Extracção de areia na Praia de Calhetona (Ilha de Santiago, Cabo Verde) : causas, processos e consequências

A extracção de areia nas praias do mar, nas bacias hidrográficas e nas encostas montanhosas, tem sido prática de muitas famílias cabo-verdianas. A Praia de Calhetona foi uma das que nos últimos anos sofreu degradação significativa, em função da apanha clandestina de areia, sem qualquer plano de extracção, destinada a construção civil. A extracção de areia, para vender ou para a autoconstrução, é efectuada em família por indivíduos, maioritariamente do sexo feminino, de baixa renda ou sem profissão remunerada. O processo de extracção de areia na Praia de Calhetona teve o seu ponto alto nos anos 80, diminuindo consideravelmente com a escassez de areia e implementação do Decreto – Lei nº 69/97, de 3 de Novembro, que visava disciplinar a exploração de inertes nas praias. Em face da pesquisa feita, baseada no estudo de caso, ficou expresso que os inquiridos implicados na actividade de extracção clandestina de areia correm riscos elevados para obterem lucros reduzidos. Quem efectivamente beneficia são os camionistas que compram esse inerte e o vendem pelo dobro do preço. Qualquer actividade de exploração de recursos naturais causa impactes sobre o espaço de actuação. No caso da Praia de Calhetona, observa-se o recuo da linha de costa, a quase ausência de areia e a desertificação de propriedades nas suas proximidades, para além dos impactes negativos sobre o turismo, a função balnear e a desova de tartaruga. Apesar de tudo, constata-se uma consciência generalizada dos impactes ambientais causados pelos inquiridos, os quais, no entanto, alegam que a extracção de areia é uma das alternativas para garantir a sobrevivência individual e das suas famílias.

Country asymmetries, endogenous product choice and the speed of trade liberalization

In a world with two countries which differ in size, we study theimpact of (the speed of) trade liberalization on firms' profitsand total welfare of the countries involved. Firms correctlyanticipate the pace of trade liberalization and take it intoaccount when deciding on their product choices, which areendogenously determined at the beginning of the game. Competitionin the marketplace then occurs either on quantities or on prices.As long as the autarkic phase continues, local firms are nationalmonopolists. When trade liberalization occurs, firms compete in aninternational duopoly. We analyze trade effects by using twodifferent models of product differentiation. Across all thespecifications adopted (and independently of the price v. quantitycompetition hypothesis), total welfare always unambiguously riseswith the speed of trade liberalization: Possible losses by firmsare always outweighed by consumers' gains, which come under theform of lower prices, enlarged variety of higher average qualitiesavailable. The effect on profits depends on the type of industryanalyzed. Two results in particular seem to be worth of mention.With vertical product differentiation and fixed costs of qualityimprovements, the expected size of the market faced by the firmsdetermines the incentive to invest in quality. The longer the periodof autarky, the lower the possibility that the firm from the smallcountry would be producing the high quality and be the leader in theinternational market when it opens. On the contrary, when trade opensimmediately, national markets do not play any role and firms fromdifferent countries have the same opportunity to become the leader.Hence, immediate trade liberalization might be in the interest ofproducers in the small country. In general, the lower the size of thesmall country, the more likely its firm will gain from tradeliberalization. Losses from the small country firm can arise when itis relegated to low quality good production and the domestic marketsize is not very small. With horizontal product differentiation (thehomogeneous good case being a limit case of it when costs ofdifferentiation tend to infinity), investments in differentiationbenefit both firms in equal manner. Firms from the small country do notrun the risk of being relegated to a lower competitive position undertrade. As a result, they would never lose from it. Instead, firms fromthe large country may still incur losses from the opening of trade whenthe market expansion effect is low (i.e. when the country is very largerelative to the other).

Interbank comptetition with costly screening

We analyse credit market equilibrium when banks screen loan applicants. When banks have a convex cost function of screening, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where banks optimally set interest rates at the same level as their competitors. This result complements Broecker s (1990) analysis, where he demonstrates that no pure strategy equilibrium exists when banks have zero screening costs. In our set up we show that interest rate on loansare largely independent of marginal costs, a feature consistent with the extant empirical evidence. In equilibrium, banks make positive profits in our model in spite of the threat of entry by inactive banks. Moreover, an increase in the number of active banks increases credit risk and so does not improve credit market effciency: this point has important regulatory implications. Finally, we extend our analysis to the case where banks havediffering screening abilities.

Optimal bail out policy, conditionality and constructive ambiguity

This paper addresses the issue of the optimal behaviour of the Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) in its microeconomic role regarding individual financial institutions in distress. It has been argued that the LOLR should not intervene at the microeconomic level and let any defaulting institution face the market discipline, as it will be confronted with the consequences of the risks it has taken. By considering a simple costbenefit analysis we show that this position may lack a sufficient foundation. We establish that, instead, uder reasonable assumptions, the optimal policy has to be conditional on the amount of uninsured debt issued by the defaulting bank. Yet in equilibrium, because the rescue policy is costly, the LOLR will not rescue all the banks that fulfill the uninsured debt requirement condition, but will follow a mixed strategy. This we interpret as the confirmation of the "creative ambiguity" principle, perfectly in line with the central bankers claim that it is efficient for them to have discretion in lending to individual institutions. Alternatively, in other cases, when the social cost of a bank's bankruptcy is too high, it is optimal for the LOLR to bail out the insititution, and this gives support to the "too big to fail" policy.

Estimating uncertainty of alcohol-attributable fractions for infectious and chronic diseases.

Background: Alcohol is a major risk factor for burden of disease and injuries globally. This paper presents a systematic method to compute the 95% confidence intervals of alcohol-attributable fractions (AAFs) with exposure and risk relations stemming from different sources.Methods: The computation was based on previous work done on modelling drinking prevalence using the gamma distribution and the inherent properties of this distribution. The Monte Carlo approach was applied to derive the variance for each AAF by generating random sets of all the parameters. A large number of random samples were thus created for each AAF to estimate variances. The derivation of the distributions of the different parameters is presented as well as sensitivity analyses which give an estimation of the number of samples required to determine the variance with predetermined precision, and to determine which parameter had the most impact on the variance of the AAFs.Results: The analysis of the five Asian regions showed that 150 000 samples gave a sufficiently accurate estimation of the 95% confidence intervals for each disease. The relative risk functions accounted for most of the variance in the majority of cases.Conclusions: Within reasonable computation time, the method yielded very accurate values for variances of AAFs.

Indisciplina na escola : compreender para prevenir : um estudo com alunos do 7º e 9º anos de Cabo Verde

A indisciplina na escola é um tema educativo de atualidade e uma preocupação daqueles que estão ligados à educação, quer seja de uma forma direta ou indireta: professores, alunos, pais ou encarregados de educação. O presente estudo teve como objetivo geral conhecer as representações que os alunos do 7º e 9º anos de escolaridade têm acerca da indisciplina na escola. Com as nove questões de investigação formuladas, pretendeu-se averiguar a distribuição dos alunos pela disrupção, vitimização e agressão na escola, e, ainda, analisar as diferenças em função do género e do ano de escolaridade nos comportamentos de disrupção, vitimização e agressão na escola. A amostra foi constituída por 240 alunos do 7º e 9º anos de escolaridade de uma escola secundária de Cabo Verde. Para se proceder à avaliação dos comportamentos disruptivos foi utilizada a Escala de Disrupção Escolar Professada pelo Aluno, desenvolvida por Veiga (1996, 2012). Foi também utilizada a escala Peer Victimization Scale, adaptada para Portugal por Veiga (2008), que permitiu avaliar comportamentos de agressor e de agredido. Os resultados indicaram uma disrupção escolar não elevada. Em termos diferenciais, de uma forma geral, os alunos do 7º ano foram mais disruptivos que os do 9º ano; os alunos do sexo masculino revelaram ser mais disruptivos que os do sexo feminino. Em relação à escala de vitimização, os resultados obtidos permitiram encontrar ocorrências de vitimização, sendo a mais frequente a verbal; nesta escala os alunos do sexo masculino foram mais vítimas do que os do sexo feminino; os alunos do 7º ano revelaram ser mais vítima do que os do 9º. Relativamente à escala de agressão, os resultados permitiram observar que não houve registo elevado de ocorrências; nesta escala os alunos do sexo masculino revelaram ser mais agressores do que os alunos do sexo feminino; os alunos do 7º ano revelaram ser mais agressores do que os do 9º ano. Os resultados aproximam-se de outros estudos semelhantes e sugerem a necessidade de novas investigações com amostras mais heterogéneas, envolvendo outros anos de escolaridade.

Overconfidence and market efficiency with heterogeneous agents

We study financial markets in which both rational and overconfident agents coexist and make endogenous information acquisition decisions. We demonstrate the following irrelevance result: when a positive fraction of rational agents (endogeneously) decides to become informed in equilibrium, prices are set as if all investors were rational, and as a consequence the overconfidence bias does not aect informational efficiency, price volatility, rational traders expected profits or their welfare. Intuitively, as overconfidence goes up, so does price infornativeness, which makes rational agents cut their information acquisition activities, effectively undoing the standard effect of more aggressive trading by the overconfident.

Residence advantage in heterospecific territorial disputes of Erythrodiplax Brauer species (Odonata, Libellulidae)

Residence advantage in heterospecific territorial disputes of Erythrodiplax Brauer species (Odonata, Libellulidae). Territories are the outcome of interactions determining where and how long individuals settle. To odonate species, aggressive disputes are not so common since the outcome can be predetermined by advantages such as residency, age, and body size. However, it is possible to predict that at heterospecific disputes, larger body-sized or more aggressive species have some profits overcoming these individual advantages, generating patterns of species hierarchy. Here, I studied the aggressiveness of five Erythrodiplax species (Odonata, Libellulidae) during territorial disputes and verified if larger body-sized species are more aggressive than smaller ones or if the residence advantage prevails on the heterospecific disputes. Larger species were not more aggressive than smaller ones and winners of intra- and interspecific territorial disputes were defined mainly by the residence. So, the residence advantage between heterospecific opponents appears to prevail over any other asymmetry among these species. This pattern may occur because, despite the territorial behaviour in dragonfly males, heterospecific disputes may not increment male reproductive success because it may not increase their access to females.

Entrepreneurial structure of the mercantile company in pre-industrial Catalonia

The mercantile company was the basic form of enterprise in pre-industrial Catalonia. The aim of this paper is to study the formation and development of the mercantile companies in Barcelona whose end was the wholesale and retail sale of textiles in the botigues de teles (textile retail shops) throughout the eighteenth century. These firms were officially registered before a notary and their deeds reveal how these establishments were administered and managed.The study covers a sample of 121 mercantile companies, and the articles and documentation that were put into effect by 32 notaries who were active in Barcelona in the 18th century have been consulted in their entirety. From an initial selection of documentation, a total of 228 deeds registering companies have been found, 107 of which (47%) relate to the creation of companies whose various activities were centred in taverns, textile manufacturing, braiding.... While the 121 companies, which make up our sample and which account for 53% of the deeds registered with the notaries mentioned above, focused exclusively on the management of textile retail shops located in the commercial heart of the city. Thus one point of interest that the documentation reveals is that the majority of the mercantile companies registered by Barcelona notaries throughout the 18th century were establishments which traded in textiles. The first part of the article focuses on the structural characteristics of these enterprises, the number and socio-professional status of the partners and the extent of each partner s involvement in the administration and management. The second part of the article examines the capital investment made by each partner, their rights and obligations agreed on, the sharing out of profits and possible losses and the duration of the companies. The final aim of the paper is to highlight the evolution of these companies through one specific case.

Drug innovation, prices and health

This article tries to reconcile economic-industrial policy with health policy when dealing with biomedical innovation and welfare state sustainability. Better health accounts for an increasingly large proportion of welfare improvements. Explanation is given to the welfare losses coming from the fact than industrial and health policy tend to ignore each other. Drug s prices reflecting their relative relative effectiveness send the right signal to the industry rewarding innovation with impact on quantity and quality of life- and to the buyers of health care services.The level of drug s public reimbursement indicates the social willingness to pay of the different national health systems, not only by means of inclusion, or rejection, in the basket of services covered, but especially establishing the proportion of the price that is going to be financed publicly.Reference pricing for therapeutic equivalents as the upper limit of the social willingness to pay- and two-tiered co-payments for users (avoidable and inversely related with the incremental effectiveness of de drug) are deemed appropriate for those countries concerned at the same time with increasing their productivity and maintaining its welfare state. Profits drive R&D but not its location. There is no intrinsic contradiction between high productivity and a consolidated National Health Service (welfare state) as the European Nordic Countries are telling us every day.

Lobbying, innovation and protectionist cycles

This paper explains why trade liberalizations occur in developing countries,and why they are often reversed. It does so by focusing on the use oflobbying for protection by import competing firms as a means to postponecostly product quality upgrades to keep up with foreign competitors. Giventhe availability of a political market for import tariffs, domestic firmswill lobby for a sequence of tariffs that insulate domestic profits from awidening quality gap, thereby allowing adjustment to be postponed. But asthe contributions required by the government grow with the size of thequality gap, it will be optimal to adjust quality and to decrease thelobbying effort at some time, leading to liberalization and technologicalcatch-up. But then the equilibrium tariff will again be small and "cheap",and it will pay to start lobbying anew, until the next quality adjustment.Therefore, cycles in protection will occur as a result of the use oflobbying as a substitute for innovation. The model thus sheds new light onthe impact of the costs of protection on the effectiveness of the lobbyingeffort over time, and on their implications for the timing and the timehorizon of trade reforms in developing countries.

Atelosteogenesis Type 2

Disease characteristics. Clinical features of atelosteogenesis type 2 (AO2) include rhizomelic limb shortening with normal-sized skull, hitchhiker thumbs, small chest, protuberant abdomen, cleft palate, and distinctive facial features (midface hypoplasia, depressed nasal bridge, epicanthus, micrognathia). Other typical findings are ulnar deviation of the fingers, gap between the first and second toes, and clubfoot. AO2 is lethal at birth or shortly thereafter because of pulmonary hypoplasia and tracheobronchomalacia. Diagnosis/testing. The diagnosis of AO2 rests on a combination of clinical, radiologic, and histopathologic features. SLC26A2 (DTDST) is the only gene currently known to be associated with AO2. The diagnosis can be confirmed by molecular genetic testing of SLC26A2, which is clinically available. Management. Treatment of manifestations: palliative care for liveborns. Genetic counseling. AO2 is inherited in an autosomal recessive manner. At conception, each sib of a proband with AO2 has a 25% chance of being affected, a 50% chance of being an asymptomatic carrier, and a 25% chance of being unaffected and not a carrier. Once an at-risk sib is known to be unaffected, the risk of his/her being a carrier is 2/3. Prenatal diagnosis for pregnancies at 25% risk is possible. Carrier testing for at-risk relatives and prenatal testing for pregnancies at increased risk are possible if both disease-causing alleles in the family are known and the carrier status of the parents has been confirmed. Ultrasound examination early in pregnancy is a reasonable complement or alternative to molecular genetic prenatal diagnosis.

Extracção de Areia na Praia de Calhetona (Ilha de Santiago, Cabo Verde) - Causas, Processos e Consequências

A extracção de areia nas praias do mar, nas bacias hidrográficas e nas encostas montanhosas, tem sido prática de muitas famílias cabo-verdianas. A Praia de Calhetona foi uma das que nos últimos anos sofreu degradação significativa, em função da apanha clandestina de areia, sem qualquer plano de extracção, destinada a construção civil. A extracção de areia, para vender ou para a autoconstrução, é efectuada em família por indivíduos, maioritariamente do sexo feminino, de baixa renda ou sem profissão remunerada. O processo de extracção de areia na Praia de Calhetona teve o seu ponto alto nos anos 80, diminuindo consideravelmente com a escassez de areia e implementação do Decreto – Lei nº 69/97, de 3 de Novembro, que visava disciplinar a exploração de inertes nas praias. Em face da pesquisa feita, baseada no estudo de caso, ficou expresso que os inquiridos implicados na actividade de extracção clandestina de areia correm riscos elevados para obterem lucros reduzidos. Quem efectivamente beneficia são os camionistas que compram esse inerte e o vendem pelo dobro do preço. Qualquer actividade de exploração de recursos naturais causa impactes sobre o espaço de actuação. No caso da Praia de Calhetona, observa-se o recuo da linha de costa, a quase ausência de areia e a desertificação de propriedades nas suas proximidades, para além dos impactes negativos sobre o turismo, a função balnear e a desova de tartaruga. Apesar de tudo, constata-se uma consciência generalizada dos impactes ambientais causados pelos inquiridos, os quais, no entanto, alegam que a extracção de areia é uma das alternativas para garantir a sobrevivência individual e das suas famílias.

Long run relationships and price rigidity

I study a repeated buyer-seller relationship for the exchange of a givengood. Asymmetric information over the buyer's reservation price, which issubject to random shocks, may lead the seller to use a rigid pricing policydespite the possibility of making higher profits through price discriminationacross the different satates of the buyer's reservation price. The existence of a flexible price subgame perfect equilibrium is shown for the buyerssufficiently locked-in. When the seller faces a population of buyers whose degree of involvmentin the relatioship is unknown, the flexible price equilibrium is notnecessarily optimal. Thus tipically the seller will prefer to use therigid price strategy. A learning process allowing the seller to screenthe population of buyers is derived abd the existence of a switching pointbetween the two regimes (i.e. price rigidity and price felxibility) isshown.

Moral hazard and non-exclusive contracts

This paper studies equilibria for economies characterized by moral hazard(hidden action), in which the set of contracts marketed in equilibrium isdetermined by the interaction of financial intermediaries.The crucial aspect of the environment that we study is thatintermediaries are restricted to trade non-exclusive contracts: theagents' contractual relationships with competing intermediaries cannot bemonitored (or are not contractible upon). We fully characterize equilibrium allocations and contracts. In thisset-up equilibrium allocations are clearly incentive constrainedinefficient. A robust property of equilibria with non-exclusivity isthat the contracts issued in equilibrium do not implement the optimalaction. Moreover we prove that, whenever equilibrium contracts doimplement the optimal action, intermediaries make positive profits andequilibrium allocations are third best inefficient (where the definitionof third best efficiency accounts for constraints which capture thenon-exclusivity of contracts).