Executive Order Number Sixty One, 1997

Assigns responsibility to coordinate disparate information technology and to provide enterprise-wide information technology services to the exectutive branch agencies to the Information Technology Services (ITS) director appointed by the Governor.

Communication, Coordination, and Efficiency in Evolutionary One-population Models

We analyze the role of commitment in pre-play communication for ensuring efficient evolutionarily stable outcomes in coordination games. All players are a priori identical as they are drawn from the same population. In games where efficient outcomes can be reached by players coordinating on the same action we find commitment to be necessary to enforce efficiency. In games where efficienct outcomes only result from play of different actions, communication without commitment is most effective although efficiency can no longer be guaranteed. Only when there are many messages then inefficient outcomes are negligible as their basins of attraction become very small.

Not one odour but two: A new model for nestmate recognition.

Recognition systems play a key role in a range of biological processes, including mate choice, immune defence and altruistic behaviour. Social insects provide an excellent model for studying recognition systems because workers need to discriminate between nestmates and non-nestmates, enabling them to direct altruistic behaviour towards closer kin and to repel potential invaders. However, the level of aggression directed towards conspecific intruders can vary enormously, even among workers within the same colony. This is usually attributed to differences in the aggression thresholds of individuals or to workers having different roles within the colony. Recent evidence from the weaver ant Oecophylla smaragdina suggests that this does not tell the whole story. Here I propose a new model for nestmate recognition based on a vector template derived from both the individual's innate odour and the shared colony odour. This model accounts for the recent findings concerning weaver ants, and also provides an alternative explanation for why the level of aggression expressed by a colony decreases as the diversity within the colony increases, even when odour is well-mixed. The model makes additional predictions that are easily tested, and represents a significant advance in our conceptualisation of recognition systems.

A One-Shot Prisoners Dilemma with Procedural Utility

This article introduces a model of rationality that combines procedural utility over actions with consequential utility over payoffs. It applies the model to the Prisoners Dilemma and shows that empirically observed cooperative behaviors can be rationally explained by a procedural utility for cooperation. The model characterizes the situations in which cooperation emerges as a Nash equilibrium. When rational individuals are not solely concerned by the consequences of their behavior but also care for the process by which these consequences are obtained, there is no one single rational solution to a Prisoners Dilemma. Rational behavior depends on the payoffs at stake and on the procedural utility of individuals. In this manner, this model of procedural utility reflects how ethical considerations, social norms or emotions can transform a game of consequences.

One Un Programme 2010 Annual Report Many Strenghts, One Mission United Nations Cape Verde

This is the second annual report on the One UN Programme in Cape Verde, covering the year 2010. The report high-lights joint efforts and achievements of the UN System, the Government and Civil Society within the framework of the One Programme. It includes both programmatic and financial reporting. It gives concrete examples of the development impact of the “Cape Verde Transition Fund” -- both how those funds were used, and how they complemented additional resources available to the UN system (e.g. core funds plus contributions resulting from other resource mobilization efforts). The report shows how UN system activities have supported national priorities as defined in the Cape Verdean Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (GPRSP II).

Executive Order Number Fifty-One, December 8, 2006

Executive order signed by Governor Thomas Vilsck

Family dynamics in face of Alzheimer's in one of its members

Abstract OBJECTIVE To understand the family dynamics when there is a member in the residence with Alzheimer's disease. METHOD A study of qualitative approach, using the creative sensitive method (CSM), and with participation of two families who had a member with Alzheimer's disease at home. RESULTS Three categories emerged: Effects of Alzheimer's disease and the family dynamics; Development process of Alzheimer's disease and Coping strategies in face of the disease. CONCLUSION It was possible to know the manifestations and consequences of Alzheimer's disease in the family, such as mutual help, the mobilization of resources to activate memories of the past, spirituality and faith. There was also understanding of the structure of family dynamics.

Year One Accomplishments, 2002

Part of Iowa's Water Ambient monitoring Program, produced by the Iowa Department of Natural Resources.

One Iowa Report, June/July 2007

This bi-monthly newsletter will keep Iowans informed of the important issues and events that are taking place both here in the Capitol and around the state.

One Iowa Report, April/May 2007

This bi-monthly newsletter will keep Iowans informed of the important issues and events that are taking place both here in the Capitol and around the state.

A polynomial algorithm for special case of the one-machine scheduling problem with time-lags

The standard one-machine scheduling problem consists in schedulinga set of jobs in one machine which can handle only one job at atime, minimizing the maximum lateness. Each job is available forprocessing at its release date, requires a known processing timeand after finishing the processing, it is delivery after a certaintime. There also can exists precedence constraints between pairsof jobs, requiring that the first jobs must be completed beforethe second job can start. An extension of this problem consistsin assigning a time interval between the processing of the jobsassociated with the precedence constrains, known by finish-starttime-lags. In presence of this constraints, the problem is NP-hardeven if preemption is allowed. In this work, we consider a specialcase of the one-machine preemption scheduling problem with time-lags, where the time-lags have a chain form, and propose apolynomial algorithm to solve it. The algorithm consist in apolynomial number of calls of the preemption version of the LongestTail Heuristic. One of the applicability of the method is to obtainlower bounds for NP-hard one-machine and job-shop schedulingproblems. We present some computational results of thisapplication, followed by some conclusions.

Minimax lower bounds for the two-armed bandit problem

We obtain minimax lower bounds on the regret for the classicaltwo--armed bandit problem. We provide a finite--sample minimax version of the well--known log $n$ asymptotic lower bound of Lai and Robbins. Also, in contrast to the log $n$ asymptotic results on the regret, we show that the minimax regret is achieved by mere random guessing under fairly mild conditions on the set of allowable configurations of the two arms. That is, we show that for {\sl every} allocation rule and for {\sl every} $n$, there is a configuration such that the regret at time $n$ is at least 1 -- $\epsilon$ times the regret of random guessing, where $\epsilon$ is any small positive constant.

One person in the battlefield is not a warrior: Self-construal, perceived ability to make a difference, and socially responsible behavior

We suggest that cultivating an individual's connectedness to others promotes sociallyresponsible behavior both directly and indirectly through increased perceived abilityto make a difference. Individuals whose interdependent self is more prominent feel theyhave more of an impact on larger scale societal outcomes and, therefore, engage more insocially responsible behaviors than do individuals whose independent self is moreprominent. We test these hypotheses in two experiments in which participants makefinancial contributions or exert an effort for a social cause. In a survey, we find thatperceived effectiveness mediates the effect of self-construal on socially responsibleconsumption.