Iowa Motor Fuel Tax Monthly Reports, March 2011

The monthly fuel tax report from Iowa Department of Transportation to the Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance.

Iowa Motor Fuel Tax Monthly Reports, August 2010

The monthly fuel tax report from Iowa Department of Transportation to the Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance.

Tax Exempt Property Report, 2008

Iowa law requires each assessor in the state to value tax exempt property within his or her jurisdiction, and report such values to the Director of Revenue each year. The following report lists the 2009 actual valuations of tax exempt property for the following types of property: religious institutions, literary societies and educational institutions, low rent housing, associations of war veterans, charitable and benevolent societies, libraries and art galleries, dwelling unit property, homes for soldiers, and racetracks. Also presented in this report are comparative 2008 exempt property values.

Tax Exempt Property Report, 2009

Iowa law requires each assessor in the state to value tax exempt property within his or her jurisdiction, and report such values to the Director of Revenue each year. The following report lists the 2009 actual valuations of tax exempt property for the following types of property: religious institutions, literary societies and educational institutions, low rent housing, associations of war veterans, charitable and benevolent societies, libraries and art galleries, dwelling unit property, homes for soldiers, and racetracks. Also presented in this report are comparative 2008 exempt property values.

Tax Exempt Property Report, 2010

Iowa law requires each assessor in the state to value tax exempt property within his or her jurisdiction, and report such values to the Director of Revenue each year. The following report lists the 2009 actual valuations of tax exempt property for the following types of property: religious institutions, literary societies and educational institutions, low rent housing, associations of war veterans, charitable and benevolent societies, libraries and art galleries, dwelling unit property, homes for soldiers, and racetracks. Also presented in this report are comparative 2008 exempt property values.

Cigarette Tax October, 2010

This is a report for the Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance about the receipts on cigarettes and tobacco for each month of the year. This receipt is the tax of each sale of cigarettes and tobacco.

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Tax Refund Loans: High Costs for Quick Cash, January 2011

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Tax Refund Loans: High Costs for Quick Cash

Multicopy suppression of a gacA mutation by the infC operon in Pseudomonas fluorescens CHA0: competition with the global translational regulator RsmA.

The gacA gene of the biocontrol strain Pseudomonas fluorescens CHA0 codes for a response regulator which, together with the sensor kinase GacS (=LemA), is required for the production of exoenzymes and secondary metabolites involved in biocontrol, including hydrogen cyanide (HCN). A gacA multicopy suppressor was isolated from a cosmid library of strain CHA0 and identified as the infC-rpmI-rplT operon, which encodes the translation initiation factor IF3 and the ribosomal proteins L35 and L20. The efficiency of suppression was about 30%, as determined by the use of a GacA-controlled reporter construct, i.e. a translational hcnA'-'lacZ fusion. Overexpression of the rsmA gene (coding for a global translational repressor) reversed the suppressive effect of the amplified infC operon. This finding suggests that some product(s) of the infC operon can compete with RsmA at the level of translation in P. fluorescens CHA0 and that important biocontrol traits can be regulated at this level.

Tax reforms and inequality: theoretical and empirical implications

In this paper we examine the effect of tax policy on the relationship between inequality and growth in a two-sector non-scale model. With non-scale models, the longrun equilibrium growth rate is determined by technological parameters and it is independent of macroeconomic policy instruments. However, this fact does not imply that fiscal policy is unimportant for long-run economic performance. It indeed has important effects on the different levels of key economic variables such as per capita stock of capital and output. Hence, although the economy grows at the same rate across steady states, the bases for economic growth may be different.The model has three essential features. First, we explicitly model skill accumulation, second, we introduce government finance into the production function, and we introduce an income tax to mirror the fiscal events of the 1980¿s and 1990¿s in the US. The fact that the non-scale model is associated with higher order dynamics enables it to replicate the distinctly non-linear nature of inequality in the US with relative ease. The results derived in this paper attract attention to the fact that the non-scale growth model does not only fit the US data well for the long-run (Jones, 1995b) but also that it possesses unique abilities in explaining short term fluctuations of the economy. It is shown that during transition the response of the relative simulated wage to changes in the tax code is rather non-monotonic, quite in accordance to the US inequality pattern in the 1980¿s and early 1990¿s.More specifically, we have analyzed in detail the dynamics following the simulation of an isolated tax decrease and an isolated tax increase. So, after a tax decrease the skill premium follows a lower trajectory than the one it would follow without a tax decrease. Hence we are able to reduce inequality for several periods after the fiscal shock. On the contrary, following a tax increase, the evolution of the skill premium remains above the trajectory carried on by the skill premium under a situation with no tax increase. Consequently, a tax increase would imply a higher level of inequality in the economy

Is there a connection between the tax administration and the political power?

This paper offers empirical evidence from Spain of a connection between the tax administration and the political power. Firstly, the regional tax administration is not immune to the budgetary situation of regional government, and tends to exert a greater (or lesser) effort in tax collection the greater (or lower) the (expected) public deficit. At the same time, the system of unconditional grants from the central layer of government provokes an ¿income effect¿ which disincentivises the efforts of the tax administration. Secondly, these efforts also decrease when the margin to lose a parliamentary seat in an electoral district is cut, although the importance of this disincentive decreases according to the parliamentary strength of the incumbent

Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain

We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.

The effects of tax deductibility on the mix of property taxes and use charges: an empirical analysis of the spanish case

This paper tests some hypothesis about the determinants of the local tax structure. In particular, we focus on the effects that the property tax deductibility in the national income tax has on the relative use of the property tax and user charges. We deal with the incentive effects that local governments face regarding the different sources of revenue by means of a model in which the local tax structure and the level of public expenditure arise as a result of the maximizing behaviour of local politicians subject to the economic effects of the tax system. We attempt to test the hypothesis developed with data corresponding to a set of Spanish municipalities during the period 1987-9l. We find that tax deductibility provides incentives to raise revenues from the property tax but does not introduce a biass against user charges or in favor of overall spending growth

The empirics of spatial competition: evidence from European regions

The New Economic Geography literature allows detailed analysis of the factors that determine the location decisions of firms in integrated markets. However, the competitive process is modelled in a rather rudimentary way, and the empirical evidence has usually been obtained from reduced-form econometric specifications. This study describes a structural model that takes into account strategic interactions between firms. We investigate the relationship between the degree of perceived competition ¿ not only from local firms but from firms in other regions ¿ and geographic concentration. The preliminary results indicate that, in aggregate terms, local firms present stronger competition than firms in other regions. Moreover, it is confirmed that greater geographical concentration of production reduces market power, due to the intensification of local competition; however, its impact on production costs is unclear.

Tax differentials and agglomeration economies in intraregional firm location

This paper analyses empirically how differences in local taxes affect the intraregional location of new manufacturing plants. These effects are examined within the random profit maximization framework while accounting for the presence of different types of agglomeration economies (localization/ urbanization/ Jacobs¿ economies) at the municipal level. We look at the location decision of more than 10,000 establishments locating between 1996 and 2003 across more than 400 municipalities in Catalonia, a Spanish region. It is necessary to restrict the choice set to the local labor market and, above all, to control for agglomeration economies so as to identify the effects of taxes on the location of new establishments.