenousseparation rates and challenges the conventional way of modelling technologyshocks in search and sticky price models.
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The origins of electoral systems have received scant attention in the literature. Looking at the history of electoral rules in the advanced world in the last century, this paper shows that the existing wide variation in electoral rules across nations can be traced to the strategic decisions that the current ruling parties, anticipating the coordinating consequences of different electoral regimes, make to maximize their representation according to the following conditions. On the one hand, as long as the electoral arena does not change substantially and the current electoral regime serves the ruling parties well, the latter have no incentives to modify the electoral regime. On the other hand, as soon as the electoral arena changes (due to the entry of new voters or a change in their preferences), the ruling parties will entertain changing the electoral system, depending on two main conditions: the emergence of new parties and the coordinating capacities of the old ruling parties. Accordingly, if the new parties are strong, the old parties shift from plurality/majority rules to proportional representation (PR) only if the latter are locked into a 'non-Duvergerian' equilibrium; i.e. if no old party enjoys a dominant position (the case of most small European states)--conversely, they do not if a Duvergerian equilibrium exists (the case of Great Britain). Similarly, whenever the new entrants are weak, a non-PR system is maintained, regardless of the structure of the old party system (the case of the USA). The paper discusses as well the role of trade and ethnic and religious heterogeneity in the adoption of PR rules.
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Audit report on the Iowa State Center Business Office of Iowa State University of Science and Technology for the year ended June 30, 2007
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Iowa State University of Science and Technology (ISU) as of and for the year ended June 30, 2007
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What explains the spatial distribution of wages across US counties? I find that two of the most important factors are spatial technology diffusion and externalities due to the aggregate scale of production. One empirical finding supporting the importance of spatial technology diffusion is that average wages in a county decrease with the average level of schooling in neighboring counties when employment in the county and average wages in neighboring counties are held constant. All empirical results are obtained using anovel instrument for (endogenous) employment at the county-leveland take into account other factors (e.g. productivity-differencesacross states, climate) that may determine wages.
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Report on a review of selected general and application controls over the Iowa State University of Science and Technology payroll system for the period March 27 through May 11, 2007