Not if but when: Out-group reactions to the timing of disclosure of an individual's same-sex attractions

One factor that research suggests impedes positive contact between outgroup members is the experience of anxiety that can occur when anticipating negative consequences of such interactions. Research examining attitudes and behaviour towards same-sex attracted individuals indicates that this intergroup anxiety is particularly evident when the anticipated interaction involves members of the same gender. The current studies investigate the effect of timing of disclosure of a person’s same-sex attractions in an effort to identify a means of reducing this anxiety. Study 1 uses a hypothetical scenario to gain insight into participants’ stated preferences for early or delayed knowledge of a person’s sexual orientation. Results reveal an association between experiencing close contact with gay individuals of the same gender in real life (but not opposite gender), and a preference for early disclosure. Results from an experimental study concur with these findings. After a face-to-face interaction task with a confederate of the same gender, participants sit further from the confederate for the late disclosure condition when compared with the early disclosure and no disclosure control. Future studies investigating the interaction between timing of disclosure of same-sex attractions and the intimacy of disclosure (casual vs. intimate), are discussed.

Measuring accounting disclosure in a period of complex changes : the case of Egypt

Significant changes in accounting disclosure are observed in periods of economic change such as those relating to emerging capital markets and programs of privatization. Measurement of the level of accounting disclosure should ideally be designed to capture the complexity of change in order to give insight and explanation to match the causes and consequences of change. This paper shows the added interpretive value in subdividing the disclosure checklist to reflect the requirements of national accounting regulations, the location of disclosure items in the annual report, and limitations on the availability of regulations in official translation to the local language. Defining targeted disclosure categories leads to significance testing of specific aspects of changes in accounting disclosure in the Egyptian capital market in the 1990s. Strong correlation of disclosure with the presence of majority government ownership of the company and the relative activity of share trading supports the applicability of political costs and capital need theories, respectively. The relation between International Accounting Standards (IASs) disclosure and the type of audit firm points to additional theoretical explanations, including relative familiarity with the legislation and compliance features identifiable with the emerging capital market. The approach described in this paper has the potential for enhancing understanding of the complexity of accounting change in other emerging capital markets and developing economies.

CEO compensation, option incentives and information disclosure

This paper examines the impact of information disclosure on the valuation of CEO options and the incentives created by those options. Prior executive compensation research in the US has made assumptions about key input variables that can affect the calculation of option values and financial incentives. Accordingly, biases may have ensued due to incomplete information disclosure about noncurrent option grants. Using new data on a sample of UK CEOs, we value executive option holdings and incentives for the first time and estimate the levels of distortion created by the less than complete US-style disclosure requirements. We also investigate the levels of distortion in the UK for the minority of companies that choose to reveal only partial information. Our results suggest that there have to date been few economic biases arising from less than complete information disclosure. Furthermore, we demonstrate that researchers using US data, who made reasonable assumptions about the inputs of noncurrent option grants, are unlikely to have made significant errors when calculating CEO financial incentives or option wealth. However, the recent downturn in the US stock market could result in the same assumptions, producing exaggerated incentive estimates in the future.

The disclosure of directors' share option information in UK companies

This paper considers the empirical determinants of the quality of information disclosed about directors’ share options in a sample of large companies in 1994 and 1995. Policy recommendations, consolidated in the recommendations of the Greenbury report, argue for full and complete disclosure of director option information. In this paper two modest contributions to the UK empirical literature are made. First, the current degree of option information disclosure in the FTSE 350 companies is documented. Second, option information disclosure as a function of variables that are thought to in¯uence corporate costs of disclosure is modelled. The results have implications for corporate governance. Speci®cally, support is oVered for the monitoring function of nonexecutive directors. In addition, nondisclosure is found to be related to variables which proxy proprietary costs of revealing information (such as company size).