Determinantes da separação entre propriedade e gestão nas cooperativas agropecuárias brasileiras

As cooperativas agropecuárias brasileiras geralmente são organizações complexas e de propriedade difusa. Entretanto, 48% dessas organizações não promovem a desvinculação dos proprietários das decisões de gestão, contrariando o que é estabelecido pelo preceito teórico dominante para empresas - cooperativas e não cooperativas - similares. Diante desse desalinhamento, neste artigo investigaram-se os possíveis determinantes da separação entre propriedade e gestão nessas organizações. Na medida em que o processo de separação compreende diferentes relações de agência, foram utilizados respectivamente os modelos logit e tobit para estudar o que determina a delegação do direito de controle formal pelos proprietários ao conselho de administração e a divisão do processo decisório entre os membros do conselho e o executivo responsável pela gestão. Dentre os resultados encontrados, destaca-se o fato de complexidade e propriedade difusa não terem se mostrado relevantes para explicar a separação entre propriedade e gestão, diferentemente do que ocorre em sociedades anônimas. Em contrapartida, características do conselho de administração (tamanho, alocação de autoridade formal, limites à reeleição, reputação e esforço) têm importante papel na determinação da ocorrência de separação. Por tratar-se do primeiro trabalho a abordar o problema do controle em cooperativas agropecuárias, novas pesquisas empíricas são desejáveis.

Separação entre propriedade e decisão de gestão nas cooperativas agropecuárias brasileiras

A visão predominante na teoria econômica é que organizações de propriedade difusa e complexas apresentam melhor desempenho se forem separados os direitos ao lucro residual das decisões de gestão. Nos países de economia desenvolvida, os modelos de governança corporativa das cooperativas agropecuárias de propriedade difusa e complexas, tal como já informado pela literatura econômica, promovem a desvinculação dos cooperados da gestão da empresa. Em contraposição, no Brasil, embora não haja estudos sistemáticos sobre o tema, evidências pontuais indicam que essas organizações concentram a propriedade e decisões de gestão. A possível divergência entre os modelos de governança utilizados nos diferentes países revela a necessidade de mensuração do grau de separação entre propriedade e decisão de gestão em cooperativas agropecuárias brasileiras, tarefa a que se dedica este artigo. A partir de dados coletados junto a 77 cooperativas agropecuárias, identificou-se que diferentes modelos de governança coexistem no Brasil. Embora grande parcela de cooperativas tenha governança concentrada, há um grupo que já adota modelos de governança que promovem a separação parcial de jure ou de facto entre propriedade e decisão de gestão. Esses resultados revelam a necessidade de pesquisas futuras voltadas a identificar os determinantes da variabilidade de modelos de governança nas cooperativas brasileiras.

Essays On CEO Compensation: New Evidence On The Managerial-Power Vs. Optimal Contracting Debate

This dissertation analyzes the effect of market analysts’ expectations of share prices (price targets) on executive compensation. It examines how well the estimated effects of price targets on compensation fit with two competing views on determining executive compensation: the arm’s length bargaining model, which assumes that a board seeks to maximize shareholders’ interests, and the managerial power model, which assumes that a board seeks to maximize managers’ compensation (Bebchuk et al. 2005). The first chapter documents the pattern of CEO pay from fiscal year 1996 to 2010. The second chapter analyzes the Institutional Broker Estimate System Detail History Price Target data file, which that reports analysts’ price targets for firms. I show that the number of price target announcements is positively associated with company share price’s volatility, that price targets are predictive of changes in the value of stocks, and that when analysts announce positive (negative) expectations of future stock price, share prices change in the same direction in the short run. The third chapter analyzes the effect of price targets on executive compensation. I find that analysts' price targets alter the composition of executive pay between cash-based compensation and stock-based compensation. When analysts forecast a rise (fall) in the share price for a firm, the compensation package tilts toward stock-based (cash-based) compensation. The substitution effect is stronger in companies that have weaker corporate governance. The fourth chapter explores the effect of the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 and its reinforcement in 2006 on the options granting process. I show that the introduction of SOX and its reinforcement eliminated the practice of backdating options but increased “spring-loading” of option grants around price targets announcements. Overall, the dissertation shows that price targets provide insights into the determinants of executive pay in favor of the managerial power model.

Shareholder protection and stock market development

The dissertation contains five parts: An introduction, three major chapters, and a short conclusion. The First Chapter starts from a survey and discussion of the studies on corporate law and financial development literature. The commonly used methods in these cross-sectional analyses are biased as legal origins are no longer valid instruments. Hence, the model uncertainty becomes a salient problem. The Bayesian Model Averaging algorithm is applied to test the robustness of empirical results in Djankov et al. (2008). The analysis finds that their constructed legal index is not robustly correlated with most of the various stock market outcome variables. The second Chapter looks into the effects of minority shareholders protection in corporate governance regime on entrepreneurs' ex ante incentives to undertake IPO. Most of the current literature focuses on the beneficial part of minority shareholder protection on valuation, while overlooks its private costs on entrepreneur's control. As a result, the entrepreneur trade-offs the costs of monitoring with the benefits of cheap sources of finance when minority shareholder protection improves. The theoretical predictions are empirically tested using panel data and GMM-sys estimator. The third Chapter investigates the corporate law and corporate governance reform in China. The corporate law in China regards shareholder control as the means to the ends of pursuing the interests of stakeholders, which is inefficient. The Chapter combines the recent development of theories of the firm, i.e., the team production theory and the property rights theory, to solve such problem. The enlightened shareholder value, which emphasizes on the long term valuation of the firm, should be adopted as objectives of listed firms. In addition, a move from the mandatory division of power between shareholder meeting and board meeting to the default regime, is proposed.

The Dual Ownership Structure: a Model to Connect the Cooperative Model With Financial Markets

In business literature, the conflicts among workers, shareholders and the management have been studied mostly in the frame of stakeholder theory. The stakeholder theory recognizes this issue as an agency problem, and tries to solve the problem by establishing a contractual relationship between the agent and principals. However, as Marcoux pointed out, the appropriateness of the contract as a medium to reduce the agency problem should be questioned. As an alternative, the cooperative model minimizes the agency costs by integrating the concept of workers, owners and management. Mondragon Corporation is a successful example of the cooperative model which grew into the sixth largest corporation in Spain. However, the cooperative model has long been ignored in discussions of corporate governance, mainly because the success of the cooperative model is extremely difficult to duplicate in reality. This thesis hopes to revitalize the scholarly examination of cooperatives by developing a new model that overcomes the fundamental problem in the cooperative model: the limited access to capital markets. By dividing the ownership interest into financial and control interest, the dual ownership structure allows cooperatives to issue stock in the capital market by making a financial product out of financial interest.

Separation of Ownership from Control and Discretionary Managerial Behaviour in a Transition Economy

This study was the final stage of a four-year study of managerial behaviour and company performance in Bulgaria and examined the influence of changing ownership and control structures of companies on managerial behaviour and initiative. It provides a theoretical summary of the specific types of ownership, control, governance structures and managerial strategies in the Bulgarian transitional economy during 1992-1996. It combines two theoretical approaches, the property-rights approach to show concentrated property-rights structure and private and majority types of control as determinants of efficient enterprise risk bearing and constrained managerial discretion, and the agency theory approach to reveal the efficient role of direct non-market governance mechanisms over managers. Mr. Peev also used empirical information collected from the Central Statistical office in Bulgaria, three different enterprise investigations of corporatised state-owned enterprises between 1992 and 1994, and his own data base of privatised and private de novo industrial companies in 1996-1996. The project gives a detailed description of the main property-rights structures in Bulgaria at the present time and of the various control structures related to these. It found that there is a strong owner type of control in private and privatised firms, although, contrary to expectations, 100% state -owned enterprises tended to be characterised by a separation of ownership from control, leaving scope for managerial discretion. Mr. Peev predicts that after the forthcoming mass privatisation, many companies will acquire a dispersed ownership structure and there will be a greater separation of ownership from control and potential or inefficient managerial behaviour. The next aspect considered in detail was governance structures and the influence of the generally unstable macroeconomic environment in the country during the period in question. In examining managerial strategies, Mr. Peev divided the years since 1990 into 3 periods. Even in the first period (1990-1992) there were some signs of a more efficient role for managers and between 1992 and 1994 the picture of control structures and different managerial behaviour in state-owned companies became more diversified. Managerial strategies identified included managerial initiatives for privatisation, where managers took initiative in resolving problems of property rights and introducing restructuring measures and privatisation proposals, managerial initiatives for restructuring without privatisation, and passive adjustment and passive management, where managers seek outside services for marketing, finance management, etc. in order to adjust to the new environment. During 1995-1996 some similarities and differences between the managerial behaviour of privatised and state-owned firms emerged. Firstly, the former have undergone many changes in investment and technology, while managers of state-owned companies have changed little in this field, indicating that the private property-rights structure is more efficient for the long-term adaptation of enterprises. In the area of strategies relating to product quality, marketing, and pricing policy there was little difference between managers of private, privatised and state-owned firms. The most passive managerial behaviour was found in non-incorporated state-owned firms, although these have only an insignificant stake in the economy.

Hanging Together, Together Hung? Career Implications of Interpersonal Ties Between CEOs and Top Managers

Is it good or bad for senior executives to have strong interpersonal ties to the CEO? We argue that a strong relationship with the CEO raises the likelihood that a top manager stays in office or makes an upward career move when the CEO leaves office voluntarily. At the same time, such interpersonal ties also reinforce the negative spillover effects of a dismissal of the CEO on the career prospects of the manager concerned. Our empirical analysis lends support to both arguments. We contribute to managerial succession research by underlining the ambivalence of interpersonal ties within top management teams.

Handlungsbedarf bei der Rechtsform ausgelagerter Organisationen der Standortförderung, Studie im Auftrag des Staatssekretariats für Wirtschaft (SECO)

Die Studie im Auftrag des Staatssekretariats für Wirtschaft (SECO) nimmt eine Lagebeurteilung hinsichtlich der Positionierung sowie der rechtlichen Ausgestaltung von Organisationen der Standortförderung vor. Im Vordergrund stehen Schweiz Tourismus (ST), die Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Hotelkredit (SGH) sowie die Osec (Business Network Switzerland). Die Studie beurteilt ein mögliches Optimierungspotenzial vor dem Hintergrund der Public Corporate Governance Grundsätze des Bundes.