749 resultados para Seminários teológicos
Resumo:
This paper proposes a method to structurally estimate an auction model using a variation of OLS, under commonly held assumptions in both auction theory and econometrics. In spite of its computational simplicity, the method applies to a wide variety of environments, including interdependent values in general, and certain forms of endogenous participation and bidder asymmetry. Furthermore, it can be used for hypotheses testing about the shape of the valuation distribution, valuation interdependence, or existence of bidder asymmetry.
Resumo:
In spite of Latin America s dismal economic performance between the 1950s and 1980s, the region experienced strong capital deepening. Furthermore, pro- ductivity (measured as TFP) grew at low rates in comparison with the U.S. In this paper, we suggest that all these facts can be explained as a consequence of the restrictive trade regime adopted at that time. Our analytical framework is based on a dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model, with scale economies in the capital- intensive sector. We assume an economy that is initially open and specialized in the production of labor-intensive goods. The trade regime is modeled as a move to a closed economy. The model produces results consistent with the Latin American experience. Speci cally, for a su¢ ciently small country, there will be no long-run growth in income per capita, but capital per capita will increase. As a result, measured TFP will fall.
Resumo:
We analyze the impact on consumer prices of the size and bias of price comparison search engines. In the context of a model related to Burdett and Judd (1983) and Varian (1980), we develop and test experimentally several theoretical predictions. The experimental results confirm the model’s predictions regarding the impact of the number of firms, and the type of bias of the search engine, but reject the model’s predictions regarding changes in the size of the index. The explanatory power of an econometric model for the price distributions is significantly improved when variables accounting for risk attitudes are introduced.
Resumo:
This paper measures the importance of indirect network effects in the adoption by colleges and students of ENEM, a standardized exam for high-school students in Brazil that can be used in college application processes. We estimate network effects and find that they are economically significant. Students are more likely to take ENEM the larger the number of colleges adopting it. Similarly, colleges are more likely to adopt it the larger the number of students taking the exam. Moreover, we find evidence that colleges play strategically and that heterogeneity determines their decisions. A college is less likely to adopt ENEM the larger the number of competitors adopting it. Colleges’ characteristics such as ownership and organization affect adoption decisions. In a counterfactual exercise we compare colleges’ adoption decisions under competition and under joint colleges’ payoffs maximization. Adoption rates are significantly reduced when colleges internalize the competitive effect, i.e., the effect of their decisions on other colleges’ payoffs. On the other hand, they increase when indirect network effects - the effect of students’ response to their decisions on other colleges’ payoffs - are also internalized. Competitive adoption rates are found to exceed joint optimum rates by a small difference. These results suggest that, without considering students’ welfare, adoption rates are excessive, but close to the joint optimum.
Resumo:
In 1824 the creation of institutions that constrained the monarch’s ability to unilaterally tax, spend, and debase the currency put Brazil on a path toward a revolution in public finance, roughly analogous to the financial consequences of England’s Glorious Revolution. This credible commitment to honor sovereign debt resulted in successful long-term funded borrowing at home and abroad from the 1820s through the 1880s that was unrivalled in Latin America. Some domestic bonds, denominated in the home currency and bearing exchange clauses, eventually circulated in European financial markets. The share of total debt accounted for by long-term funded issues grew, and domestic debt came to dominate foreign debt. Sovereign debt yields fell over time in London and Rio de Janeiro, and the cost of new borrowing declined on average. The market’s assessment of the probability of default tended to decrease. Imperial Brazil enjoyed favorable conditions for borrowing, and escaped the strong form of “original sin” stressed by recent work on sovereign debt. The development of vibrant private financial markets did not, however, follow from the enhanced credibility of government debt. Private finance in Imperial Brazil suffered from politicized market interventions that undermined the development of domestic capital markets. Private interest rates remained high, entry into commercial banking was heavily restricted, and limited-liability joint-stock companies were tightly controlled. The Brazilian case provides a powerful counterexample to the general proposition of North and Weingast that institutional changes that credibly commit the government to honor its obligations necessarily promote the development of private finance. The very institutions that enhanced the credibility of sovereign debt permitted the systematic repression of private financial development. In terms of its consequences for domestic capital markets, the liberal Constitution of 1824 represented an “inglorious” revolution.
Resumo:
It is often suggested that competition improves productivity, however, the underlying support for this idea is surprisingly thin. This paper presents a case study examining the e ects of a change in the competitive environment on productivity at the Petrobras, Brazil's state-owned oil company. Petrobras had a legal monopoly on production, re ning, transportation and importation of oil in Brazil until it was removed in 1995. Even though Petrobras continues to have a de facto monopoly, the end of legal monopoly labor productivity growth rate more than doubled. A growth accounting of the industry shows that between 1977 and 1993 output growth rate (and productivity growth rate) is explained by the accumulation of capital, while Total Factor Productivity (TFP) decreased. Between 1994 and 2000 labor productivity growth rate is completely explained by the growth rate of TFP. The results suggest that the threat of competition alone is su cient to improve productivity. They also provide evidence that restricting competition help cause Brazil's depression of the 1980s.
Resumo:
Labor force participation among youth is extremely high in Brazil when compared to countries with a similar economic background. In Argentina and Chile labor force participation, among those with 10 to 14 years old, is around 1% while in Brazil this rate is as high as 17 %. For the those between 15 and 19 years old these figures are around 10% in Chile, 15% in Argentina and 53% in Brazil. On the other hand the data on school attendance give a more optimistic picture. The percentage of children, between 10 and 14 years old, enrolled in school increased steadily from 79% to 95% from 1981 to 1998 and with age between 15 and 19, from 46% to 66% in the same period. These figures are close to the ones presented by Chile and Argentina. around 99% among the youngest group and around 70% for the 15 to 19 years old group. The objective of the paper is to understand the determinants of the time allocation decision of the Brazilian youth during the last twenty years. Using a multinomial logit regression we investigate the conditional effect of various micro and macro variables on the time allocation decision for the 1991 to 1998 period. Our main findings are: working and studying became the most likely allocation among the youngest in the poor rural areas and, in general, to study, whether working or not, became less dependent on family background for the youngest group but not for the older.
Resumo:
This paper uses a unique dataset of political corruption, constructed from municipal audit reports obtained from Brazil’s randomized anti-corruption program, to test whether reelection incentives affect the level of rent extraction of incumbent politicians. In order to identify reelection incentives, we use the existence of a term limit in Brazil’s municipal elections. We find that in municipalities where mayors are in their second and final term, there is significantly more corruption compared to similar municipalities where mayors are in their first-term. In particular, in municipalities with second-term mayors there is, on average, R$188,431 more diversion of resources and the incidence of irregularities is 23% higher. We also find more pronounced effects where the costs of rent-extraction are lower (municipalities without media and judicial presence), and the density of pivotal voters is higher (more political competition). Finally, we show that first-term mayors, while less corrupt, have a larger incidence of poor administration suggesting that there may exist a trade-off between corruption and quality in public good provision.