The degree of polydispersity in micellar dispersions: A sum rule approach

Statistical properties of a two-dimensional ideal dispersion of polydisperse micelles are derived by analyzing the convergence properties of a sum rule set by mass conservation. Internal micellar degrees of freedom are accounted for by a microscopic model describing small displacements of the constituting amphiphiles with respect to their equilibrium positions. The transfer matrix (TM) method is employed to compute internal micelle partition function. We show that the conditions under which the sum rule is saturated by the largest eigenvalue of the TM determine the value of amphiphile concentration above which the dispersion becomes highly polydisperse and micelle sizes approach a Schultz distribution. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Molecular Ordering of Layer-by-Layer Polyelectrolyte Films Studied by Sum-Frequency Vibrational Spectroscopy

The molecular arrangement in organic thin films is crucial for their increasing technological applications. Here, we use vibrational spectroscopy by sum-frequency generation (SFG) to study the ordering of polyelectrolyte layers adsorbed on silica for all steps of layer-by-layer (LbL) self-assembly. In situ measurements during adsorption and rinsing showed that the adsorbed polymer has a disordered conformation and confirmed surface charge overcompensation upon polyelectrolyte adsorption by probing the interfacial electric field. In dry films, the polymer chains acquired a net orientational ordering, which was affected, however, by the adsorption of subsequent layers. Such a detailed characterization may allow the control of LbL film structure and functionality with unprecedented power.

Molecular Ordering in Layer-by-Layer Polyelectrolyte Films Studied by Sum-Frequency Vibrational Spectroscopy: The Effects of Drying Procedures

Sum-Frequency Vibrational Spectroscopy (SFVS) has been used to investigate the effect of nitrogen-flow drying on the molecular ordering of Layer-by-Layer (LbL) films of poly(allylamine hydrochloride) (PAH) alternated with poly(styrene sulfonate) (PSS). We find that films dried by spontaneous water evaporation are more ordered and homogeneous than films dried by nitrogen flow. The latter are quite inhomogeneous and may have regions with highly disordered polymer conformation. We propose that drying by spontaneous water evaporation reduces the effect of drag by the drying front, while during nitrogen-flow drying the fast evaporation of water ""freezes"" the disordered conformation of adsorbed polyelectrolyte molecules. These findings are important for many applications of LbL films, since device performance usually depends on film morphology and its molecular structure.

Polynomial identities for the ternary cyclic sum

We simplify the results of Bremner and Hentzel [J. Algebra 231 (2000) 387-405] on polynomial identities of degree 9 in two variables satisfied by the ternary cyclic sum [a, b, c] abc + bca + cab in every totally associative ternary algebra. We also obtain new identities of degree 9 in three variables which do not follow from the identities in two variables. Our results depend on (i) the LLL algorithm for lattice basis reduction, and (ii) linearization operators in the group algebra of the symmetric group which permit efficient computation of the representation matrices for a non-linear identity. Our computational methods can be applied to polynomial identities for other algebraic structures.

"I like being under those rules here": Students Using the College Library

This presentation was offered as part of the CUNY Library Assessment Conference, Reinventing Libraries: Reinventing Assessment, held at the City University of New York in June 2014.

Endogenous time-dependent rules and inflation inertia: preliminary version

When policy rules are changed, the effect of nominal rigidities should be modelled through endogenous pricing rules. We endogenize Taylor (1979) type pricing rule to examine the output effects of monetary disinflations. We derive optimal fixed-price time-dependent rules in inflationary steady states and during disinflations. We also develop a methodology to aggregate individual pricing rules which vary through disinflation. This allows us to reevaluate the output costs of monetary disinflation, including aspects as the role of the initial leveI of inflation and the importance of the degree of credibility of the policy change.

Endogenous time-dependent rules and the costs of disinflation with imperfect credibility

This paper examines the output effects of monetary disinflation in a model with endogenous time-dependent pricing rules and imperfect credibility of the disinflation policy. We find that these features interact to generate an additional effect on top f the ones obtained with either endogenous time-dependent rules (Bonomo and Carvalho, 2003) or imperfect credibility (Ball, 1995) in isolation. This results in higher output costs of monetary disinflation.

Electoral rules, political competition and fiscal spending: regression discontinuity evidence from brazilian municipalities

We exploit a discontinuity in Brazilian municipal election rules to investigate whether political competition has a causal impact on policy choices. In municipalities with less than 200,000 voters mayors are elected with a plurality of the vote. In municipalities with more than 200,000 voters a run-off election takes place among the top two candidates if neither achieves a majority of the votes. At a first stage, we show that the possibility of runoff increases political competition. At a second stage, we use the discontinuity as a source of exogenous variation to infer causality from political competition to fiscal policy. Our second stage results suggest that political competition induces more investment and less current spending, particularly personnel expenses. Furthermore, the impact of political competition is larger when incumbents can run for reelection, suggesting incentives matter insofar as incumbents can themselves remain in office.

Decision rules and information provision: monitoring versus manipulation

The paper focuses on the organization of institutions designed to resolve disputes between two parties, when some information is not veriable and decision makers may have vested preferences. It shows that the choice of how much discretional power to grant to the decision maker and who provides the information are intrinsically related. Direct involvement of the interested parties in the supply of information enhances monitoring over the decision maker, although at the cost of higher manipulation. Thus, it is desirable when the decision maker is granted high discretion. On the contrary, when the decision maker has limited discretional power, information provision is better assigned to an agent with no direct stake. The analysis helps to rationalize some organizational arrangements that are commonly observed in the context of judicial and antitrust decision-making.

Are one-sided S,s rules useful proxies for optimal pricing rules?

This article is motivated by the prominence of one-sided S,s rules in the literature and by the unrealistic strict conditions necessary for their optimality. It aims to assess whether one-sided pricing rules could be an adequate individual rule for macroeconomic models, despite its suboptimality. It aims to answer two questions. First, since agents are not fully rational, is it plausible that they use such a non-optimal rule? Second, even if the agents adopt optimal rules, is the economist committing a serious mistake by assuming that agents use one-sided Ss rules? Using parameters based on real economy data, we found that since the additional cost involved in adopting the simpler rule is relatively small, it is plausible that one-sided rules are used in practice. We also found that suboptimal one-sided rules and optimal two-sided rules are in practice similar, since one of the bounds is not reached very often. We concluded that the macroeconomic effects when one-sided rules are suboptimal are similar to the results obtained under two-sided optimal rules, when they are close to each other. However, this is true only when one-sided rules are used in the context where they are not optimal.

Sequential cost-reimbursement rules

This paper studies cost-sharing rules under dynamic adverse selection. We present a typical principal-agent model with two periods, set up in Laffont and Tirole's (1986) canonical regulation environment. At first, when the contract is signed, the firm has prior uncertainty about its efficiency parameter. In the second period, the firm learns its efficiency and chooses the level of cost-reducing effort. The optimal mechanism sequentially screens the firm's types and achieves a higher level of welfare than its static counterpart. The contract is indirectly implemented by a sequence of transfers, consisting of a fixed advance payment based on the reported cost estimate, and an ex-post compensation linear in cost performance.