Don’t complicate it even further: Macroeconomic Conditionality as a Substitute for new Structural Reform Contracts. European Policy Brief No. 15, May 2013

The idea of introducing contracts between Member States and the EU on structural reforms has its merits, it also has several disadvantages. Most notably, the contracts risk rendering European economic governance even more complex and cumbersome. It is therefore sensible to first try to integrate the structural reform contracts into one of the foreseen economic governance instruments. This Policy Brief argues that macroeconomic conditionality can serve this purpose. With some minor reforms, it could even become a full-fledged substitute for structural reform contracts – without suffering some of latter’s disadvantages.

The European Power Hierarchy, Member State Trust, and Public Support for the Common Security and Defense Policy. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 15 No. 2, August 2015

Existing studies focus on overall support for European integration while less work has been done on explaining public opinion on specific policy areas, such as the development of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). We hypothesize that the probability of supporting a CSDP increases with greater levels of trust in the European Union member states, most notably the more powerful members. This variable is critical since integration’s development is influenced strongly by, and dependent on, the resources of the relatively more powerful European member states. Binary logistic regression analyses using pooled repeated cross-sectional data from the Eurobarometer surveys conducted from 1992 to 1997 among individuals of 11 member states largely support these claims.