Potemkin conservatism. An ideological tool of the Kremlin. OSW Point of View 48, February 2015

Since the beginning of his third presidential term, Vladimir Putin has consistently invoked conservative ideology. Thus he legitimises the Kremlin’s new political strategy, the aim of which is to stabilise the regime and prevent any political mobilisation in Russia around a liberal agenda. This strategy is also intended to strengthen the legitimacy of the current model of government, by portraying it as ‘traditional’ for Russia; and to justify the government’s repressive and anti-Western policies. It also includes the policy of reintegrating the post-Soviet space under the auspices of Moscow, as evidenced by the annexation of Crimea and the Novorossiya project. This strategy was devised as a response to the galvanisation of adherents of liberalisation in Russia, namely the new middle class and a part of the business and administrative elites who publicly demonstrated their dissatisfaction with the regime in 2011 and 2012. However, the dissonance between the conservative slogans mouthed by the ruling elite and its actual conduct suggest that the Kremlin’s ‘conservative project’ is purely instrumental in nature, which in the longer term will undercut its effectiveness by undermining its credibility in the eyes of Russian society.

An Exercise in Legal Honesty: Re-writing the Court of Justice and the Bundesverfassungsgericht. IHS Political Science Series No. 136, February 2014

At a time of crisis – a true state of emergency – both the Court of Justice of the European Union and the German Federal Constitutional Court have failed the rule of law in Europe. Worse still, in their evaluation of the ersatz crisis law, which has been developed in response to financial and sovereign debt crises, both courts have undermined constitutionality throughout Europe. Each jurisdiction has been implicated within the techocratisation of democratic process. Each Court has contributed to an incremental process of the undermining of the political subjectivity of European Citizens. The results are depressing for lawyers who are still attached to notions of constitutionality. Yet, we must also ask whether the Courts could have acted otherwise. Given the original flaws in the construction of Economic and Monetary Union, as well as the politically pre-emptive constraints imposed by global financial markets, each Court might thus be argued to have been forced to suspend immediate legality in a longer term effort to secure the character of the legal jurisdiction as a whole. Crisis can and does defeat the law. Nevertheless, what continues to disturb is the failure of law in Europe to open up any perspective for a return to normal constitutionality post crisis, as well as its apparent inability to give proper and honest consideration to the hardship now being experienced by millions of Europeans within crisis. This contribution accordingly seeks to reimagine each Judgment in a language of legal honesty. Above all, this contribution seeks to suggest a new form of post-national constitutional language; a language which takes as its primary function, proper protection of democratic process against the ever encroaching powers of a post-national executive power. This contribution forms a part of an on-going effort to identify a new basis for the legitimacy of European Law, conducted jointly and severally with Christian Joerges, University of Bremen and Hertie School of Government, Berlin. Differences do remain in our theoretical positions; hence this individual essay. Nevertheless, the congruence between pluralist and conflict of law approaches to the topic are also readily apparent. See, for example, Everson & Joerges (2013).

Don’t complicate it even further: Macroeconomic Conditionality as a Substitute for new Structural Reform Contracts. European Policy Brief No. 15, May 2013

The idea of introducing contracts between Member States and the EU on structural reforms has its merits, it also has several disadvantages. Most notably, the contracts risk rendering European economic governance even more complex and cumbersome. It is therefore sensible to first try to integrate the structural reform contracts into one of the foreseen economic governance instruments. This Policy Brief argues that macroeconomic conditionality can serve this purpose. With some minor reforms, it could even become a full-fledged substitute for structural reform contracts – without suffering some of latter’s disadvantages.

The History and Challenges of Cohesion Policies. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 2, February 2014

From Introduction. Regional economic disequilibria was viewed as both an obstacle to and result of integration (European Commission 1965; European Commission 1962; European Commission 1969). Even within the Treaty of Rome, the Community tried to establish mechanisms to alleviate regional inequality. However, it was not until 1975 that the main mechanism of regional policy was established as a result of British and Irish enlargement: the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). Since then, cohesion policy has become a significant EU expenditure accounting for €347bn, or 35.7% of the total EU budget for 2007-13(European Commission Regional Policy-Info Regio 2012). It has also become a key policy linked to enlargement. The underlying principle of cohesion policy assumes that the market alone cannot solve development problems and therefore government intervention is needed. This notion is in direct contrast to the underlying principle of EU competition policy, which asserts that the free market can solve economic development problems (Meadows, interview by author, 2003). The logic underlying cohesion policy is not only counter to EU competition policy, but also regulatory policies. Unlike other EU policies, cohesion policy is not a sectoral policy, but rather territorial in nature (Leonardi, 2006). Thus at times EU regulatory policy has also unintentionally worked counter to the goals of regional policy, sometimes disadvantaging poorer regions (Dudek, 2005). As the Community has sought to ameliorate regional disparities, it meant that all levels of government: local, regional, national and supranational would need to be involved, however, member states have different territorial governance and European regional development programs have to varying degrees impacted the relationship and policy responsibility of different levels of government (Leonardi, 2006; Bachtler and Michie 1993; Marks, 1993). The very nature of regional development policy has provoked a re-examination of subsidiarity, or which level of government is the lowest and most appropriate level. The discussion of policy formulation and implementation at the lowest level possible also addresses the issue of the democratic deficit. Some argue that the closer government is to the people the more responsive and representative it is. Democracy, however, also implies that public funds are used in a transparent way and for public rather than private good. Yet, as we examine the history and current situation of EU regional funds we find that corruption and misuse still abound. Thus, to understand the history of regional policy it is imperative to look at the major transformations of the policy, how regional policy has impacted subsidiarity and the quality of democracy, become an important instrument of enlargement and contradicted or conflicted with other EU policies.

The Dilemmas of Diffusion: Institutional Transfer & the Remaking of Vocational Training Practices in Eastern Germany, CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 05.10, 1996

Through a case study of the diffusion of the celebrated West Gennan "dual system" of vocational training to the territory of the fonner German Democratic Republic, we develop the argument that local sociopolitical relations matter crucially for the successful transfer and implementation of institutional arrangements. Notwithstanding massive levels of government funding, the presence of complementary supports, and the concerted efforts of Ger­many's social partners, the dual system is experiencing significant difficulties in the new federal states of the East. These difficulties are not due simply to the particular politics of unification (the wholesale transfer of West German institutions whether or not they were appropriate to Eastern Germany) nor even simply to the paucity of dynamic private firms capable of and willing to train new apprentices. The difficulties stem also from the under­ lying weaknesses of the East German sociopolitical infrastructure on which the entire dual system rests. This. hy­ pothesis is elaborated and substantiated through a range of data on training in the East and especially through the use of detailed case studies of Leipzig and Chemrutz.

Creating Stability: National Preferences and the Origins of European Monetary System. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 00.9, December 2000

This essay compares the preferences of France, Italy, and Britain on the creation of the European Monetary System in 1978-1979, especially the Exchange Rate Mechanism, which stabilised nominal exchange rates. My claim is that the different conclusions reached by the governments (France and Italy in, Britain out) cannot be explained by economic circumstances or by interests, and I elaborate an intervening institutional variable which helps explain preferences. Deducing from spatial theory that where decisionmakers `sit' on the left-right spectrum matters to their position on the EMS, I argue that domestic constitutional power-. sharing mechanisms privilege certain actors over others in a predictable and consistent way. Where centrists were in power, the government's decision was to join. Where left or right extremists were privileged, the government's decision was negative. The article measures the centrism of the governments in place at the time, and also reviews the positions taken by the national political parties in and out of government. It is intended to contribute to the growing comparativist literature on the European Union, and to the burgeoning literature on EU-member-state relations.

Combating corruption in Ukraine – the beginning of a long march. OSW COMMENTARY Number 170, 06.05.2015

From a public opinion point of view, corruption has been the gravest problem of today’s Ukraine, excepting the armed conflict in the east of the country. The government might be able to delay certain key reforms such as the constitutional reform or the reform of local government structures, however, without stepping up measures to combat corruption they would face the risk of losing social support which has already been weak. There is no single strategy for combating corruption in Ukraine. What has been implemented is a series of often contradictory concepts and actions (initiated by the president’s office, the government, civil society institutions, or launched to meet the requirements of donors). The successes of the new government have included efforts aimed at fighting corruption at the middle level of government and the introduction of legislative changes in compliance with international practice. The main weaknesses, on the other hand, have been the lack of efficient mechanisms to implement the adopted legislation to ensure that an individual charged with corruption (regardless of political connections) could be effectively tried and the money received as bribery could be returned to the state. Similarly, the judiciary system has not been prepared to actively handle corruption cases.

Why Greece is different. CEPS Commentary, 22 May 2015

With Greece’s economy tanking again, the country’s government is convinced that it is the victim of the wrong treatment in the form of excessive austerity and is calling for a renegotiation of the bailout deal it made with its international creditors. In Daniel Gros’ view, however, this narrative overlooks the fact that the approach worked in other peripheral countries: Portugal, Ireland, Spain and even Cyprus, are all visibly recovering. As he points out in this CEPS Commentary, it was their strong export performance which allowed these countries to escape the austerity trap and he accordingly urges Greece’s policy-makers to focus their attention on stimulating exports rather than only discussing the budget.

The ‘Visible Hand’ of the ECB’s Quantitative Easing. CEPS Working Document No. 407/May 2015

Quantitative easing à la ECB has produced so far an impact on long-term nominal rates through ex ante channels: signalling channels, term duration channels, and risk premia channels. The term duration channel will also lead to a lengthening of the average maturity of government debts, with possible implications for fiscal policy. The ECB’s determination to buy government bonds in a fragmented market with a low net supply may also produce an ex post impact, during the actual asset purchases, but less on nominal rates and more on financial plumbing, as recent volatility suggests. As the effects of scarce supply in collateral markets are felt, repo rates remain well below zero. Lower supply and limited re-usability of high quality collateral, capped by regulatory requirements, is a constraint on market liquidity and compresses dealers’ balance sheets. By keeping a depressed yield curve and asset prices high, QE may also accelerate the consolidation of both traditional and capital-market based (dealer) bank business models. What is less clear is how these changing business models will interact with the sharp rise of the asset management industry in the aftermath of the crisis, which raises questions about the implications for global collateral flows and deposit-like funding channels.

The UK's EU Vote: The 1975 Precedent and Today's Negotiations. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue 2015/08, June 2015

Highlights • The United Kingdom's European Union Referendum Bill, introduced in the House of Commons on 28 May 2015, legislates for the holding of a referendum before 31 December 2017 on the UK’s continued EU membership. UK prime minister David Cameron is opening negotiations with other EU member states to try to obtain an EU reform deal that better suits UK interests. Both the negotiations and the outcome of the referendum pose major challenges for the UK and the EU. • It will not be the first time that a UK government has staged a referendum following a renegotiation of its terms of EU membership. The first such referendum took place on 5 June 1975 after nearly a year of renegotiations, and the ‘yes’ won with 67.2 percent of the vote. Notwithstanding obvious differences, the conduct of today’s renegotiations should bear in mind this precedent, and in particular consider (a) how much the UK government can get out of the negotiations, in particular with respect to potential Treaty changes; (b) why political marketing is central to the referendum’s outcome; (c) how the UK administration’s internal divisions risk derailing the negotiations; and (d) why the negotiations risk antagonising even the UK’s best allies.

Evolving Patterns of Euroscepticism in the Danish Political Landscape. EPIN Commentary No. 25/15 July 2015

Catharina Sørensen observes in this new EPIN Commentary that the most significant result of the Danish elections on June 18th was not the change of government from centre-left to centre-right, but rather the possibility that the anti-immigration, anti-European integration Danish People’s Party (DPP) would also enter government. While its leadership elected not to do so, but rather to exercise influence from outside, the author further notes that one positive outcome of a new pro-European government that is dependent on a largely eurosceptic supporting party could be that EU issues will finally get the prominence in Danish politics that they deserve.

Ramzanistan. Russia's Chechen Problem. OSW POINT OF VIEW Number 54, 2015-08-25

The political activity and growing independence of Chechnya’s leader Ramzan Kadyrov raises questions about his loyalty and the possibility of his openly renouncing his servitude to Moscow. Such a scenario seems unlikely because of the dependence of Kadyrov’s regime on Russia. He is burdened by his republic’s financial dependence, the stain of collaboration and the crimes committed on his own people, and so his regime cannot exist without Moscow’s support. However, Kadyrov’s dependence on Moscow and the apparent stability of the situation in Chechnya do not mean that a lasting peace has been established there. The current plan for governing the republic and the relationship between Moscow and Grozny is a temporary solution, based not on durable solutions, but on the situational convergence of the Kremlin and Kadyrov’s interests. A change of government in the Kremlin, or to an even greater degree a domestic crisis in Russia which weakens its position in the Caucasus, would mean the fall of Kadyrov’s regime, and the reactivation of pro-independence rhetoric in Chechnya.

Will Cameron get what he wants? Anticipating reactions to Britain’s EU reform proposals. CEPS Commentary, 29 October 2015

After months of speculation about the British Prime Minister’s specific demands in terms of the “renegotiation” of the UK’s relationship with the EU, David Cameron has bowed to pressure from the heads of state or government of the other EU member states and committed himself to setting out the UK’s specific “concerns” in writing by early November. While we cannot be certain of the contents of David Cameron’s missive to the EU, his recent pronouncements before Parliament set out an agenda whose contours have become quite clear. In this Commentary the authors consider how far the other EU member states might be willing to accommodate Cameron’s demands and provide him with the political capital he seeks to lead the ‘in’ campaign. They distinguish four different attitudes among EU countries, and advocate a constructive approach that sets the scene for a Convention after 2017 – one that opens the treaty for a revision that could accommodate both the British demands for an ‘opt-out’ from ever closer union and gives leeway to those who wish to integrate further. Putting emphasis on strengthening the single market in the more immediate term would allow the Prime Minister to show his home audience that he is a leading reformer and that the EU gives oxygen to the British economy.This is an obvious area where he might be able to seal deals during the UK’s Presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2017. The authors also consider what the European Council Conclusions on the UK’s wish list for EU reform might look like, given that any treaty revision before the time set for the UK referendum is unattainable. They present the results of a two-day simulation exercise involving a cross-section of national experts and present mock European Council Conclusions on the areas of ever closer union; the role of national parliaments; competitiveness; economic and monetary integration; and the free movement of labour.

The uncertain future of the coal energy industry in Germany. OSW COMMENTARY #188, 2015-10-20

Germany’s current energy strategy, known as the “energy transition”, or Energiewende, involves an accelerated withdrawal from the use of nuclear power plants and the development of renewable energy sources (RES). According to the government’s plans, the share of RES in electricity production will gradually increase from its present rate of 26% to 80% in 2050. Greenhouse gas emissions are expected to fall by 80–95% by 2050 when compared to 1990 levels. However, coal power plants still predominate in Germany’s energy mix – they produced 44% of electricity in 2014 (26% from lignite and 18% from hard coal). This makes it difficult to meet the emission reduction objectives, lignite combustion causes the highest levels of greenhouse gas emissions. In order to reach the emission reduction goals, the government launched the process of accelerating the reduction of coal consumption. On 2 July, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy published a plan to reform the German energy market which will be implemented during the present term of government. Emission reduction from coal power plants is the most important issue. This problem has been extensively discussed over the past year and has transformed into a conflict between the government and the coal lobby. The dispute reached its peak when lignite miners took to the streets in Berlin. As the government admits, in order to reach the long-term emission reduction objectives, it is necessary to completely liquidate the coal energy industry in Germany. This is expected to take place within 25 to 30 years. However, since the decision to decommission nuclear power plants was passed, the German ecological movement and the Green Party have shifted their attention to coal power plants, demanding that these be decommissioned by 2030 at the latest.

The Protocol of Frankfurt: a new treaty for the eurozone. EPC Discussion Paper, 12 January 2016

At a time when the EU finds itself in a perfect storm of crises which it seems unable to overcome, a bold move is needed to reinvigorate the EU’s system of government and stave off the risk of disintegration. In order to address the inherent weakness of the EU’s monetary and economic governance, this pamphlet proposes a new treaty for the eurozone: the Protocol of Frankfurt. Written by Andrew Duff, former Member of the European Parliament and Visiting Fellow at the EPC, it is the first ever attempt to draft a treaty aimed at setting up a fiscal union. “The Protocol of Frankfurt provides the constitutional framework for a proper economic government and will, hopefully, also serve to accelerate the debate on the Five Presidents’ Report”. Realising that the time is not ripe for a major constitutional overhaul, the pamphlet instead puts forward a shorter treaty revision that concentrates on re-engineering the Maastricht arrangements for the economic and monetary union, taking on the form of a Protocol to be added on to the existing Treaties. Article 48(2) of the Treaty on European Union allows the government of any member state, the European Parliament or the Commission to table amendments to the Treaties. Our hope is that somebody, informed by this draft Protocol, does just that.