The Political Logic of Disintegration: Seven Lessons from the Soviet Collapse. CEPS Essay (No. 1), September 2012

In short, the European Union, as we know it, no longer exists. The very foundations on which it was built are eroding. Shared memories of the Second World War have faded away – half the 15- and 16-year-olds in German high schools do not know that Hitler was a dictator, while a third believe that he protected human rights. The collapse of the Soviet Union has stripped away the geopolitical rationale for European unity. The democratic welfare state that was at the heart of the post-war political consensus is under siege by, among other things, sheer demographics. And the prosperity that bolstered the European project’s political legitimacy is vanishing. More than six out of ten Europeans believe that the lives of today’s children will be more difficult than those of people from their own generation. Against this background, how unthinkable is the EU’s disintegration? Should Europeans make the mistake of taking the Union for granted? Should they assume that the Union would not collapse because it should not collapse? Here, Europe’s capacity to learn from the Soviet precedent could play a crucial part. For the very survival of the EU may depend on its leaders’ ability to manage a similar mix of political, economic and psychological factors that were in play in the process of the Soviet collapse. The game of disintegration is primarily a political one driven much more by the perceptions and misperceptions of the political actors than simply by the constellation of the structural factors – institutional and economic.

Can Policy Make Us Happier? Individual characteristics socioeconomic factors, and life satisfaction in Central and Eastern Europe. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 22/November 2011

In the last decade, Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries have witnessed a rapid economic convergence vis-à-vis Western Europe. However, this rapid growth has not been matched by a similarly rapid increase in life satisfaction, which has remained low in the European context. This paper sets out to address this conundrum, by looking at the individual and macro-level determinants of individual life satisfaction in ten CEE countries. The results highlight that while Central and Eastern Europeans share the same individual determinants of happiness as people in the West (despite some significant cross-country variation), macroeconomic and institutional differences are the key factors behind the lack of convergence in life satisfaction. On the macroeconomic side, GDP growth is still a source of increasing well-being, but the happiness bonus associated with it is becoming smaller. The different levels of individual happiness in CEE are therefore mostly determined by institutional factors such as corruption, government spending and decentralisation, making policies aimed at enhancing institutional quality capable of bringing about substantial improvements in the overall life satisfaction of the people in the region.

spotlight europe #2015/03 — August 2015: Money or Democracy? Greece and the Euro Dilemma

The negotiations on the third bailout package for Greece are still going on, but the euro area has already paid a high price for it. The compromise on which it is based is clearly very controversial. Some of its critics believe that it does not make sense in economic terms, whereas others point out that it may have an adverse political effect. But what in fact is Greece actually supposed to be doing, and what does all this mean with regard to sovereignty and democracy?

The EU’s Enlargement Strategy 2015: Will the ‘new elements’ make a difference? CEPS Commentary, 26 November 2015

After an unprecedented delay, the European Commission adopted its 2015 Enlargement Package on November 10th, together with the annual reports on each of the candidate and prospective candidate countries. In this Commentary, Erwan Fouéré offers his assessment of what Enlargement Commissioner Johannes Hahn called the “new elements” in the package, including an “overarching strategy for the next 4 years” (coinciding with the remainder of the Commission’s mandate), “much clearer guidance to the countries on what they have to focus on in the year ahead”, as well as on the “longer-term results that are needed to meet EU expectations”.

Modi's Reform Agenda: Change You Can Believe In? Asia Policy Brief 2015/04, November 2015

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi entered office with a historic political mandate. For the first time in thirty years, a single party won a majority of seats in the lower house of Parliament (Lok Sabha). However, Modi faces skyhigh expectations to fulfill his campaign promises of getting India’s economy back on track. Eighteen months into his government’s term and in the wake of electoral defeats in the states of Delhi and Bihar, questions are being raised about its economic performance. While the Modi government has stabilized India’s macroeconomy and announced a series of incremental economic reforms, more sweeping changes have fallen victim to India’s nettlesome domestic politics, including roadblocks within the ruling alliance.

Automatic Fiscal Stabiliser: Make it happen! EPC Discussion Paper, 2 May 2016

The eurozone crisis triggered a whole new series of innovations in EU economic governance in order to make the Union more resilient for the next economic downswing. But one of the more persistent issues are the socio-economic divergences between member states, identified by the Five Presidents’ Report as a major problem in the functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Debates took place in recent years about automatic stabilisers, and more specifically about the possibility of introducing an unemployment insurance within the EMU. While the need for some form of fiscal risk-sharing has become a dominant view in expert circles, there has been much less progress among the main political parties and stakeholders. In this study, Regula Hess and László Andor analyse the political feasibility of the adoption of an automatic fiscal stabiliser (AFS) for the eurozone by evaluating actors’ positions towards three distinctive proposals: 1) cyclical shock insurance, 2) reinsurance, 3) a European basic unemployment insurance; they included an empirical case study of France and Germany as the most relevant players within the intergovernmental bargaining constellation. Although the authors realise the current political context makes the adoption of an AFS improbable, Hess and Andor encourage stakeholders to further pursue the discussion, as windows of opportunities can open at any time, and even give some suggestions on what the parameters of the most feasible proposal might be.

Drosophila melanogaster larvae make nutritional choices that minimize developmental time

Organisms from slime moulds to humans carefully regulate their macronutrient intake to optimize a wide range of life history characters including survival, stress resistance, and reproductive success. However, life history characters often differ in their response to nutrition, forcing organisms to make foraging decisions while balancing the trade-offs between these effects. To date, we have a limited understanding of how the nutritional environment shapes the relationship between life history characters and foraging decisions. To gain insight into the problem, we used a geometric framework for nutrition to assess how the protein and carbohydrate content of the larval diet affected key life history traits in the fruit fly, Drosophila melanogaster. In no-choice assays, survival from egg to pupae, female and male body size, and ovariole number - a proxy for female fecundity - were maximized at the highest protein to carbohydrate (P:C) ratio (1.5:1). In contrast, development time was minimized at intermediate P:C ratios, around 1:2. Next, we subjected larvae to two-choice tests to determine how they regulated their protein and carbohydrate intake in relation to these life history traits. Our results show that larvae targeted their consumption to P:C ratios that minimized development time. Finally, we examined whether adult females also chose to lay their eggs in the P:C ratios that minimized developmental time. Using a three-choice assay, we found that adult females preferentially laid their eggs in food P:C ratios that were suboptimal for all larval life history traits. Our results demonstrate that D. melanogaster larvae make foraging decisions that trade-off developmental time with body size, ovariole number, and survival. In addition, adult females make oviposition decisions that do not appear to benefit the larvae. We propose that these decisions may reflect the living nature of the larval nutritional environment in rotting fruit. These studies illustrate the interaction between the nutritional environment, life history traits, and foraging choices in D. melanogaster, and lend insight into the ecology of their foraging decisions.