Early Versus Late Effort in Dynamic Agencies with Unverifiable Information

In this paper we analyze a dynamic agency problem where contracting parties do not know the agent's future productivity at the beginning of the relationship. We consider a two-period model where both the agent and the principal observe the agent's second-period productivity at the end of the first period. This observation is assumed to be non-verifiable information. We compare long-term contracts with short-term contracts with respect to their suitability to motivate effort in both periods. On the one hand, short-term contracts allow for a better fine-tuning of second-period incentives as they can be aligned with the agent's second-period productivity. On the other hand, in short-term contracts first-period effort incentives might be distorted as contracts have to be sequentially optimal. Hence, the difference between long-term and short-term contracts is characterized by a trade-off between inducing effort in the first and in the second period. We analyze the determinants of this trade-off and demonstrate its implications for performance measurement and information system design.

Theories of Militancy in Practice: Explanations of Muslim Terrorism in India

This article analyzes the interaction between theories of radicalization and state responses to militancy in India. Focusing on the interpretation of the increased frequency of terrorist attacks in Indian metropolises in the last decade, the article examines the narratives surrounding those classified as terrorists in the context of rising Muslim militancy in the country. Different state agencies operate with different theories about the links between processes of radicalization and terrorist violence. The scenarios of radicalization underlying legislative efforts to prevent terrorism, the construction of motives by the police, and the interpretation of violence by the judiciary all rely on assumptions about radicalization and violence. Such narratives are used to explain terrorism both to security agencies and to the public; they inform the categories and scenarios of prevention. Prevention relies on detection of future deeds, planning, intentions, and even potential intentions. "Detection" of potential intentions relies on assumptions about specific dispositions. Identification of such dispositions in turn relies on the context-specific theories of the causes of militancy. These determine what "characteristics" of individuals or groups indicate potential threats and form the basis for their categorization as "potentially dangerous." The article explores the cultural contexts of theories of radicalization, focusing on how they are framed by societal understandings of the causes of deviance and the relation between the individual and society emerging in contemporary India. It examines the shift in the perception of threat and the categories of "dangerous others" from a focus on role to a focus on ascriptive identity.

A social network-based approach to assess de facto independence of regulatory agencies

This article uses a policy network perspective to assess the independence of regulatory agencies (RAs) in liberalized public utility sectors. We focus on the de facto independence of RAs from elected politicians, regulatees and other co-regulators. We go further than previous studies, which only undertook a general analysis of the de jure independence of RAs from political authorities. Specifically, we apply a social network analysis (SNA), which concentrates on the attributes and relational profiles of all actors involved in new regulatory arrangements. The concept of de facto independence is applied to the Swiss telecommunications sector in order to provide initial empirical insights. Results clearly show that SNA indicators are an appropriate tool to identify the de facto independence of RAs and can improve knowledge about the issues arising from the emergence of the ‘regulatory State’.

Having your cake and eating it too: Can regulatory agencies be both independent and accountable?

Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) were created in various sectors and on different governmental levels to implement liberalization policies. This paper investigates the link between IRAs' independence, which is said to promote regulatory credibility and the use of technical expertise, and their accountability, which is related to the need for controlling and legitimizing independent regulators. The literature on the regulatory state anticipates a positive relation between the independence and accountability of IRAs, but systematic empirical evidence is still lacking. To tackle this question, this paper measures and compares the independence and the accountability of IRAs in three differentially liberalized sectors in Switzerland (telecommunications, electricity and railways). With the application of Social Network Analysis, this piece of research shows that IRAs can be de facto independent and accountable at the same time, but the two features do not necessarily co-evolve in the same direction.

Regulation of the Telecommunications in Switzerland: A Network Approach to Assess the Regulatory Agencies' Independence

The liberalization process of the Swiss telecommunications sector follows a logic of ‘autonomous adaptation’ to the regulations of the European Union (EU). Switzerland, which is not a Member State of the EU, voluntarily adapts to the European policy without being for- mally required to do so (Sciarini et al., 2004). This process went hand in hand with the partial privatization of the legal statute and assets of the former monopolist and with the re-regulation of the liberalized telecommunications sector.

Regulation and the Management of Expectations - Rating Agencies Revisited

In the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, scholars have begun to revise their conceptions of how market participants interact. While the traditional “rationalist optic” posits market participants who are able to process decisionrelevant information and thereby transform uncertainty into quantifiable risks, the increasingly popular “sociological optic” stresses the role of uncertainty in expectation formation and social conventions for creating confidence in markets. Applications of the sociological optic to concrete regulatory problems are still limited. By subjecting both optics to the same regulatory problem—the role of credit rating agencies (CRAs) and their ratings in capital markets—this paper provides insights into whether the sociological optic offers advice to tackle concrete regulatory problems and discusses the potential of the sociological optic in complementing the rationalist optic. The empirical application suggests that the sociological optic is not only able to improve our understanding of the role of CRAs and their ratings, but also to provide solutions complementary to those posited by the rationalist optic.

Evaluation of Police Patrol Patterns

This paper describes an ArcView extension that allows police planners to design patrol districts and to evaluate them by displaying various performance measures. It uses a spatially distributed queuing system (the Larson Hypercube) to calculate expected travel times, workloads, preventive patrol frequencies, and other variables; and it allows planners to see the unavoidable tradeoffs among their objectives. Using this tool, planners can experiment with various patrol patterns to find those that best meet their Department.s goals. For example, those patrol patterns which are best in terms of average response time don.t do as well as others in terms of workload balance, or those that are best in terms of achieving a uniform response time across different parts of the city don't do as well as others in terms of minimizing inter-district dispatches. There is, of course, no perfect solution for this problem: the facts of the situation force us to balance competing goals. Described here is a way of explicitly weighting the alternative objectives.

Search, Seizure and (False?) Arrest: An Analysis of Fourth Amendment Remedies when Police can Plant Evidence

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures in criminal investigations. The Supreme Court has interpreted this to require that police obtain a warrant prior to search and that illegally seized evidence be excluded from trial. A consensus has developed in the law and economics literature that tort liability for police officers is a superior means of deterring unreasonable searches. We argue that this conclusion depends on the assumption of truth-seeking police, and develop a game-theoretic model to compare the two remedies when some police officers (the bad type) are willing to plant evidence in order to obtain convictions, even though other police (the good type) are not (where this type is private information). We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the asymmetric-information game between the police and a court that seeks to minimize error costs in deciding whether to convict or acquit suspects. In this framework, we show that the exclusionary rule with a warrant requirement leads to superior outcomes (relative to tort liability) in terms of truth-finding function of courts, because the warrant requirement can reduce the scope for bad types of police to plant evidence

Na 1 Nachlass Max Horkheimer, 687 - "Experimental Movie Project", "The Police and Minority Groups" u.a. (p. IX 150.1-17 - IX 152.1-2)

"Experimental Movie Project" (1945-46):; 1. "Below the Surface", Drehbuch des Testfilms, a) als Typoskript vervielfältigt, 46 Blatt, b) als Typoskript vervielfältigt, 26 Blatt, c) als Typoskript vervielfältigt, 26 Blatt, d) als Typoskript vervielfältigt, 26 Blatt "Experimental Movie Project" (1945-46): Memoranden zum Test; 2. 'Notes' 25.4.1946, Typoskript, 1 Blatt; 3. "Memorandum on Experimental Movie Project", 19.4.1946. Typoskript, 3 Blatt; 4. "Memorandum re: 'Below the Surface" (Juli 1945). Typoskript, 2 Blatt; 5. Dore Schary und Allen Rivkin: 'Memorandum, Subject: New Suggested Treatment for 'Below the Surface'", 13.7.1945. Typoskript, 2 Blatt; 6. Hans Richter: "Report about the film script 'Below the surface'", 7. u. 8.7.1945, a) Typoskript, 1 Blatt, b) Typoskript, 1 Blatt; 7. Hans Richter: Bestätigung der Vereinbarung mit dem American Jewish Committee, 3.7.1945. Typoskript, 1 Blatt; 8. "Notes and Suggestions re Experimental Motion Picture", Juni 1945. Typoskript, 2 Blatt; 9. Siegfried Kracauer; "Suggestions for the Dialogue" (4.4.1945). Typoskript, 3 Blatt; 10. "Motion Picture", März 1945. Typoskript, 5 Blatt; 11. "Project on a Test film", a) Typoskript, 4 Blatt, b) Typoskript, 5 Blatt; 12. "Memorandum re: 'Below the Surface'", a) Typoskript, 3 Blatt, b) Typoskript mit eigenhändigen Korrekturen von Theodor W. Adorno, 3 Blatt; "Experimental Movie Project" (1945-46): Korrespondenz zum Test-Film-Projekt:; 13. Friedrich Pollock: 1 Brief an Max Horkheimer, Santa Monica, California, 12.10.1945; 14. Theodor W. Adorno: 2 Briefe an Max Horkheimer, Los Angeles und Santa Monica, California, 1945; 15. Joseph M. Proskauer: 1 Brief von Max Horkheimer, o.O., 29.6.1945, 1 Brief mit Unterschrift an Max Horkheimer, o.O., o.D., 3 Blatt; 16. Alexander Hackenschmied, 1 Brief mit Unterschrift an Max Horkheimer, New York, 19.6.1945, 1 Blatt; 17. Gilbert Gabriel: 1 Brief von John Slawson, o.O., 22.3.1945, 2 Blatt; "The Police and Minority Groups" (1946):; 1. "The Police and Minority Groups". Typoskript, 2 Blatt; 2. Robert W. Kenny: "Police and Minority Groups - an Experiment". Als Typoskript vervielfältigt, 17 Blatt; 3. Davis McEntire, Robert B. Powers: "Police Training Bulletin. A Guide to Race Relations for Police Officers", State of California, 1946, 38 Seiten; Max Horkheimer: "Memorandum on a Study of Race Hatred in Post-War Germany" (1946):; 1. Memorandum, a) Typoskript, 8 Blatt, b) Typoskript mit eigenhändigen und handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 6 Blatt, c) Typoskript, 5 Blatt, d) Teilstück, Typoskript mit eigenhändigen Korrekturen, 1 Blatt e) Typoskript mit eigenhändigen Korrekturen, 5 Blatt, f) Teilstück, Typoskript mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 2 Blatt, g) Typoskript mit eigenhändigen Korrekturen, 7 Blatt, h) Teilstück, Typoskript mit eigenhändigen Korrekturen und Ergänzungen, 1 Blatt, i) Typoskript, 2 Blatt; 2. Theodor W. Adorno: "Ad Memorandum Neumann", Manuskript, 3 Blatt;

Houston police officer attitudes towards the mentally ill: CIT trained and non-CIT trained

The purpose of this study was to develop a better understanding of police officer attitudes towards the mentally ill and what impact that might have on their behavior. Focused on the effects of Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) training on Houston police officers, this research wanted to determine if CIT training decreases attitudes of authoritarianism and increases attitudes of self-efficacy in dealing with the mentally ill—other factors assessed were age, years of service, ethnicity, and gender. Results confirmed that CIT training had an effect on an officer's attitudes with CIT officers being less authoritarian and having more self-efficacy with respect to dealing with the mentally ill as compared to non-CIT officers. Because of these results, this study could offer support in tailoring training programs to have successful officer-mentally ill person interactions. ^