Beyond pure public and pure private management models: Partial privatization in the European airport industry

The use of private funding and management is enjoying an increasing trend in airports. The literature has not paid enough attention to the mixed management models in this industry, although many European airports take the form of mixed public-private companies, where ownership is shared between public and private sectors. We examine the determinants of the degree of private participation in the European airport sector. Drawing on a sample of the 100 largest European airports, we estimate a multivariate equation in order to determine the role of airport characteristics, fiscal variables, and political factors on the extent of private involvement. Our results confirm the alignment between public and private interests in partially privatized airports. Fiscal constraints and market attractiveness promote private participation. Integrated governance models and the share of network carriers prevent the presence of private ownership, while the degree of private participation appears to be pragmatic rather than ideological.

The determinants of contractual choice for private involvement in infrastructure projects in the United States

Reliance on private partners to help provide infrastructure investment and service delivery is increasing in the United States. Numerous studies have examined the determinants of the degree of private participation in infrastructure projects as governed by contract type. We depart from this simple public/private dichotomy by examining a rich set of contractual arrangements. We utilize both municipal and state-level data on 472 projects of various types completed between 1985 and 2008. Our estimates indicate that infrastructure characteristics, particularly those that reflect stand alone versus network characteristics, are key factors influencing the extent of private participation. Fiscal variables, such as a jurisdiction’s relative debt level, and basic controls, such as population and locality of government, increase the degree of private participation, while a greater tax burden reduces private participation.

Beyond pure public and pure private management models: Mixed firms in the European Airport Industry

The use of private funding and management enjoys an increasing trend in airports. The literature has not paid enough attention to the mixed management models in this industry, although many European airports take the form of mixed firms or Institutional PPP, where ownership is shared between public and private sectors. We examine the determinants of the degree of private participation in the European airport sector. Drawing on a sample of the 100 largest European airports we estimate a multivariate equation in order to determine the role of airport characteristics, fiscal variables and political factors on the extent of private involvement. Our results confirm the alignment between public and private interests in PPPs. Fiscal constraints and market attractiveness promote private participation. Integrated governance models and the share of network carriers prevent the presence of private ownership, while the degree of private participation appears to be pragmatic rather than ideological.

Recovery Risk and Labor Costs in Public-Private Partnerships : Contractual Choice in the US Water industry

We use an ordered logistic model to empirically examine the factors that explain varying degrees of private involvement in the U.S. water sector through public-private partnerships. Our estimates suggest that a variety of factors help explain greater private participation in this sector. We find that the risk to private participants regarding cost recovery is an important driver of private participation. The relative cost of labor is also a key factor in determining the degree of private involvement in the contract choice. When public wages are high relative to private wages, private participation is viewed as a source of cost savings. We thus find two main drivers of greater private involvement: one encouraging private participation by reducing risk, and another encouraging government to seek out private participation in lowering costs.

Public-private sector wage differentials by type of contract: evidence from Spain

The article examines public-private sector wage differentials in Spain using microdata from the Structure of Earnings Survey (Encuesta de Estructura Salarial). When applying various decomposition techniques, we find that it is important to distinguish by gender and type of contract. Our results also highlight the presence of a positive wage premium for public sector workers that can be partially explained by their better endowment of characteristics, in particular by the characteristics of the establishment where they work. The wage premium is greater for female and fixed-term employees and falls across the wage distribution, being negative for more highly skilled workers.

Corporate governancen raportointi, case Osuuskauppa Hämeenmaa

Tämän tutkielman tarkoitus oli tutkia corporate governancen raportointia suomalaisen normiston mukaan. Suositus listayhtiöiden hallinnointi- ja ohjausjärjestelmästä (corporate governance) tuli voimaan vuonna 2004, ja se on tarkoitettu Helsingin Pörssissä listattujen yhtiöiden noudatettavaksi. Listaamattomien yhtiöiden hallinnoinnin kehittämisestä (corporate governance) Keskuskauppakamari julkaisi vuonna 2006 asialuettelon. Laajasti omistetut osuuskunnat Keskuskauppakamari huomioi vuonna 2006 erillisessä kannanotossa, jonka mukaan laajasti omistettujen osuuskuntien tulisi noudattaa nykyistä listayhtiöille annettua suositusta siltä osin, kuin se on mahdollista. Tutkielman teoreettinen viitekehys käsittelee corporate governancen ja sen raportoinnin taustateorioita sekä corporate governancen suomalaista normistoa. Corporate governanen ja sen raportoinnin taustateorioita ovat tässä tutkimuksessa agenttiteoria, stewardship - teoria, stakeholder -teoria, legitimacy -teoria ja transaktiokustannusteoria. Corporate governancen raportointia käytännössä on tutkittu benchmarking-tutkimuksen avulla. Tutkielman empiirisen osan case-tutkimus on tehty Osuuskauppa Hämeenmaassa. Case-tutkimuksen tavoitteena oli löytää kohdeyrityksen corporate governancen raportoinnista kehityskohteita. Tutkimuksen tuloksissa näkyy corporate governancen raportoinnin vapaaehtoisuus sekä osuuskuntamuotoisen yrityksen erityispiirteet.

Jevons, Mill and the Private Laboratory of the Mind

In this paper the rift between Jevons and Mill over the method of political economy serves as a prehistory to recent attempts of behavioural economists to once again explain economic behaviour by taking recourse to mankind's physiology. While Mill relied on the association psychology and its introspective method to establish indubitable first principles, Jevons scorned all recourse to introspection. As exemplified for Jevons's theory of labour, psychophysiology gave Jevons the means to think about economic behaviour in terms of functional form, and promised its assessment by means of experiments. Thus levelling down the Victorian distinction between mind and matter, Jevons turned political economy into social physics.

Are Public Private Partnerships that Rigid ? And Why ? : Evidence from Toll Road Concession Contracts

Transport concession contracts are commonly said to be standardized and too rigid. They would not allow public authorities to adapt them to evolving context and circumstances. This paper aims at challenging this view and, more particularly, the view that contractual rigidity for transport concessions is exogenous. Using a transaction cost framework, we disentangle between three main determinants of contractual rigidity: traffic uncertainty; connivance between contracting parties; quality of the institutional environment. Using an original database of toll road concession contracts, we observe a great variety of provisions for toll adjustment. We find that these exogenous determinants significantly influence contractual choices.

Arxiu de Relacions Laborals Teresa Claramunt

The "Teresa Claramunt Industrial Relations Registry" started as an initiative of the Grup d'Estudis Sociològics sobre la Vida Quotidiana i el Treball (Everyday Life and Work Sociological Research Group), with the aim of starting a compilation where could be centralized the main working papers and publication from enterprise and labour organizations, and to achieve a compilation of the edited production done by the labour ambit.

Entrepreneurial Initiative Selling Within Organizations: Towards a More Comprehensive Motivational Framework

We develop and test a motivational framework to explain the intensity with which individuals sell entrepreneurial initiatives within their organizations. Initiative selling efforts may be driven by several factors that hitherto have not been given full consideration: initiative characteristics, individuals' anticipation of rewards, and their level of dissatisfaction. On the basis of a survey in a mail service firm of 192 managers who proposed an entrepreneurial initiative, we find that individuals' reported intensity of their selling efforts with respect to that initiative is greater when they (1) believe that the organizational benefits of the initiative are high, (2) perceive that the initiative is consistent with current organizational practices (although this effect is weak), (3) believe that their immediate organizational environment provides extrinsic rewards for initiatives, and (4) are satisfied with the current organizational situation. These findings extend previous expectancy theory-based explanations of initiative selling (by considering the roles of initiative characteristics and that of initiative valence for the proponent) and show the role of satisfaction as an important motivational driver for initiative selling.

Is Transnational Private Regulation Potentially an Effective Means of Promoting Collective Industrial Relations?

This paper asks whether collective industrial relations can be promoted by means other than seeking change in public policy. Recent research points to the increasing significance of transnational private regulation (TPR) in developing economies. There is an emerging consensus that market incentives to improve wages and conditions of work can have a modest positive effect on measurable outcomes like hours of work, and health and safety. However, it appears that TPR has little impact on the capacity of workers to pursue such improvements for themselves via collective action. The paper takes a closer look at the potential of TPR to enhance worker voice and participation. It argues that this potential cannot be properly evaluated without understanding how local actors mobilise the social and political resources that TPR provides. The case studies presented show how different TPR schemes have been used by unions in Africa as a means to pursue the interests of members. The authors found that the scale of the impact of TPR in all of the contexts studied depended almost entirely on the existing capacities and resources of the unions involved. TPR led to the creation of collective industrial relations processes, or helped unions to ensure that certain enterprises participated in existing industrial relations processes, but did virtually nothing to enhance the political and organisational capacity of the unions to influence the outcomes of those processes in terms of wages and conditions of employment. The paper concludes that the potential of TPR to promote the emergence of collective industrial relations systems is very low.

The First Privatization Policy in a Democracy: Selling State-Owned Enterprises in 1948-1950, Puerto Rico

In the 1940s, when the Governor of Puerto Rico was appointed by the US President and the Puerto Rican government was answerable only to the US Federal government, a large state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector was established on the island. Public services such as water, transportation and energy were nationalized, and several new manufacturing SOEs were created to produce cement, glass, shoes, paper and chalkboard, and clay products. These enterprises were created and managed by government-owned corporations. Later on, between 1948 and 1950, under the island’s first elected Governor, the government sold these SOEs to private groups. This paper documents both the creation and the privatization of the SOE sector in Puerto Rico, and analyzes the role played by ideology, political interests, and economic concerns in the decision to privatize them. Whereas ideological factors might have played a significant role in the building of the SOE sector, we find that privatization was driven basically by economic factors, such as the superior efficiency of private firms in the sectors where the SOEs operated, and by the desire to attract private industrial investment to the Puerto Rican economy.

Factors of customer project profitability in an engineering industrial enterprise

The purpose of the study is to find factors affecting projects' profitability in project business. The issue is approached from customer profitability and project management point of view. The study has been made for a big Finnish company acting in a global market place. The research method is quantitative. Research hypotheses are based on the literature. The used database is originated from the company's ERP- (enterprise resource planning) and project financial follow-up —system. The findings of the study supported the hypotheses weakly. Obviously profitability fluctuated depending on a customer and a project manager. The reasons could not be justified with the variables used in the research.

Public and Private Production in a Mixed Delivery System: Regulation, Competition and Costs

Academics and policy makers are increasingly shifting the debate concerning the best form of public service provision beyond the traditional dilemma between pure public and pure private delivery modes, because, among other reasons, there is a growing body of evidence that casts doubt on the existence of systematic cost savings from privatization, while any competition seems to be eroded over time. In this paper we compare the relative merits of public and private delivery within a mixed delivery system. We study the role played by ownership, transaction costs, and competition on local public service delivery within the same jurisdiction. Using a stochastic cost frontier, we analyze the public-private urban bus system in the Barcelona Metropolitan Area. Our results suggest that private firms tendering the service have higher delivery costs than those incurred by the public firm, especially when transaction costs are taken into account. Tenders, therefore, do not help to reduce delivery costs. Our results suggest that under a mixed delivery scheme, which permits the co-existence of public and private production, the metropolitan government and the regulator can use private delivery to contain costs in the public firm and, at the same time, benefit from the greater flexibility of private firms for dealing with events not provided for under contract.