What is an absolute right? Deciphering absoluteness in the context of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights

The answer to the question of what it means to say that a right is absolute is often taken for granted, yet still sparks doubt and scepticism. This article investigates absoluteness further, bringing rights theory and the judicial approach on an absolute right together. A theoretical framework is set up that addresses two distinct but potentially related parameters of investigation: the first is what I have labelled the ‘applicability’ criterion, which looks at whether and when the applicability of the standard referred to as absolute can be displaced, in other words whether other considerations can justify its infringement; the second parameter, which I have labelled the ‘specification’ criterion, explores the degree to which and bases on which the content of the standard characterised as absolute is specified. This theoretical framework is then used to assess key principles and issues that arise in the Strasbourg Court’s approach to Article 3. It is suggested that this analysis allows us to explore both the distinction and the interplay between the two parameters in the judicial interpretation of the right and that appreciating the significance of this is fundamental to the understanding of and discourse on the concept of an absolute right.

Possession Taken by Theft and the Original Acquisition of Personal Property Rights

This paper queries the soundness of the view that wrongful possession (eg a thief’s possession of goods he has stolen) should be protected by the standard actions for interference with goods. It uses close historical analysis of the development of the relevant concepts through the cases to argue that this is not a proposition that is compelled on the authorities, nor one demanded as a matter of principle. It then abstracts to consider the implications of this argument at a theoretical level, exposing great need for development in the common law’s basic principles of possessory protection. It argues innovatively that the objects of the law might be better served by the creation of a more limited form of possessory protection, achieved through the possessor’s acquisition of a personal right, and correlatively that the values that underpin and justify our basic rules of possessory protection entail a more nuanced response to matters of property acquisition.

GSP+ and Human Rights::Is the EU's Approach the Right One?

Among the purposes of the EU’s GSP+ programme is to link human rights to trade incentives, with the idea of using such incentives to promote developing countries’ adoption of the values found in core human rights treaties. With the re-renewal of the GSP (and GSP+) programmes to take effect in January 2014, it is fruitful to examine their efficacy and consistency with WTO law. In this article, I argue the GSP+ programme is not only ineffective in obtaining an improvement in human rights conditions for the vast majority of the world’s population, but it is also incompatible with WTO law. A stick-based regime where human rights abuses are linked to trade sanctions is a better way to proceed. After outlining the GSP+ system, and its linkage of human rights and trade, I analyse its efficacy and WTO consistency. Having shown that it is ineffective and contrary to WTO law, I argue that trade sanctions based on a PPM distinction and/or GATT XX(a) may be the appropriate means of linking trade and human rights. The article ends with some concluding remarks on the need for the careful design of such a system.

Truth Recovery and Transitional Justice: Deferring human rights issues

This book investigates why some societies defer the solution of transitional justice issues, such as the disappeared/missing, even after successful democratic consolidation. It also explains why the same societies finally decide to deal with these human rights issues. In short, it considers the interesting and understudied phenomenon of post-transitional justice. The prolonged silences in Spain, Cyprus and Greece contradict the experience of other countries -- such as South Africa, Bosnia, and Guatemala -- where truth recovery for disappeared/missing persons was a central element of the transition to peace and democracy. Despite democratization, the exhumation of mass graves containing the victims from the violence in Cyprus (1963-1974) and the Spanish civil war (1936-1939) was delayed until the early 2000s, when both countries suddenly decided to revisit the past. Cyprus and Spain are not alone: this is an increasing trend among countries trying to come to terms with past violence. Interestingly, despite similar background conditions, Greece is resisting the trend, challenging both theory and regional experience. Truth Recovery and Transitional Justice considers three interrelated issues. First, what factors can explain prolonged silence on the issue of missing persons in some transitional settings? Second, which processes can address the occasional yet puzzling transformation of victims’ groups from opponents of truth recovery to vocal pro-reconciliation pressure groups? Third, under which conditions is it better to tie victims’ rights to an overall political settlement? The book looks at Spain and Cyprus to show how they have attempted to bring closure to deep trauma by exhuming and identifying their missing, albeit under considerably different conditions. It then probes the generalizability of the conclusions on Spain and Cyprus by looking at the Greek experience; oddly, despite similar background conditions, Greece remains resistant to post-transitional justice norms. Interestingly, each case study takes a different approach to transitional justice.