Iowa Homeland Security & Emergency Management Division Performance Report, FY 2005

Agency Performance Report

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, January 2006

Supplemental Security Income Program January 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, December 2005

Supplemental Security Income Program December 2005

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, February 2006

Supplemental Security Income Program, February 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, April 2006

Supplemental Security Income Program, April 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, March 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, March 2006

Social Security in Theory and Practice (II): Efficiency Theories, Narrative Theories, and Implications for Reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forces create and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "government economizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory". The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, July 2006

Supplemental Security Income Program, May 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, May 2006

Supplemental Security Income Program, May 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, June 2006

Supplemental Security Income Program, May 2006

Assessing the Political Viability of Labour Market Reform: The Case of Employment Protection

We analyze the political support for employment protection legislation. Unlike my previous work on the same topic, this paper pays a lot of attention to the role of obsolescence in the growth process. In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employees trade off lower living standards (because employment protection maintains workers in less productive activities) against longer job duration. The support for employment protection will then depend on the value of the latter relative to the cost of the former. We highlight two key deeterminants of this trade-off: first, the workers' bargaining power, second, the economy's growth rate-more precisely its rate of creative destruction.

Public Employment Relations Board - Notification Letter, July 26, 2006

State Audit Reports - Notification Letter

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, August 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, August 2006

Body Size, Activity, Employment and Wages in Europe: A First Approach

In this article we present the first empirical analysis on the associations between body size, activity, employment and wages for several European countries. The main advantage of the present work with respect to the previous literature is offered by the comparability of the data and its large geographical coverage. According to our results, for Spanish women, being obese is associated with both a 9% lower wage and probability of being employed, while for Swedish and Danish, obesity is associated with a 12% lower probability of being employed, and a 10% lower wage respectively. In Belgium, obesity is associated with a 19% lower probability of being employed for men. These robust estimates are strongly informative and may be used as a simple statistical rule of thumb to decide the countries in which lab and field experiments should be run.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, September 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program produced by the Department of Human Services