Patent Price Dynamics in the Context of Patent Age and Patent Latent Variables

The decision to patent a technology is a difficult one to make for the top management of any organization. The expected value that the patent might deliver in the market is an important factor that impacts this judgement. Earlier researchers have suggested that patent prices are better indicators of value of a patent and that auction prices are the best way of determining value. However, the lack of public data on pricing has prevented research on understanding the dynamics of patent pricing. Our paper uses singleton patent auction price data of Ocean Tomo LLC to study the prices of patents. We describe price characteristics of these patents. The price of these patents was correlated with their age, and a significant correlation was found. A price - age matrix was developed and we describe the price characteristics of patents using four quadrants of the matrix, namely young and old patents with low and high prices. We also found that patents owned by small firms get transacted more often and inventor owned patents attracted a better price than assignee owned patents.

Nonneutral network and the role of bargaining power in side payments

Representatives of several Internet access providers have expressed their wish to see a substantial change in the pricing policies of the Internet. In particular, they would like to see content providers pay for use of the network, given the large amount of resources they use. This would be in clear violation of the �network neutrality� principle that had characterized the development of the wireline Internet. Our first goal in this paper is to propose and study possible ways of implementing such payments and of regulating their amount. We introduce a model that includes the internaut�s behavior, the utilities of the ISP and of the content providers, and the monetary flow that involves the internauts, the ISP and content provider, and in particular, the content provider�s revenues from advertisements. We consider various game models and study the resulting equilibrium; they are all combinations of a noncooperative game (in which the service and content providers determine how much they will charge the internauts) with a cooperative one - the content provider and the service provider bargain with each other over payments to one another. We include in our model a possible asymmetric bargaining power which is represented by a parameter (that varies between zero to one). We then extend our model to study the case of several content providers. We also provide a very brief study of the equilibria that arise when one of the content providers enters into an exclusive contract with the ISP.

A new approach to the design of electronic exchanges

Electronic Exchanges are double-sided marketplaces that allows multiple buyers to trade with multiple sellers, with aggregation of demand and supply across the bids to maximize the revenue in the market. In this paper, we propose a new design approach for an one-shot exchange that collects bids from buyers and sellers and clears the market at the end of the bidding period. The main principle of the approach is to decouple the allocation from pricing. It is well known that it is impossible for an exchange with voluntary participation to be efficient and budget-balanced. Budget-balance is a mandatory requirement for an exchange to operate in profit. Our approach is to allocate the trade to maximize the reported values of the agents. The pricing is posed as payoff determination problem that distributes the total payoff fairly to all agents with budget-balance imposed as a constraint. We devise an arbitration scheme by axiomatic approach to solve the payoff determination problem using the added-value concept of game theory.

The Case for Non-Cooperative Multihoming of Users to Access Points in IEEE 802.11 WLANs

In many cases, a mobile user has the option of connecting to one of several IEEE 802.11 access points (APs),each using an independent channel. User throughput in each AP is determined by the number of other users as well as the frame size and physical rate being used. We consider the scenario where users could multihome, i.e., split their traffic amongst all the available APs, based on the throughput they obtain and the price charged. Thus, they are involved in a non-cooperative game with each other. We convert the problem into a fluid model and show that under a pricing scheme, which we call the cost price mechanism, the total system throughput is maximized,i.e., the system suffers no loss of efficiency due to selfish dynamics. We also study the case where the Internet Service Provider (ISP) could charge prices greater than that of the cost price mechanism. We show that even in this case multihoming outperforms unihoming, both in terms of throughput as well as profit to the ISP.

Dynamics between patent latent variables and patent price

This paper focuses on studying the relationship between patent latent variables and patent price. From the existing literature, seven patent latent variables, namely age, generality, originality, foreign filings, technology field, forward citations, and backward citations were identified as having an influence on patent value. We used Ocean Tomo's patent auction price data in this study. We transformed the price and the predictor variables (excluding the dummy variables) to its logarithmic value. The OLS estimates revealed that forward citations and foreign filings were positively correlated to price. Both the variables jointly explained 14.79% of the variance in patent pricing. We did not find sufficient evidence to come up with any definite conclusions on the relationship between price and the variables such as age, technology field, generality, backward citations and originality. The Heckman two-stage sample selection model was used to test for selection bias. (C) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Trade determination in multi-attribute exchanges

Electronic exchanges are double-sided marketplaces that allow multiple buyers to trade with multiple sellers, with aggregation of demand and supply across the bids to maximize the revenue in the market. Two important issues in the design of exchanges are (1) trade determination (determining the number of goods traded between any buyer-seller pair) and (2) pricing. In this paper we address the trade determination issue for one-shot, multi-attribute exchanges that trade multiple units of the same good. The bids are configurable with separable additive price functions over the attributes and each function is continuous and piecewise linear. We model trade determination as mixed integer programming problems for different possible bid structures and show that even in two-attribute exchanges, trade determination is NP-hard for certain bid structures. We also make some observations on the pricing issues that are closely related to the mixed integer formulations.

Opportunistic Scheduling in Cellular Systems in the Presence of Noncooperative Mobiles

A central scheduling problem in wireless communications is that of allocating resources to one of many mobile stations that have a common radio channel. Much attention has been given to the design of efficient and fair scheduling schemes that are centrally controlled by a base station (BS) whose decisions depend on the channel conditions reported by each mobile. The BS is the only entity taking decisions in this framework. The decisions are based on the reports of mobiles on their radio channel conditions. In this paper, we study the scheduling problem from a game-theoretic perspective in which some of the mobiles may be noncooperative or strategic, and may not necessarily report their true channel conditions. We model this situation as a signaling game and study its equilibria. We demonstrate that the only Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) of the signaling game are of the babbling type: the noncooperative mobiles send signals independent of their channel states, the BS simply ignores them, and allocates channels based only on the prior information on the channel statistics. We then propose various approaches to enforce truthful signaling of the radio channel conditions: a pricing approach, an approach based on some knowledge of the mobiles' policies, and an approach that replaces this knowledge by a stochastic approximations approach that combines estimation and control. We further identify other equilibria that involve non-truthful signaling.

A relational contract for water demand management

For necessary goods like water, under supply constraints, fairness considerations lead to negative externalities. The objective of this paper is to design an infinite horizon contract or relational contract (a type of long-term contract) that ensures self-enforcing (instead of court-enforced) behaviour by the agents to mitigate the externality due to fairness issues. In this contract, the consumer is induced to consume at firm-supply level using the threat of higher fair price for future time periods. The pricing mechanism, computed in this paper, internalizes the externality and is shown to be economically efficient and provides revenue sufficiency.

Game theoretic analysis of collusions in nonneutral networks

This paper studies the impact of exclusive contracts between a content provider (CP) and an internet service provider (ISP) in a nonneutral network. We consider a simple linear demand function for the CPs. We studywhen an exclusive contract is benefcial to the colluding pair and evaluate its impact on the noncolluding players at equilibrium. For the case of two CPs and one ISP we show that collusion may not always be benefcial. We derive an explicit condition in terms of the advertisement revenues of the CPs that tells when a collusion is proftable to the colluding entities.

Efectos de la política monetaria en un modelo de precios rígidos en distintas monedas

Resumen: En un modelo dinámico, de dos países y con precios rígidos, este trabajo analiza la transmisión de la política monetaria cuando las empresas fijan sus precios en distintas monedas. Siguiendo el modelo de Betts y Devereux (2000) suponemos que las empresas pueden fijar un único precio para el mercado local y extranjero en moneda del país al cual exportan. Algunas empresas segmentan el mercado por país y otras fijan un único precio en su propia moneda o en la del país vecino. Los precios rígidos en moneda del país vecino aumentan la variabilidad del tipo de cambio y reducen los efectos positivos que la política monetaria tiene sobre el consumo y la tasa de interés real, respecto a una situación donde las empresas sólo segmentan el mercado o fijan un único precio en su propia moneda. En ausencia de segmentación de mercado, a mayor número de empresas que fijen su precio en moneda del país vecino, mayor es el efecto positivo que un shock monetario en el país extranjero tiene sobre su bienestar y el del otro, pero es menor en ambos cuando se produce en el país local.

The Relationship between Risk and Expected Return in Europe

Revised: 2006-07

Going Multinational under Exchange Rate Uncertainty

Published as an article in: Journal of International Money and Finance, 2010, vol. 29, issue 6, pages 1171-1191.

Smiling under stochastic volatility

This paper studies the behavior of the implied volatility function (smile) when the true distribution of the underlying asset is consistent with the stochastic volatility model proposed by Heston (1993). The main result of the paper is to extend previous results applicable to the smile as a whole to alternative degrees of moneyness. The conditions under which the implied volatility function changes whenever there is a change in the parameters associated with Hestons stochastic volatility model for a given degree of moneyness are given.

Los Modelos Implícitos de Valoración de Opciones

[ES] Los modelos implícitos constituyen uno de los enfoques de valoración de opciones alternativos al modelo de Black-Scholes que ha conocido un mayor desarrollo en los últimos años. Dentro de este planteamiento existen diferentes alternativas: los árboles implícitos, los modelos con función de volatilidad determinista y los modelos con función de volatilidad implícita. Todos ellos se construyen a partir de una estimación de la distribución de probabilidades riesgo-neutral del precio futuro del activo subyacente, congruente con los precios de mercado de las opciones negociadas. En consecuencia, los modelos implícitos proporcionan buenos resultados en la valoración de opciones dentro de la muestra. Sin embargo, su comportamiento como instrumento de predicción para opciones fuera de muestra no resulta satisfactorio. En este artículo se analiza la medida en la que este enfoque contribuye a la mejora de la valoración de opciones, tanto desde un punto de vista teórico como práctico.

Report on Knowledge Exchange workshop Price of keeping knowledge: financial streams for digital preservation

In contrast to cost modeling activities, the pricing of services must be simple and transparent. Calculating and thus knowing price structures, would not only help identify the level of detail required for cost modeling of individual instititutions, but also help develop a ”public” market for services as well as clarify the division of task and the modeling of funding and revenue streams for data preservation of public institutions. This workshop has built on the results from the workshop ”The Costs and Benefits of Keeping Knowledge” which took place 11 June 2012 in Copenhagen. This expert workshop aimed at: •Identifying ways for data repositories to abstract from their complicated cost structures and arrive at one transparent pricing structure which can be aligned with available and plausible funding schemes. Those repositories will probably need a stable institutional funding stream for data management and preservation. Are there any estimates for this, absolute or as percentage of overall cost? Part of the revenue will probably have to come through data management fees upon ingest. How could that be priced? Per dataset, per GB or as a percentage of research cost? Will it be necessary to charge access prices, as they contradict the open science paradigm? •What are the price components for pricing individual services, which prices are currently being paid e.g. to commercial providers? What are the description and conditions of the service(s) delivered and guaranteed? •What types of risks are inherent in these pricing schemes? •How can services and prices be defined in an all-inclusive and simple manner, so as to enable researchers to apply for specific amount when asking for funding of data-intensive projects?Please