Agency Fact Sheet, Department of Commerce: Insurance Division, FY2003

This document produced by the Iowa Department of Administrative Services has been developed to provide a multitude of information about executive branch agencies/department on a single sheet of paper. The facts provides general information, contact information, workforce data, leave and benefits information and affirmative action data.

Agency Fact Sheet, Department of Commerce: Insurance Division, FY2004

This document produced by the Iowa Department of Administrative Services has been developed to provide a multitude of information about executive branch agencies/department on a single sheet of paper. The facts provides general information, contact information, workforce data, leave and benefits information and affirmative action data.

Agency Fact Sheet, Department of Commerce: Insurance Division, FY2005

This document produced by the Iowa Department of Administrative Services has been developed to provide a multitude of information about executive branch agencies/department on a single sheet of paper. The facts provides general information, contact information, workforce data, leave and benefits information and affirmative action data.

Agency Fact Sheet, Department of Commerce: Insurance Division, FY2006

This document produced by the Iowa Department of Administrative Services has been developed to provide a multitude of information about executive branch agencies/department on a single sheet of paper. The facts provides general information, contact information, workforce data, leave and benefits information and affirmative action data.

Self-selection and risk selection on the Swiss health insurance market

Abstract This thesis presents three empirical studies in the field of health insurance in Switzerland. First we investigate the link between health insurance coverage and health care expenditures. We use claims data for over 60 000 adult individuals covered by a major Swiss Health Insurance Fund, followed for four years; the data show a strong positive correlation between coverage and expenditures. Two methods are developed and estimated in order to separate selection effects (due to individual choice of coverage) and incentive effects ("ex post moral hazard"). The first method uses the comparison between inpatient and outpatient expenditures to identify both effects and we conclude that both selection and incentive effects are significantly present in our data. The second method is based on a structural model of joint demand of health care and health insurance and makes the most of the change in the marginal cost of health care to identify selection and incentive effects. We conclude that the correlation between insurance coverage and health care expenditures may be decomposed into the two effects: 75% may be attributed to selection, and 25 % to incentive effects. Moreover, we estimate that a decrease in the coinsurance rate from 100% to 10% increases the marginal demand for health care by about 90% and from 100% to 0% by about 150%. Secondly, having shown that selection and incentive effects exist in the Swiss health insurance market, we present the consequence of this result in the context of risk adjustment. We show that if individuals choose their insurance coverage in function of their health status (selection effect), the optimal compensations should be function of the se- lection and incentive effects. Therefore, a risk adjustment mechanism which ignores these effects, as it is the case presently in Switzerland, will miss his main goal to eliminate incentives for sickness funds to select risks. Using a simplified model, we show that the optimal compensations have to take into account the distribution of risks through the insurance plans in case of self-selection in order to avoid incentives to select risks.Then, we apply our propositions to Swiss data and propose a simple econometric procedure to control for self-selection in the estimation of the risk adjustment formula in order to compute the optimal compensations.

Insurance Fraud Alert, 2011

Do not let anyone use your personal information from your car or health insurance policy to file a fraudulent insurance claim of any kind.

Audit report on the Northeast Iowa Schools Insurance Trust for the year ended June 30, 2011

Audit report on the Northeast Iowa Schools Insurance Trust for the year ended June 30, 2011

The aggregate claims distribution of a life insurance portfolio with a pairwise positive dependence structure

The individual life model has always been considered as the one closest to the real situation of the total claims of a life insurance portfolio. It only makes the ¿nearly inevitable assumption¿ of independence of the lifelenghts of insured persons in the portfolio. Many clinical studies, however, have demonstrated positive dependence of paired lives such as husband and wife. In our opinion, it won¿t be unrealistic expecting a considerable number of married couples in any life insurance portfolio (e.g. life insurance contracts formalized at the time of signing a mortatge) and these dependences materially increase the values for the stop-loss premiums associated to the aggregate claims of the portfolio. Since the stop-loss order is the order followed by any risk averse decison maker, the simplifying hypothesis of independence constitute a real financial danger for the company, in the sense that most of their decisions are based on the aggregated claims distribution. In this paper, we will determine approximations for the distribution of the aggregate claims of a life insurance portfolio with some married couples and we will describe how to make safe decisions when we don¿t know exactly the dependence structure between the risks in each couple. Results in this paper are partly based on results in Dhaene and Goovaerts (1997)

Discrete analysis of dividend payments in a non-life insurance portfolio

The process of free reserves in a non-life insurance portfolio as defined in the classical model of risk theory is modified by the introduction of dividend policies that set maximum levels for the accumulation of reserves. The first part of the work formulates the quantification of the dividend payments via the expectation of their current value under diferent hypotheses. The second part presents a solution based on a system of linear equations for discrete dividend payments in the case of a constant dividend barrier, illustrated by solving a specific case.

Willigness to pay for long-term care coverage: the role of private information and self-insurance

Both public and private insurance for long-term care is undeveloped in some European countries such as in Spain and empirical evidence is still limited. This paper aims at exmining the determinants of the demand for Long Term Care (LTC) coverage in Spain using contingent valuation techniques. Our findings indicate that only one-fifth of the population is willing to pay to assure coverage decisions are significantly affected by private information asymmetry and housing tenure in giving rise to self-insurance reduces the probability of insurance being hypothetically purchased.

Audit report on the Northeast Iowa Schools Insurance Trust for the year ended June 30, 2012

Audit report on the Northeast Iowa Schools Insurance Trust for the year ended June 30, 2012

Consumer Advisory: Navigating the New Health Insurance Marketplace, September 2013

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Navigating the New Health Insurance Marketplace