Audit report on the Page County Landfill Association for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2007

Audit report on the Page County Landfill Association for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2007

Fiscal decentralization policies and sub-national government debt in evolving federations

As part of a process of democratization, many countries spanning Europe, Latin Amertica, Africa, and Asia are reorganizing their governments bydevolving fiscal responsibility and authority to newly empowered regionaland local governments. Although decentralization in each country proceedsdifferently, a common element tends to be an initially heavy relianceon central government grants to fund regional spending. We develop atheoretical model of regional borrowing decisions in which the incentivesfor regional borrowing depend crucially on how the regions expect thefederal system of finance to evolve. We examine the implications of themodel using data on Spanish regions for the period 1984-1995 and findevidence that regions may be borrowing inefficiently in response toincentives imbedded in the Spanish system of fiscal decentralization.

Debt sustainability in historical perspective: The role of fiscal repression

This article examines the debt history of two contenders for European hegemony: 16th-centurySpain and 18th-century Britain. We analyze their fiscal behavior using measures of overborrowingand fiscal policy functions. Our results suggest that stringency was not key for Britain ssuccess in avoiding default. Instead, fiscal repression allowed the United Kingdom to borrowat below-market rates, thereby outspending its continental rivals.

Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR) of the Iowa Public Employees Retirement System (IPERS) for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2007

Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR) of the Iowa Public Employees Retirement System (IPERS) for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2007

Optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a currency union

We lay out a tractable model for fiscal and monetary policy analysis in a currency union, and study its implications for the optimal design of such policies. Monetary policy is conducted by a common central bank, which sets the interest rate for the union as a whole. Fiscal policy is implemented at the countrylevel, through the choice of government spending. The model incorporates country-specific shocks and nominal rigidities. Under our assumptions, the optimal cooperative policy arrangement requires that inflation be stabilized at the union level by the common central bank, while fiscal policy is used by each country for stabilization purposes. By contrast, when the fiscal authorities act in a non-coordinated way, their joint actions lead to a suboptimal outcome, and make the common central bank face a trade-off between inflation and output gap stabilization at the union level.

The sustainable debts of Philip II: A reconstruction of Castile's fiscal position, 1566-1596

The defaults of Philip II have attained mythical status as the origin of sovereigndebt crises. We reassess the fiscal position of Habsburg Castile, derivingcomprehensive estimates of revenue, debt, and expenditure from new archivaldata. The king s debts were sustainable. Primary surpluses were large and rising.Debt-to-revenue ratios remained broadly unchanged during Philip s reign.Castilian finances in the sixteenth century compare favorably with those of otherearly modern fiscal states at the height of their imperial ambitions, includingBritain. The defaults of Philip II therefore reflected short-term liquidity crises,and were not a sign of unsustainable debts.

Nota sinonímica em Chinaia Bruner & Metcalf (Hemiptera, Cicadellidae, Neocoelidiinae)

Uma nova sinonímia é proposta: Chinaia caprella Kramer, 1958 = Neocoelidiana chlorata DeLong & Kolbe, 1975 syn. nov. A espécie é redescrita e ilustrada.

Nota e espécies novas de Cyrtinus LeConte (Coleoptera, Cerambycidae, Lamiinae, Cyrtinini) da Região Neotropical

São descritas novas espécies de Cyrtinus LeConte, 1852: C. hispidus sp. nov. do Equador (Pichincha); C. bifasciatus sp. nov. do Panamá (Colón) e da Costa Rica, C. umbus sp. nov. (Guanacaste) e C. melzeri sp. nov. (Cartago). Acrescentam-se ocorrência e figura de C. penicillatus (Bates, 1885).

G-1A Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs, Fiscal Year 2008 (July 1, 2007 - June 30, 2008)

This report contains information on the Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs. Programs included are FIP (Iowa’s TANF program), Title IV-D (Child Support), Food Stamps (USDA Food Assistance Program), Title XIX (Medicaid), Title XX (Social Services Block Grant), Juvenile Parole, State Supplemental Assistance, Other, Food Stamp Fraud, FIP Fraud, RCA (Refugee Cash Assistance) Fraud, and a total for all the programs. This report is issued annually at the end of the fiscal year.

G-1A Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs, Fiscal Year 2007 (July 1, 2006 - June 30, 2007)

This report contains information on the Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs. Programs included are FIP (Iowa’s TANF program), Title IV-D (Child Support), Food Stamps (USDA Food Assistance Program), Title XIX (Medicaid), Title XX (Social Services Block Grant), Juvenile Parole, State Supplemental Assistance, Other, Food Stamp Fraud, FIP Fraud, RCA (Refugee Cash Assistance) Fraud, and a total for all the programs. This report is issued annually at the end of the fiscal year.

G-1A Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs, Fiscal Year 2005 (July 1, 2004 - June 30, 2005)

This report contains information on the Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs. Programs included are FIP (Iowa’s TANF program), Title IV-D (Child Support), Food Stamps (USDA Food Assistance Program), Title XIX (Medicaid), Title XX (Social Services Block Grant), Juvenile Parole, State Supplemental Assistance, Other, Food Stamp Fraud, FIP Fraud, RCA (Refugee Cash Assistance) Fraud, and a total for all the programs. This report is issued annually at the end of the fiscal year.

G-1A Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs, Fiscal Year 2006 (July 1, 2005 - June 30, 2006)

This report contains information on the Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs. Programs included are FIP (Iowa’s TANF program), Title IV-D (Child Support), Food Stamps (USDA Food Assistance Program), Title XIX (Medicaid), Title XX (Social Services Block Grant), Juvenile Parole, State Supplemental Assistance, Other, Food Stamp Fraud, FIP Fraud, RCA (Refugee Cash Assistance) Fraud, and a total for all the programs. This report is issued annually at the end of the fiscal year.

G-1A Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs, Fiscal Year 2004 (July 1, 2003 - June 30, 2004)

This report contains information on the Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs. Programs included are FIP (Iowa’s TANF program), Title IV-D (Child Support), Food Stamps (USDA Food Assistance Program), Title XIX (Medicaid), Title XX (Social Services Block Grant), Juvenile Parole, State Supplemental Assistance, Other, Food Stamp Fraud, FIP Fraud, RCA (Refugee Cash Assistance) Fraud, and a total for all the programs. This report is issued annually at the end of the fiscal year.

G-1A Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs, Fiscal Year 2001 (July 1, 2000 - June 30, 2001)

This report contains information on the Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs. Programs included are FIP (Iowa’s TANF program), Title IV-D (Child Support), Food Stamps (USDA Food Assistance Program), Title XIX (Medicaid), Title XX (Social Services Block Grant), Juvenile Parole, State Supplemental Assistance, Other, Food Stamp Fraud, FIP Fraud, RCA (Refugee Cash Assistance) Fraud, and a total for all the programs. This report is issued annually at the end of the fiscal year.

Fiscal decentralization in Spain: An asymmetric transition to democracy

Asymmetric fiscal decentralization, by which we mean different fiscal arrangements between the central government and different groups of, or individual, lower-level governments, may be justified from an economic efficiency perspective. As argued by Tiebout (1956), Oates (1972) and others, a decentralized system of regional and local governments is better able to accommodate differences in tastes for public goods and services. This efficiency argument calls for decentralization of fiscal authority to regional and local governments, but not necessarily asymmetric decentralization. However, when the differences in tastes for public goods and services arise out of differences in history, culture and language across regions of a country, asymmetric treatment may be justified. History, culture and language may influence how a group of people (a region) views autonomy, independence and fiscal authority. Some regions may have had experience with autonomous government in the past, they may have a culture that is strongly reliant upon (or leery of) the central government, or they may be fearful of losing their separate languages if they do not have special arrangements. To accommodate differences in taste for independence, autonomy, and fiscal authority, it may be necessary to have different fiscal arrangements between the central government and the different regions comprising the country.