The effect of financiaI repression & enforcernent on entrepreneurship and economic deveIopment

This paper studies the effect of financiaI repression and contract enforcement on entrepreneurship and economic development. We construct and solve a general equilibrium mo deI with heterogeneous agents, occupational choice and two financiaI frictions: intermediation costs and financiaI contract enforcement. Occupational choice and firm size are determined endogenously, and depend on agent type (wealth and ability) and the credit market frictions. The mo deI shows that differences across countries in intermediation costs and enforcement generate differences in occupational choice, firm size, credit, output and inequality. Counterfactual experiments are performed for Latin American, European, transition and high growth Asian countries. We use empirical estimates of each country's financiaI frictions, and United States values for all other parameters. The results allow us to isolate the quantitative effect of these financiaI frictions in explaining the performance gap between each country and the United States. The results depend critically on whether à general equilibrium factor price effect is operative, which in turn depends on whether financiaI markets are open or closed. This yields a positive policy prescription: If the goal is to maximize steady-state efficiency, financial reforms should be accompanied by measures to increase financiaI capital mobility.

Demand- side resistance to creative destruction in schumpeterian growth theory

The Schumpelerian model of endogeno~s growlh is generalized with lhe introduction of stochastic resislance. by agenls other Ihan producers. to lhe innovations which drive growth. This causes a queue to be formcd of innovations, alrcady discovered, bUI waiting to be adopled~ A slationary stochastic equilibrium (SSE) is obtained when the queue is stable~ It is shown that in the SSE, such resistance will always reduce lhe average growth iate hut it may increa~e wclfare in certain silualions. In an example, Ihis is when innovatiuns are small anti monopoly power great. The cont1icl hetween this welfare motive for resistance and those of rent-seeking innovalors.may well explain why growth rates differ.

Temporal causality between the exchange rate and the trade balance : the case of Brazil

The paper assesses the impact of intemational relative prices and domestic expenditure variables on Brazil' s foreign trade performance in the first half of the 1990s. It has been argued that the appreciation of the Real since 1994 has had a detrimental impact of the country's trade balance. However, using temporal precedence analysis, our results do not indicate that the trade balance is strongly affected by intemational rei ative prices, such as the exchange rate. Instead, domestic expenditure variables appear to be more powerful determinant of the country' s trade performance in recent years. Granger and error correction causality techniques are used to determine temporal precedence between the trade balance and the exchange rate in the period under examination. Our findings shed light on the debate over the sustainability of recent exchange rate-anchored macroeconomic stabilisation programmes, which is a topic that has encouraged a lot of debate among academics and practitioners.

Inflation and occupational choices

This paper studies the impact of (high rates) of infiation on ocupational choices in a model where the demand for labor is derived from a production technology that uses capital, productive labor, and managerial services done by administrative labor and money; while the supply of both kinds of labor is rigid in the short-run due to irreversible professional choices. The dynamic path of the economy after stabilization plans exhibits the main sty!ized facts reported in the literature inc1uding an initial consumption boon followed by a gradual adjustment. In its open economy version, the initial phase of the transitional dynamics exhibits capital infiight. The model also generates an increase of income inequality during the trasitional dynamics.

Profit sharing with heterogeneous entrepreneural prowess

This paper analyzes the impact of profit sharing on the incentives that individuals face to set up their own business. It presents a model of capital accumulation in which individuals are equally skilled to be workers but differ in their abilities to manage a firmo It is shown that profit sharing can inhibit entrepreneurial initiatives, reducing the number of firms in operation, the aggregate output and the economy's long run capital stock.

Mandatory profit sharing, entrepreneurial incentives and capital accumulation

The impact of a mandatory tax on profits which is transferred to workers is analyzed in a general equilibrium entrepreneurial model. In the short run, this distortion reduces the number of fmns and the aggregate output. In the long run, if capital and labor are bad substitutes, it fosters capital accumulation and increases the aggregate output. In a small open economy with free movement of capital, it improves the welfare of the economy's average individual. One concludes that the benefits of sharing schemes may go beyond the short run employment-stabilization goal focused by the profit sharing literature.

Entry mistakes happen!

Frequently, aspiring entrants have only limited infonnation about their potential rivaIs' entry decisions. As a result, the outcome of the entry game may be that more firms enter than the market can sustain; or, at least, that unnecessary entry investments are made: entry mistakes may happen. We consider two models of non-coordinated entry. In these models, entry mistakes occur because of lags in observing rivaIs' entry decisions (grabthe- dollar entry) or because entry investments take time (war-of-attrition entry). The widebody aircraft industry in the late sixties is presented as supporting evidence for the models' assumptions. We also discuss the welfare implications of non-coordinated free entry. Both models predict that entry incentives are excessive (resp. insufficient) when duopoly profits are high (resp. low). However, if entry costs are high, entry incentives are excessive under war-of-attrition entry but insufficient under grab-the-dollar entry.

Bailey's measure of the welfare costs of infiation as a general-equilibrium measure

Lucas (2000) has ShO\nl t hat Baile,\"'s formula for t hc \\'elfare costs of inflatioIl caIl bc rcgardpd as an approximation to t hc gcneral-equilibriuIll IllCaSllH'S \\"hich emerge from thc Sidrauski anrl the shopping-time models, In this paper \\'c shm\' that Baile~"s mcaSllrc can bc cxactly obtairlf'd in tllf' Siclrauski geIleral-equilibri1lIn framp\\'ork under the assUIllption of quasilinpar prefpreIlC'cs, The rpslllt. based on ",heter or not \\'Palt h pffpcts are incorporatccl into t hp analysis, is also helpful in darif\'ing \\'hy Lucas' Illeasurp clerin'd from the Siclrauski model turns 01lt to be aIl upper bOllIlcl to Bailp~"s, T,,'o eXaInplcs arp used to illustratc t he main C'ondusions,

The role of profits in wage determination: evidence from US manufacturing

We estimate the effect of firms' profitability on wage determination for the American economy. Two standard bargaining models are used to illustrate the problems caused by the endogeneity of profits-per-worker in a real wage equation. The profit-sharing parameter can be identified with instruments which shift demando Using information from the input-output table, we create demand-shift variables for 63 4-digit sectors of the US manufacturing sector. The LV. estimates show that profit-sharing is a relevant and widespread phenomenon. The elasticity of wages with respect to profits-per-worker is seven times as large as OLS estimates here and in previous papers. Sensitivity analysis of the profit-sharing parameter controlling for the extent of unionization and product market concentration reinforces our results.

Neighborhood feedbacks, endogenous stratification, and income inequality

This paper explores the evolution of the cross-section income distribution in economies where endogenous neighborhood formation interacts with positive within-neighborhood feedback effects. We study an economy in which the economic success of adults is determined by the characteristics of the families in the neighborhood in which a person grows up. These feedbacks take two forms. First, the tax base of a neighborhood affects the leveI of education investment in offspring. Second, the effectiveness of education investment is affected by a neighborhood's in come distribution, reflecting factors such as role model or labor market connection effects. Conditions are developed under which endogenous stratification, defined as the tendency for families wi th similar incomes to choose to form common communities, will occur. When families are allowed to choose their neighborhoods, wealthy families will have an incentive to segregate themselves from the rest of the population. This resulting stratification is supported by house price differences between ricli and poor communities. Endogenous stratification can lead to pronounced intertemporal inequality as different families provide very different interaction environments for offspring. When the transformation of human capital into in come exhibits constant retums to scale, cross-section in come differences may also grow across time. As a result, endogenous stratification and neighborhood feedbacks can interact to produce long run inequality.

Effects on school enrollment and performance of a conditional transfers program in Mexico

We study the effects of a conditional transfers program on school enrollment and performance in Mexico. We provide a theoretical framework for analyzing the dynamic educational decision and process inc1uding the endogeneity and uncertainty of performance (passing grades) and the effect of a conditional cash transfer program for children enrolled at school. Careful identification of the program impact on this model is studied. This framework is used to study the Mexican social program Progresa in which a randomized experiment has been implemented and allows us to identify the effect of the conditional cash transfer program on enrollment and performance at school. Using the mIes of the conditional program, we can explain the different incentive effects provided. We also derive the formal identifying assumptions needed to provide consistent estimates of the average treatment effects on enrollment and performance at school. We estimate empirically these effects and find that Progresa had always a positive impact on school continuation whereas for performance it had a positive impact at primary school but a negative one at secondary school, a possible consequence of disincentives due to the program termination after the third year of secondary school.

Indexing stock portfolios in Brazil: tracking the IBOVESPA and the FGV 100

Indexing is a passive investment strategy in which the investor weights bis portfolio to match the performance of a broad-based indexo Since severaI studies showed that indexed portfolios have consistently outperformed active management strategies over the last decades, an increasing number of investors has become interested in indexing portfolios IateIy. Brazilian financiaI institutions do not offer indexed portfolios to their clients at this point in time. In this work we propose the use of indexed portfolios to track the performance oftwo ofthe most important Brazilian stock indexes: the mOVESPA and the FGVIOO. We test the tracking performance of our modeI by a historical simulation. We applied several statistical tests to the data to verify how many stocks should be used to controI the portfolio tracking error within user specified bounds.