The electoral success of the Svoboda Party - the consequences for Ukrainian politics. OSW Commentary No. 97, 2012-11-26

The All-Ukrainian Association ‘Svoboda’ scored an unexpected success in the parliamentary elections, winning support from over 10% of the voters and entering the select group of Ukrainian parliamentary parties which operate at a national level. Svoboda’s manifesto is nationalist and anti-liberal, in both economic and political aspects. It is in fact the anti-liberal component of this party’s manifesto which it can thank for achieving such a big electoral success. The faction formed by Svoboda’s 37 representatives in the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian parliament) will have a small impact on legislative work, but their activity may add further to the brutalisation of parliamentary life. Furthermore, Svoboda will attempt to make other opposition groupings adopt a more radical approach, which may trigger the disintegration of the United Opposition Baktivshchyna. A new wave of public protests is likely to emerge in Ukraine in the coming months. Therefore, it can be expected that Svoboda will make efforts to join in or even incite them, in order to promote its social and nationalist messages. This may contribute to increasing the popularity of nationalist ideas and to a further radicalisation of sentiments in Ukraine.

Turkey: has the AKP ended its winning streak? OSW Commentary No. 117, 2013-10-07

Since the conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) took power in Turkey in 2002, it has enjoyed a constant winning streak: it won each election (with a support level of 49.83% in 2011), subordinated the army (which had de facto stood above the civilian government) and was reforming the country. The situation in the country was stable (especially when compared to the crises and restlessness in the 1990s), the economy was booming, Turkey’s position in regional politics was strengthening, and Ankara’s significance on the international arena was growing. This encouraged the ruling class to make long-term plans, leading up to the hundredth anniversary of the republic in 2023. In the coming decade, Turkey governed by the AKP was to become one of the global economic and political centres, a full member of the EU and at the same time a political and economic leader in the Middle East. However, the negative trends in the situation both domestically (mass public protests, the deadlocked Kurdish issue and the unsuccessful attempt to amend the constitution) and abroad (the war in Syria and the coup in Egypt) seen over the past few months have laid bare the limitations of the AKP’s rule and have affected the government’s democratic mandate, prestige and credibility on the international arena, as well as peace and order and domestic security. When compared to the beginning of 2013, the way the situation will develop in Turkey is at this moment definitely less predictable; and the possible scenarios include both relative peace (however, with socio-political tension present in the background) and the threat of destabilisation. Therefore, although the AKP will still remain the sole major political force, this party will have to face challenges which will decide not only its political future but also the directions the country will be developing in. However, a comprehensive solution of the accumulated problems and a simple return to the status quo ante, convenient to the government, seem unlikely in the foreseeable future.

The Iasi-Ungheni pipeline: a means of achieving energy independence from Russia? Moldova's attempts at gas supply diversification. OSW Commentary No. 118, 2013-10-08

Since taking power in 2009, the Alliance for European Integration (AIE) has been trying to end Moldova’s dependence on Russian gas. Currently, natural gas accounts for about 50% of the country’s energy balance (excluding Transnistria), and Gazprom has a monopoly on the supply of gas to the republic. The key element of Chișinău’s diversification project is the construction of the Iasi-Ungheni pipeline, which is designed to link the Moldovan and Romanian gas transmission networks, and consequently make it possible for Moldova to purchase gas from countries other than Russia. Despite significant delays, construction work on the interconnector began in August 2013. The Moldovan government sees ensuring energy independence from Russia as its top priority. The significance and urgency of the project reflect Chișinău’s frustration at Moscow’s continued attempts to use its monopoly of Moldova’s energy sector to exert political pressure on the republic. Nonetheless, despite numerous declarations by Moldovan and Romanian politicians, the Iasi- -Ungheni pipeline will not end Moldova’s dependence on Russian gas before the end of the current decade. This timeframe is unrealistic for two reasons: first, because an additional gas pipeline from Ungheni to Chisinau and a compression station must be constructed, which will take at least five years and will require significant investment; and second, because of the unrelenting opposition to the project coming from Gazprom, which currently controls Moldova’s pipelines and will likely try to torpedo any energy diversification attempts. Independence from Russian gas will only be possible after the the Gazprom-controlled Moldova-GAZ, the operator of the Moldovan transmission network and the country’s importer of natural gas, is divided. The division of the company has in fact been envisaged in the EU’s Third Energy Package, which is meant to be implemented by Moldova in 2020.

Turkey's economy: a story of success with an uncertain future. OSW Commentary No. 120, 2013-11-05

In the decade since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power, Turkey’s economy has become synonymous with success and well-implemented reforms. Economic development has been the basis of both socio-political stability inside the country and of an ambitious foreign policy agenda pursued by the AKP. However, the risks associated with a series of unresolved issues are becoming increasingly apparent. These include the country’s current account deficit, its over-reliance on short-term external financing, and unfinished reforms, for example of the education sector. This leaves Turkey exposed to over-dependence on investors, especially from the West. Consequently, Ankara has become a hostage of its own image as an economically successful state with a stable socio-political system. Any changes to this image would cause capital flight, as exemplified by the outflow of portfolio investment1 and an increase in the cost of external debt2 that followed the nationwide protests over the proposed closure of Gezi Park last summer. In addition, Turkey remains vulnerable to potential changes in investor sentiment towards emerging markets.

After the Euro Crisis: The President of Europe, A new paradigm for increasing legitimacy and effectiveness in the EU. EuropEos Commentary No. 12, 1 June 2012

The crisis in the eurozone– which became worse in Europe at the same time that the Lisbon Treaty entered in force at the end of 2009 – has presented the first test of the crisis management capabilities of the intergovernmental approach. As provided under the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council has been the true decision-making centre for the policies adopted in response to the financial crisis, with the Commission playing a technical role. This commentary finds, however, that this institutional set-up has been unsatisfactory and unable to overcome the three fundamental dilemmas of the integration process: the dilemma of veto power, the dilemma of enforcement of the agreements and the dilemma of decision-making legitimacy. While it remains to be seen whether the election of François Hollande as President of France signals the beginning of a new political cycle characterised by new ideas on the institutional future of the EU, if that were to materialise, this paper aims to contribute to the debate on those new ideas.

Necessary desirability: The inherent contradiction in the European system. EuropEos Commentary No. 11, 9 June 2011

In all political systems there is a gap between the rhetoric of electoral programmes and the practical work of institutions, argues author Riccardo Perissich, but the ‘vision thing’ is often a necessary prerequisite to reaching difficult decisions. When it comes to European institutions, which include the member states acting collectively, the desirable vision – the goal of European unity – has always been there and is still very much alive. Also, the existence of a broadly defined political goal has often facilitated agreements that were in fact purely necessary. However, because we lack a pan-European constituency to debate it, the narrative about this goal has been translated into different languages and is all but common. In fact, we have never seriously tried to unify it. Indeed, Europeans stopped debating what is desirable a long time ago: they simply react to events.

Eurozone Debt Crisis: Reckless debtors or misguided rescuers? EuropEos Commentary No. 10, 26 May 2011

Based on the latest round of difficulties to emerge from the Greek financial assistance programme, this commentary concludes that there are serious flaws in the design of the eurozone’s crisis management system that periodically push the members to the brink of financial meltdown. He warns that the same is bound to happen again with Ireland and Portugal, and each time with higher risks that the fabric of cooperation within the eurozone will tear irreparably. In order to fix them, he proposes three basic changes to the crisis management arrangements and the design of the European Stabilty Mechanism (ESM) decided in March by the European Council.

Europe’s false alibi in the G2. EuropEos Commentary No. 9, 13 May 2011

In the wake of Osama Bin Ladin’s death and against the background of a more confident United States and a more anxious China, Marta Dassù explores in this EuropEos Commentary the prospect that these two leading countries could form a ‘G2’, further marginalising Europe.

Nothing personal: The age of ego-diplomacy. EuropEos Commentary No. 7, 17 March 2011

A new EuropEos Commentary laments the decline of diplomacy and the rise of ‘summits’ in recent history as the predominant way of conducting international relations. World leaders are urged to pay more attention to the sound and unimpeded analysis of their ambassadors and professional diplomatic corps whenever possible.

The eurozone in bad need of a psychiatrist. EuropEos Commentary No. 6, 9 December 2010

Stefano Micossi, Director General of Assonime and member of the CEPS Board of Directors, observes in a new EuropEos Commentary that there is something surreal to the unfolding financial crisis of the eurozone, as the leaders grudgingly do what is needed to prevent disaster just minutes before it’s too late, and then in the next minute revert to the same behaviour that had brought them against the wall in the first place. He cites rising sovereign spreads within the area as the visible result of this strategy: they signal investors’ expectation that the future can only bring more of the same, a series of ever-larger sovereign debt crises, under Damocles’ sword that at some stage Germany, the paymaster of last resort, will close its purse and let Armageddon start.

Turkey and the EU: A play in search of a script. EuropEos Commentary No. 5, 28 September 2010

This Commentary warns that by continuing to act as if Turkey’s membership of the EU was still a credible prospect, the EU is dodging the critical issue of how to establish friendly and constructive relations with an independent, self-confident Turkey. More importantly, this approach prevents the EU from at last accepting that enlargement is not the only – nor necessarily the best – policy option available to deal effectively with a strategically important country on its borders.

The role of politicians in inciting financial markets to attack the eurozone. EuropEos Commentary No. 4, 21 June 2010

While acknowledging that the sustainability of sovereign debt is a serious issue that must be confronted, this EuropEos Commentary finds that financial markets have blown the problem completely out of proportion, leading to a full-scale confidence crisis. The authors present evidence suggesting that politicians’ public disagreements and careless statements at critical junctures may have added oil to incipient fire. By creating the impression that domestic political interests would take precedence over orderly management of the Greek debt crisis, they raised broader doubts about their ability to address fundamental economic divergences within the area, which are the real source of debt sustainability problems in the medium term.

Moments of Truth – A new neo-Gaullist Germany? EuropEos Commentary No. 3, 1 June 2010

The European process is based on compromises; when it comes to selling them to national electorates, countries behave differently. France feels compelled to declare victory; Germany has more often chosen to stress the concessions that it made, adding that they were painful but necessary for the sake of ‘Europe’. The reality is very different. In this new EuropEos Commentary, Riccardo Perissich, Executive Vice-President of the Council for the United States and Italy, describes that European reality, in unambiguous terms.

Do we need a resolution fund paid for by financial institutions? EuropEos Commentary No. 2, 17 May 2010

In this EuropEos Commentary, Stefano Micossi reviews recent efforts to build a stronger and more coherent regulatory system for financial markets and finds the idea of a resolution fund at best a distraction, and at worst a harbinger of renewed financial instability.

A stronger, growth-oriented surveillance for EMU. EuropEos Commentary No. 1, 19 April 2010

This Commentary finds that the recent adjustment measures taken by the Greek government in combination with the financial support proffered by the Eurogroup may not be sufficient to deal with the risk of instability in EMU in the longer term. The author argues that other imbalances, most notably the current account imbalances within EMU, need to be addressed to avoid a deflation spiral that would aggravate sustainability problems in highly indebted countries. The Greek crisis highlights the need to take steps to strengthen the economic governance of the euro area. A key component of these steps would be a stronger, growth-oriented, surveillance.