Iowa Department of Revenue & Finance, Agency Performance Plan

Annual Report, Agency Performance Plan

Iowa Finance Authority Agency Performance Plan

Agency Performance Plan

Social capital and the equilibrium number of entrepreneurs

Social capital is viewed either as a proprietary asset that serves private interests, including those of entrepreneurs, or as a collective asset that supports trust-based transactions saving on transaction costs both in markets and within the boundaries of firms, and benefiting society as a whole. This paper explains the relative specialization between entrepreneurs and market-governed exchanges as a result of the interaction between social capital that lowers transaction costs, and the scale economies of ability in managerial jobs (Lucas 1978). The main hypothesis formulated in the paper is that higher social capital will benefit the hierarchy relatively more than the market as a governance mechanism, and therefore in economies with higher social capital, the equilibrium number of entrepreneurs will be lower and their average span of control larger than in economies with lower social capital. The empirical evidence, with data from the Spanish Autonomous Communities, is consistent with this prediction.

2002 Annual Report of the Iowa Railway Finance Authority

Railway finance report for the Iowa Department of Transportation.

2003 Annual Report of the Iowa Railway Finance Authority

Annual report for Iowa Railway Finance Authority. Annual Report produced by Iowa Department of Transportation.

Report of Recommendations to the Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance, June 30, 2002

State Agency Audit Report

Iowa Water Pollution Control Works and Drinking Water Facilities Financing Programs (Joint Programs of the Iowa Finance Authority and the Iowa Department of Natural Resources), June 30, 2002

State Agency Audit Report State Revolving Fund - Clean Water & Drinking Programs

Essays in banking and corporate finance

Abstract This paper presents a model of executive compensation in which the executive is risk-averse and has specific knowledge -knowledge about the optimal actions to take that is costly to transfer to the principal. The model generates predictions that are consistent with the available evidence and provides a rationale for a number of unresolved puzzles in executive compensation. Notably, we find that relative performance evaluation is optimal only if the quality of specific knowledge is low. We also show (1) why some common risk components are not filtered out of executives' pay, (2) why performance is more likely to be evaluated relative to aggregate market movements than relative to industry movements, and (3) why executives with higher perceived abilities are given stronger incentives. Finally, we demonstrate that the relation between risk and incentives may be positive or negative, depending on the quality of the executive's specific knowledge.

Report of Recommendations to the Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance, June 30, 2003

State Agency Audit Report

Iowa Water Pollution Control Works and Drinking Water Facilities Financing Programs (Joint Programs of the Iowa Finance Authority and the Iowa Department of Natural Resources), Independent Auditor's Reports Financial Statements and Supplemental Information Schedule of Findings, June 30, 2003

State Agency Audit Report

2004 Annual Report of the Iowa Railway Finance Authority

Annual report for Iowa Railway Finance Authority. Annual Report produced by Iowa Department of Transportation.